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ABSTRACT 
Prison Days: Incarceration and Punishment in Modern Iran 
Golnar Nikpour 
 
The Iranian prison is the subject of intense scrutiny for both opponents and supporters of the 
contemporary Islamic Republic. Despite these concerns, the longer history of Iranian crime and 
punishment has been given short shrift by scholars and political analysts alike. The 
historiographical silence on the history of confinement in modern Iran runs counter to an earlier 
Iranian intellectual trend, which took it as axiomatic that to live an ethical life meant eventual 
incarceration and probable torture. This dissertation argues that the prison has been a preeminent 
site from which modern discourses on rights, citizenship, justice, and the law have been staged, 
contested, and enacted. Through a study of previously unremarked on archives I argue that the 
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“We are prisoners entangled in fear and hope but still 
In this fear and hope my heart is elsewhere 
In this tumultuous city full of turmoil I am happy 




— Mehdi Akhavan-Sales 
From “Me, This Autumn in Prison”1 










	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The translation of this poem, like all of the translations in this dissertation, are my own unless otherwise noted. 
Akhavān-Sālis, Mahdi. Sih Kitāb. [Three Books.] Tehran: Zimistān, 1385 / 2006. Print, 19-24. In general, 
throughout this dissertation, I have used the IJMES transliteration system for Persian, except in cases of proper 






On the Significance of the Iranian Prison 
  
 
In the winter of 2005, the Department of Cultural Heritage in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
announced that Qasr Prison, the first modern prison built in Iran and a fixture of its penal system 
from the first years of Pahlavi rule in the 1920s until 2008, would be transformed into a national 
museum and park. In the remade Qasr, which re-opened its doors in the summer of 2013, visitors 
can now explore general prisoner blocks as well as the cells of select political prisoners held 
during Pahlavi rule and commemorated by the Islamic state as revolutionary heroes. The 
entrance of the compound has been rebuilt as a park, with walkways in which visitors can go for 
leisurely strolls while learning about the punishment techniques and famous prisoners of the 
ancien régime.2 (Fig. 1, Fig. 2) The re-opening of Qasr-as-museum is just the most recent 
instance of the Islamic Republic’s memorialization of the penal record of its predecessor, as the 
cultural wing of the current regime has made something of an industry out of selectively 
remembering Iranian punishments past. To this end, Qasr is not the only former Pahlavi penal 
site repurposed as a museum in the Islamic Republic. Central Tehran’s ‘Ibrat (“Example”) 
Museum, praised as one of the city’s top tourist attractions by international travel guides,3 invites 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For news of the announcement of Qasr’s transformation into a museum, see “Tarāhī-yi Naghshi-yi Aḥdās -i Bāgh-i 
Muzih-yi Zindān-i Qasr” [“The Design Plan for the Construction of the Garden Museum of Qasr Prison”] Dorna 
Online. Mihr 1384 [October 2005]. Accessed 14 January 2014.  For further news about the matter, see: “Zindān-i 
Qasr Muzih Mīshavad” [“Qasr Prison to become a Museum”], Jām-i Jam Online. Shahrīvar 1387 [September 2008]. 
Web. See also Qasr’s official website, which includes some historical information and news on the museum’s daily 
operations. www.qasr.ir.  
3 See http://www.lonelyplanet.com/iran/tehran/sights/museums-galleries/iran-ebrat-museum.  
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visitors to explore the former political interrogation center known in the late Pahlavi era as 
Kumitih-yi Mushtarik-i Zid-i Kharābkār (“United Anti-Sabotage Committee”).4 The pedagogical 
function of ‘ibrat is even more unambiguous than that of Qasr, as visitors — including school-
aged children on class trips5 — are led on a mandatory guided tour and shown a film outlining 
the gruesome violence meted out by the Shah’s intelligence apparatus on Islamist and clerical 
prisoners.6 These are certainly not be the first examples of penal institutions absorbed into a 
tourist economy; for one such example, one need look no further than Alcatraz Island, which is 
routinely among the most popular tourist destinations in California. Still, the transformation of 
these prison and interrogation sites into “cultural heritage” institutions in which citizens are 
supposed to learn about the harshness of Pahlavi rule as well as heroic (Islamist) resistance to 
that rule features a distinctly national-pedagogical aspect not found as readily in commercial-
entertainment sites such as Alcatraz. The re-imagining of Qasr and ‘Ibrat as sites of state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Kumitih-yi Mushtarik-i Ẓidd-i Kharābkār (“United Anti-Sabotage Committee”), typically just known as the 
Kumitih interrogation center, was a facility opened in 1350 / 1971 in central Tehran jointly run by the police force 
and the Shah’s intelligence and security service SAVAK (Sāzmān-i Iṭilāʿāt va Amniyat-i Kishvar, or Intelligence 
and National Security Organization), in an effort to unify the two law enforcement agencies in their efforts at 
quashing anti-Pahlavi activities. Before it was re-opened as the Kumitih center, this facility was the site of a 
women’s prison. In the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution, the jail was renamed Kumitih-i Tūḥīd (“Unity 
Committee”) and run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards. Unsurprisingly, there are myriad references to this 
notorious interrogation center in the literature produced by ‘Ibrat Museum, such as Rizvīān, Maḥmūd, Ed. 
Naghmihhā Va Ash‘ār-i Zindānīān Dar Band-i SAVAK. [Prison Songs and Poetry from SAVAK’s Cells.] Tehran: 
‘Ibrat Museum, 1388 / 2009. Print. 
5 I visited both museums in spring 2014, and was told by museum employees at each site that class visits are 
common occurrences. On the day of my visit to Qasr, a handful of young children were playing in the newly built 
playground overlooking the repurposed cellblocks. 
6 ‘Ibrat’s website provides a similar pedagogical function as does their guided tour, with sections outlining the 
history of the Kumitih center, types of torture used, and biographies of the torturers who made their careers there. 
See http://www.ebratmuseum.ir. Accessed October 1 2014. ‘Ibrat also has an active publishing wing, which has in 
recent years released a series of prison writing from pre-revolutionary Islamist prisoners. For examples of this 
literature, see Rafī‘, Jalāl. Az Dānishgāh-i Tiḥrān tā Shikanjihgāh-i SAVAK: Guftigū bā Jalāl Rafī‘. [From the 
University of Tehran to SAVAK’s Torture Chambers.] Tehran: ‘Ibrat Museum, 1382 / 2003. Print. See also Sharīf-
Ābādi, Murtiża, Ed. Yāddāshthā-yi Zindān [Prison Notes]. Tehran: ‘Ibrat Museum, 1384 / 1995. Print. 
Unsurprisingly, the museum remains conspicuously silent on both the ample history of non-Islamist prisoners held 
at the detention center and the site’s post-revolution era record as Kumitih-yi Tūḥid. For an essential recent memoir 
in which a former leftist prisoner (of both the Pahlavi regime and later the Islamic Republic) describes returning to 
the Kumitih interrogation center in its new life as museum — called Iṭilā‘āt (“Information”) Museum at the time of 
her visit — only to see her own experiences there completely effaced, see Talebi, Shahla. Ghosts of Revolution: 
Rekindled Memories of Imprisonment in Iran. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2011. Print. 
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pedagogy evokes an inescapable consonance with their previous deployment as institutions 
among Iran’s premier modern prisons and interrogation centers. That is to say, Qasr / ‘Ibrat-as-
prison also played important tutelary functions, insofar as these prisons were a site in which 
Iranians met the pedagogical and disciplinary apparatuses of the state viscerally. Indeed, it was in 
and through the institutions of the state penal apparatus that the Iranian public was educated en 
masse about modern notions of law and order, criminality, and the capacity of the state to 
regulate that criminality. That Qasr and ‘Ibrat are today no longer needed in their former 
functions should certainly not imply that recent decades have seen the end of what Michel 
Foucault dubbed the “modern carceral state” in Iran.7 Regardless, the prison’s re-imagining as 
another institution of the modern state — that is, the museum — re-establishes and re-publicizes 
Pahlavi practices, albeit to different normative ends. The memorialization of Qasr and ‘Ibrat, 
such memorable symbols of Pahlavi state power and violence, displays the degree to which the 
punishment practices of the former regime continue to authorize the politics of the contemporary 
Islamic Republic.  
Contemporary interest in Pahlavi prisons does not end with these prison-museums. Inside 
of the Islamic Republic, Pahlavi prisons and punishment practices are remembered, researched, 
memorialized, and written on extensively. The cultural and research wing of the state, for 
instance, has sponsored numerous publications on Pahlavi carceral sites, and major state-
sponsored research institutes publish regularly on the topic of torture in the Shah’s Iran.8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 2nd Edition. Trans. Alan Sheridan. 1977. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1995.  
8 For one example of these prison-related publishing efforts, see Ghīāsiān, Said, Ed. Khātirāt-i Zindān: Gazidih-ī Az 
Nagoftihā-yi Zindāniān-i Siyāsi-yi Rizhīm-i Shāh. [Prison Memoirs: A Selection of Untold Stories by the Political 
Prisoners of the Shah’s Regime.] Surih Mihr: Tehran, 1390 / 2011. Print. This collection of Islamist prison writings 
is published by Surih Mihr, the publishing house connected to state-affiliated Ḥūzih-i Hunarī (Arts Department). For 
an example of state-sponsored scholarship on the history of torture and political prisoners in Iran, see Hakīmiān, 
Iqbāl. “Zindānhā va Zindānīān-i Siyāsī-yi Dūrih-yi Riẓā Shāh.” Tehran: Institute for Contemporary Iranian 
Historical Studies. Web. http://www.iichs.org/PDF_files/A_Zindaniyan.pdf. 
5 
	  
Notably, long before it had turned Pahlavi prisons into an industry, the nascent Islamic Republic 
had already turned its focus to Pahlavi prison policies as a principal target of its ethical and 
juridical scrutiny. This focus came on the heels of a revolutionary movement that, although 
precipitated by a diverse confluence of social, economic, and political forces, was nonetheless 
united on the question of Pahlavi punishment.9 The centrality of Pahlavi torture in the lead-up to 
1979 Pahlavi collapse was so decisive that theorist of torture Darius Rejali has noted, “the 
Iranian revolution of 1978-1979 was the revolution against torture. When the Shah criticized 
Khomayni as a black-robed Islamic medieval throwback, Khomayni replied, look who is talking, 
the man who tortures.”10 In the months following the assumption of power by Ayatollah 
Khomeini, this sentiment was channeled by the emergent clerical regime into retributive 
tribunals initially focused on exacting revolutionary justice on those with close ties to the royalist 
government. During those early post-revolutionary months, the revolutionary tribunals hastily 
tried and executed many well-known Pahlavi cronies, including the three surviving directors of 
SAVAK.11 In an interview with Iran Radio in May 1979, then Minister of Foreign Affairs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Despite the importance of Pahlavi prisons to the Iranian revolutionaries, scholarly accounts of the 1979 Revolution 
and the founding of the Islamic Republic have typically given only brief look at those modern prisons and penal 
practices whose notoriety helped fuel the revolutionary moment. These accounts of the revolution have provided 
essential readings of competing ideologies, social movements, political economy, and other factors. For the 
definitive study of the “Islamic ideology” of the Islamist revolutionaries, as well as that ideology’s interaction with 
the two other ascendant political theoretical frames of Iranian political modernity, namely nationalism and Marxism, 
see Dabashi, Hamid. Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. 2nd ed. 
Edison, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005. Print. For a thorough historical study of various political and social trends 
in the lead-up to the 1979 Revolution, with a particular focus on leftist political movements, see Abrahamian, 
Ervand. 1982. Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Print. For a text that spans 
a similar scope, see also Keddie, Nikki. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2003. Print. For texts that focus on the Islamist elements of the 1960s and 1970s political culture of Iran, see 
Arjomand, Said Amir. The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran. New York: Oxford University, 
1989. Print. Mottahadeh, Roy. The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran. New York: Oneworld, 
1985. Print. For an important study on the working class and the revolution, see Bayat, Asef. Workers and 
Revolution in Iran. London: Zed, 1987. Print.  
10 Horton, Scott. “Six Questions For Darius Rejali.” Harper’s Magazine. Feb 2008. Print.  
11 Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions, 125. In the months immediately after the fall of the Shah, a great deal of 
information was circulated regarding Pahlavi and SAVAK torture and political violence, and the trials of SAVAK 
agents, moves meant to further legitimize the actions of the revolutionary tribunals. See for instance a pamphlet that 
circulated in the first months of the revolution outlining the actions of notorious SAVAK interrogator Bahman 
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Ibrāhīm Yazdī defended the ethicality of these revolutionary tribunals, stating, “Most cases were 
open to the public, many were shown on TV. These people were criminals. They tortured people, 
they killed and massacred people.”12 So important was the issue of torture for the Iranian 
revolutionaries that, three months after the collapse of the shah, Khomeini himself claimed that 
no person could be sentenced to death except for in circumstances “when a person is proved to 
have killed a human being, and…when a person has ordered a massacre or has perpetrated an act 
of torture.”13 The unflinching punishment of the most unpopular of the shah’s close associates 
lent further to Khomeini’s air of anti-colonial legitimacy, as well as furthering the authority of 
the emergent revolutionary government. It was in this context that the Iranian intellectual 
Daryush Shayegan famously quipped to Time magazine that, “Khomeini is an Islamic Gandhi.”14 
From the first days after the fall of the shah, Pahlavi punishment techniques served to authorize 
the politics of those who had wrested power from the deposed monarch.  
Outside of the Islamic Republic, there has also been a veritable deluge of texts 
remembering the Iranian prison, though these texts typically begin rather than end the story with 
the establishment of the Islamic Republic.15 The penal record of the Islamic Republic has, since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Nādirīpūr, aka Tihrānī, regarding his role in the deaths of a number of important revolutionaries. Much of this 
pamphlet is culled from Tihrānī’s confession during a hasty trial by revolutionary tribunal, but is introduced by an 
essay by an anonymous Islamist revolutionary. In this introduction, the author asserts that the henchmen of the 
former regime are simply attempting to distance themselves from their crimes, and are trying to blame the system 
rather than their own wickedness. This is because these conspirators, executioners, torturers are merely trying to 
save their own skins. The author demands retribution for these “criminals’” actions, quoting the Qur’an as an 
authoritative source on revenge. The essay further mocks Tihrānī’s confession specifically, noting incredulously that 
Tihrānī’s claims to feels remorse and wants to serve the Islamic Republic. Matn-i Kāmil-i Nāmih-yi Tuṭe’ih Āmīz 
“Tihrānī” Dazhkhīm Va Shikanjihgar-i SAVAK. [The Complete Text of Conspiratorial Letter of Tehrani, 
Executioner and Torturer of SAVAK.] n.p. 1979. Print. 
12 Amnesty International, Law and Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran: A Report Covering Events Within 
the Seven-Month Period Following the Revolution of 1979. London, 1980, Print, 57.  
13 Ibid, 53.  
14 “The Khomeini Era Begins” Time Magazine. February 12, 1979, 40. Shayegan, a philosopher, had done part of 
his graduate work on Gandhian philosophy.  
15 A great deal of this post-revolutionary prison literature is written in Persian and published in Europe for Iranian 
exiles and dissidents of various political stripes. For some examples, see Alīzādih, Parvānih. Khūb Nigāh Konīd, 




the establishment of the revolutionary state, emerged as a topic of concern among myriad rights 
groups, political dissidents, and scholars who, contrary to the narrative put forward by the 
Islamic Republic, argue that it is precisely the history of the modern prison that de-legitimates 
Iran’s contemporary regime.16 While some of these texts are valuable, detail-rich additions to the 
literature on the history of Iran’s penal apparatus, this post-revolutionary discourse on the prisons 
of the Islamic Republic also includes a recent glut of sensational, often-sexualized accounts of 
imprisonment and abuse in the Islamic Republic of Iran authored largely by women and 
marketed to English-language audiences as quasi-feminist interventions against the brutality of 
Iran’s current regime.17 Formatted as tell-all memoirs — intimate, often sexualized, cathartic, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Press, 1366 / 1987. Print. Barādarān, Munīrā. (Raha. M.) Haqīqat-i Sādih. [Plain Truth.] 2nd ed. Lindenallee, 
Germany: Nima Verlag, 1379 / 2000. Print. Barādarān has also written a text on the psychological aspects of torture 
in the Islamic Republic. See Barādarān, Munīrā. Ravānshināsī-yi Shikanjih. [The Psychology of Torture.] Spånga, 
Sweden: Baran, 1380 / 2001. Print. There are also examples of prison memoirs by non-Islamist (largely leftist) 
prisoners from the Pahlavi era published in the post-revolutionary era outside of Iran. For instance, see Samakar, 
Abbas. Man Yik Shūrishī Hastam: Khātirāt-i Zindān Va Yadbūd-i Khosrow Golsorkhi va Kerāmat Danishīān. [I Am 
A Rebel: Prison Memoirs and Reminiscences of Khosrow Golsorkhi and Kerāmat Danishīān.] Los Angeles: Ketab, 
2001. Print. Dādāshzādih, Kāvih. Pādishāh-i Zindānhā: Khātirāt-i Zindān. [Shah of the Prisons: Prison Memoirs.] 
Tehran: Intishārāt-i Khujastih, 1389 / 2010. Print. Bāmdād, Weria. Zindān-i Shah. [The Shah’s Prison.] Frankfurt: 
Alborz Verlag, 1384 / 2006. Print. A select few prison memoirs published in recent years span both the Pahlavi era 
and the Islamic Republic era. See Parsipur, Shahrnush. Khātirāt-i Zindān. [Prison Memoir.] 2nd ed. Baran: Sweden, 
1998. Unfortunately, the recent English translation of Parsipur’s memoir excises some of the pre-revolutionary 
political context from the text.  
16 For a very early human rights-centered critique of the Islamic Republic’s legal and penal practices, see Amnesty 
International. Law and Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran: A Report Covering Events Within the Seven 
Month Period Following the Revolution of 1979. London: Amnesty International, 1980. Print. For a polemical early 
critique of Islamic Republic prisons from one of its major adversaries, see The People’s Mojahedin Organization of 
Iran. List of Names and Particulars of 12,082 Victims of Khomeini’s Regime. PMOI, 1985. Print. For a similar early 
critique from the point of view of exiled leftist guerrillas, see an essay in the Organization of People’s Fadāī 
Guerrillas post-revolutionary journal Kār [Work], in which they describe the prisons of the Islamic Republic as the 
place “where human dignity and animal savagery come face to face.” OIPFG. “A Prisoner’s Report From Evin 
Prison” Kār. October 1984, No. 14: 24. Print. For a more recent scholarly work that seeks to “name and shame” the 
Islamic Republic and those who would defend its practices, see Afshari, Reza. Human Rights in Iran: The Abuse of 
Cultural Relativism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001. Print. For one representative example of 
human rights activism currently focused on Iranian prisons, see the website of the Iran Human Rights organization. 
http://iranhr.net. Accessed 10 October 2014. 
17 For just a few examples of this ballooning body of literature, see Nemat, Marina. Prisoner of Tehran: A Memoir. 
New York City: Simon & Schuster. 2008. Print. Entekhabifard, Camelia. Camelia: Save Yourself By Telling the 
Truth. New York: Seven Stories, 2007. Print. Esfandiari, Haleh. My Prison, My Home: One Woman’s Story of 
Captivity in Iran. New York: Harper Collins, 2009. Print. Rostampour, Maryam and Marziyeh Amirzadeh. Captive 
in Iran: A Remarkable True Story of Hope and Triumph Amid the Horror of Tehran’s Brutal Evin Prison. Atlanta: 
Tyndale Momentum, 2013. Print. Ghahramani, Zarah. My Life as a Traitor: An Iranian Memoir. New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2008. Print. These texts represent a sub-genre in a larger trend of memoirs written by women 
8 
	  
internal, and lacking historical detail or political context — these texts cast their author-heroes as 
legible liberal subjects directly defying the inevitable violence meted out to them by an archaic 
Islamic culture. These texts have their own pedagogical and normative implications, insofar as 
they paint the contemporary Islamic Republic as a pathologically violent and anti-modern regime 
demanding retributive intervention from the outside.  
These competing narratives and counter-narratives of Iranian penitentiaries and 
punishment raise some crucial questions. Why is the prison such a significant site of contestation 
in and for the Islamic Republic? What are the historical factors and contingencies that help us 
understand the centrality of this site? In other words, how has it come to be that both the 
contemporary state and those who oppose it understand their political and ethical projects 
through the analysis of policing and punishment practices? These questions are difficult to 
answer or even approach because the contemporary discussion on Iranian prisons and 
punishment is so entwined in the polemical and ideological battles outlined above.  
I argue in this dissertation that, beginning long before the 1979 establishment of the 
Islamic Republic, modernity in Iran has unfolded in and through the contested history of its 
prisons. To be sure, the establishment of a modern carceral apparatus has been one of the 
elemental and enduring transformations of the Iranian state form in the 20th century. Iranian civil 
and criminal laws were fully centralized and codified in the early Reza Shah period during the 
same years that the judiciary was completely overhauled, after a quarter century of piecemeal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
from Muslim majority countries that focus particularly on Islam as the source of the repression of women. For the 
most famous example in the Iranian context, see Nafisy, Azar. Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books. New 
York: Random House, 2003. Print. For an example by an author from a non-Iranian locale, see Hirsi Ali, Ayaan. 
Infidel. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007. Print. Despite the popularity of these texts, there have been a number 
of important and necessary critiques of this genre. For the definitive critique of Nafisi’s book, see Dabashi, Hamid. 
“Native Informers and the Making of American Empire.” Al-Ahram Weekly Online. 1-7 June 2006 Issue No. 797. 
For an invaluable critique of Hirsi Ali (among others) and the sinister gendered component of these texts, which 
mobilize the language of feminism for imperial political projects, see Abu-Lughod, Lila. Do Muslim Women Need 
Saving. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013. Print.  
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reforms in these codes.18 In the same era, plans for building several prisons of various sizes 
emerged, brought about by the ballooning needs of a state now fully invested in confining those 
accused or convicted of breaking codified laws in modern prison structures. Indeed, by the early 
Pahlavi era, the concept of the modern “criminal” in need of long term incarceration was more 
and more commonplace, as activities that may have once cost retributive payment to wronged 
parties or corporal punishment without forced confinement began increasingly to require trial, 
sentencing, and imprisonment. The “criminal” was not the only new figure of modern state and 
social anxiety. In 1931, an anti-communist law was passed, paving the way for politicized 
incarceration along modern lines; almost immediately, Marxist, Islamist, and Nationalist 
intellectuals alike became “political prisoners” (or in the parlance of the state, “security 
prisoners” (zindāni-yi amniyat-i), and began to experience and write about the pressures and 
realities of Iranian carceral modernity in their own right.  
These legal, juridical, and institutional changes produced a transforming intellectual and 
popular milieu increasingly concerned with issues of crime, punishment, and the law in Iran. 
Genres such as the crime novel, the prison memoir, and the social scientific criminological text 
emerged, creating a crucial and formative interplay between the “real” space of the modern 
Iranian prison and the narratives told of and about that space. In other words, the emergence of 
modern policing and punishment in Iran produced not only institutional and practical changes, 
but also public, social, and discursive effects. It is these effects that I trace in this dissertation. 
Throughout this project, in reading these prison archives and discourses, I explore the ways in 
which prisoners (and would-be prisoners) have perpetually evoked the questions: who has the 
right to be considered a citizen? How are subjectivities produced in and through encounters with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 For more on this history, see Enayat, Hadi. Law, State, and Society in Modern Iran: Constitutionalism, Autocracy, 
and Legal Reform, 1906-1941. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Print. 
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this quintessential state institution? How is state authority predicated on the suffering of the 
prisoner’s body or rehabilitation of the criminal’s soul? In what ways does the prisoner enact and 
transform those very concepts — rights, nation, citizen — that the state is urgently attempting to 
define and control? Exploring these questions from the late Qajar era to the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution, I show that in this era in which novel legal reforms were fitfully defined and enacted 
by a modernizing state, the policing and penal apparatus of the state perhaps paradoxically came 
to have a public life through its representations in Iranian discourses. Through these discourses, I 
argue, the prison cell and the prisoner’s body become sites for both testing the limits of authority 




There has been a considerable amount of scholarship on the worldwide emergence of the 
modern prison and modern prisoner, both political and otherwise, although the lion’s share of 
that work has focused on European contexts and, since the early 1970s, the changes most 
memorably theorized by Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish.19 In that epochal work, 
Foucault frames his argument around the transformation of earlier, spectacular forms of public 
punishment — i.e. public torture and execution — to an apparently naturalized, self-regulating 
scheme that he terms the “carceral system.” For Foucault, the emergence of this carceral system, 
which not only includes the prison and its architecture but also penetrates society through 
schools, the military, etc., is intimately linked to the shift from earlier forms of sovereignty to 
modern forms of disciplinary power through which the modern subject is effected, individuated, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 2nd Edition. Trans. Alan Sheridan. 1977. New 
York: Vintage Books, 1995. Print. 
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and classified through institutionalized attention to embodied practice and comportment. At the 
same time that the modern subject of discipline is produced in Foucault’s prisons, hospitals, and 
asylums, a typology of criminality also emerges, alongside a series of typified corrective 
behaviors for these newly classified criminals.   
Foucault’s work on the prison, and in particular his discussion of the move away from 
spectacular punishment, was in part a response to earlier liberal historiography on European 
penal practices, which emphasized the humanitarian concerns of those individuals involved with 
prison reform movements. According to historian of English prisons Clive Emsley, the prison 
reformists of the 18th and 19th centuries considered themselves to be “progressive and 
humanitarian” and wrote about their efforts to “humanize” the prison in just those terms.20 These 
earnest convictions were echoed by later historians, who typically took the reformists at their 
word.21 Of course, Foucault was not the first to question this liberal historiographical tradition; 
Marxist historians and critics questioned the “humane” impulses of the modern state long before 
the writing of Discipline and Punish, albeit with markedly different understandings of the 
workings of power.22 Early Marxist theorists of crime and punishment such as Otto Kirchheimer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20  Emsley, Clive. Crime, Police, and Penal Policy: European Experiences 1750-1940. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006, p. 3. Also see Emsley, Clive and Louis A. Knafla, eds. Crime Histories and Histories of 
Crime: Studies in the Historiography of Crime and Criminal Justice in Modern History. Westport, Conn: 
Greenwood Press, 1996. Print. 
21 Emsley goes on to argue that although many historiographical strides have been taken to better understand the 
modern prison in a more sophisticated manner, the notion of humane punishment, criminality, and a just social order 
emphasized by early 20th century historiography remains “embedded in many of the popular histories of crime and 
the institutional histories of police and penal policy in Britain and they are implicit also in much of the traditional 
understanding of the changes in other countries. They commonly presuppose a social order based on consensus in 
which the criminal is identifiable, alien ‘other’ that preys upon ordinary, law-abiding citizens.” Emsley, 3.   
22 It is interesting to note, however, that Marx himself never wrote directly on questions of the prison or penal 
practice, even in cases of convict labor. Indeed, with the exception of a series of lesser known articles written for the 
Rheinische Zeitung, along with more abstract discussions of the category of the (sometimes criminal) underclass in 
Das Kapital and the Grundrisse, Marx wrote precious little about crime or punishment at all. For more see Phillips, 
Paul. Marx and Engels on Law and Laws. Oxford: Martin Robertson Press, 1980. Print. See a brief discussion on 
Marx and Marxian writings on crime in Emsley, Crime, Police, and Penal Policy. For the English translation of the 
text that inaugurated the field of so-called “Marxist criminology” see the treatise by Bonger, Willem Adriaan. 
Criminality and Economic Conditions. Trans. H. Horton. Boston: Little Brown, 1916. Print. In this well-known 
work, Bonger — who was also strongly influenced by the writings Karl Kautsky, the Austrian Marxist eventually 
12 
	  
and Georg Rusche argued that changes in penal practice not only were not instigated by 
humanitarian concerns but also could be directly mapped onto the shifting needs of the ruling 
classes.23 Foucault’s theorization of power as a productive rather than repressive force, however, 
famously challenged Marxian theorizations, which saw power as the purview of a ruling class 
(and ruling-class-as-state) whose primary interest was in the control of the laboring classes 
whose labor power they sought to exploit.  
Despite their significant analytical and theoretical differences, the above debates between 
Marxists, liberals, and postmodernists have nonetheless largely all taken the European theater as 
the primary site of their inquiries. As a result, the relationship between European states and their 
colonial outposts — and the policing and penal systems in those colonial locales — has been a 
longtime lacuna in the scholarship outlined above. Despite the partially coeval histories of prison 
reform and European colonialism, few historians of Europe have specifically addressed the 
influence of colonial administration in the emergence of the modern prison at “home.” This 
lacuna has been increasingly addressed by recent scholarship on prisons, prisoners, crime, and 
law in non-European and/or colonial contexts. Much of this scholarship has emerged in the field 
of post-colonial studies, which, broadly speaking, is a field concerned with the legacy of the 
colonial state in the era of the sovereign post-colony. Although influenced in many cases by 
Foucault, some of this scholarship has effectively argued that that in colonial situations, the 
needs of the colonizing state are often more unambiguous — and therefore more apparently 
repressive (and concerned with forms of labor and state-mediated exploitation) — than 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
well-known for opposing the 1917 October Revolution — argued for a directly causal link between class conditions 
and criminality. Later Marxian thinkers have agreed with Bonger that crime is a social and not biological issue, but 
many have rejected the directly causal relationship that Bonger advocated.  
23 Emsley, 5. Emsley goes on to argue that Punishment and Social Structure, Rusche and Kirchheimer’s book — 
which appeared just before WWII but was popularized in the 1960s — “appeared at the same time as both a radical 
critique of prisons systems and the first wave of the recent research into the history of crime, which, while not 
necessarily Marxist, was underpinned by a perception of societies divided by class conflict.” 
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Foucault’s theorizations on forms of power would allow. Indeed, at the same time that English 
and French statesmen were ostensibly concerned with “humanizing” the European prison and 
“rehabilitating” criminal offenders, colonial states were importing the modern prison to their 
colonial outposts and perfecting methods of control therein. In her essay “The Politics of 
Enclosure in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa,” Florence Bernault writes, “At the end of the 
nineteenth century, the modern African prison system emerged through the massive importation 
of a foreign judicial order, and the eclipse of a large number of precolonial penal techniques.”24 
In part, Bernault argues that because African colonial prisons were often sites of forced convict 
labor, they served not only as a model imported from abroad but also as an example in which 
techniques later used at “home” were introduced and perfected.25 Bernault’s work is among a 
recent body of scholarship on punishment in colonial contexts that includes Anoma Pieris’ 
scholarship on forced labor and the segregation of ethnically marked prisoners in colonial 
Singapore,26 Anand Yang’s scholarship on pre-independence criminality and colonial policing in 
India,27 Steven Pierce and Anupama Rao’s volume on the discipline, violence, and embodied 
practices of colonial modernity,28 and Samera Esmeir’s text on pain, punishment, and the 
emergence of the category of “the human” in the colonial Egypt legal order.29 These scholars 
offer both correctives to the Eurocentric models above and illustrations of the social and political 
life of punishment and penal practice in the colony and post-colony.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Bernault, Florence. “The Politics of Enclosure in Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa.” A History of Prison and 
Confinement in Africa. Ed. Florence Bernault. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann Press, 2003. Print. 
25 Bernault’s arguments also has an important Marxian aspect, insofar as she notes that the African context saw the 
rise of extremely exploitative colonially mediated convict labor in contexts where such practices were previously 
non-existent.  
26 Pieris, Anoma. Hidden Hands and Divided Landscapes: A Penal History of Singapore’s Plural Society. Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2009. Print. 
27 Yang, Anand A. Crime and Criminality in British India. Tucson, AZ: University of Arizona Press, 1985. 
28 Pierce, Steven and Anupama Rao. Discipline and the Other Body: Correction, Corporeality, Colonialism. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006. Print. 
29 Esmeir, Samera. Juridical Humanity: A Colonial History. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012. Print. 
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Unlike formally colonized regions in Africa or Asia, however, the Iranian penal apparatus 
did not emerge in a strictly colonial setting in which a European power imports, builds, and 
manages the penal institutions of a state, a context in which “colonial violence” exists in the 
same sense as that discussed by Pierce and Rao,30 or one whose legal edifice features the same 
“colonial career” as that which Esmeir outlines.31 It is perhaps for this reason that enforced 
convict labor, colonially mandated markers of ethnic difference among prisoners, or legal orders 
established by the European powers do not become guiding norms in the economies or social 
worlds of the Iranian prison system. Resultantly, while the aforementioned postcolonial 
scholarship on punishment has informed and helped guide this dissertation, particularly in its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Though caught between British and Russian imperial influence and encroachment through the 19th century, Qajar 
state institutions were not transformed root and branch by the establishment of a colonial state, nor was colonial 
legal liberalism inscribed into the legal order as in Esmeir’s reading of colonial Egypt. Still, its economic relations 
were radically altered with the steady triumphs of capitalist modernity, as the Persian economy was rapidly changed 
into one primarily relying on the export of raw materials to Europe. Generally, the relationship between Qajar Persia 
and the European powers was filtered through European interest in trade routes, raw materials (including newly 
found oil reserves), and the balance of regional power, and would remain mired in Anglo-Russian machinations 
even after Iran’s 1905-1911 Constitutional Revolution and through World War I. Still, for Iranian social movements 
since the late Qajar era, inept and autocratic state rule has been at least as much a focus of antagonism as European 
colonialism. Since the late 19th century, Iranian intellectuals have argued that Iran is mired in the double oppression 
of internal istibdād (despotism) and external isti’mār (colonialism). Persia/Iran’s relationship to capitalist colonial 
modernity has been described as semi-colonial for obvious reasons, but this designation, while useful as a 
shorthand, holds little analytical meaning when studying the establishment of modern state institutions (like the 
prison) or theories of law, criminality, or punishment. Like scholarship on other regions mined for raw materials and 
transformed by European influence but not formally colonized (such as China), scholarship on Iranian modernity 
has found itself awkwardly positioned in relation to trends in postcolonial studies and European historiography 
alike. For more on Russian and English imperial influence in Iran, see Keddie, Nikki. Modern Iran: Roots and 
Results of Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. Print. For more on the economic history of this era 
and the absorption of Persia into global capitalist markets, see Issawi, Charles. The Economic History of Iran, 1800-
1914. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971. Print. 
31 Samera Esmeir’s Juridical Humanity is a critical contribution both to studies of the prison in colonial Egypt in 
particular and to post-Foucauldian prison analysis specifically. Esmeir argues that through a process she calls 
“juridical humanity” — that is, the process of inscribing “the human” as the modern subject of law — English 
colonial lawmakers “put pain and suffering to use” by instituting reforms in order to ostensibly reduce suffering 
among late 19th- /early 20th-century Egyptian prisoners. These Benthamian reforms sought to control populations 
through a utilitarian understanding of pain/pleasure. In turn, this moral sentiment regarding the reduction of 
unnecessary suffering, an affective and political hallmark of liberalism, targeted only certain types of pain as objects 
of its concern at the same time that it inscribed the body-in-pain into colonial law. It is illustrative that Esmeir notes 
that Bentham corresponded directly with Egyptian lawmakers and rulers regarding the panoptic principle, and that 
utilitarianism exerted direct influence on the Egyptian legal context. Although she may overstate the ease with 
which European legal theory is inscribed into Egyptian law, she is nonetheless correct to emphasize the “colonial 
career” of the law in Egypt. The relationship between colonial modernity, liberalism, and the legal order, however, 
is not as straightforward in Iran, which as I mention, was never formally colonized and thus engaged with European 
legal modernity in different ways. Esmeir, Samera. Juridical Humanity, 109-147. 
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insistent attention to the workings of power, these texts nonetheless provide imperfect analogies 
for a region that was neither formally colonized nor able to escape imperial influence and 
capitalist expansion.  
There have also been some significant recent studies on law, legality, crime, and 
punishment in Islamicate empires moving from pre-modern empires to modern states. A recent 
text by Fariba Zarinebaf, for instance, looks at early modern crime and punishment in Ottoman 
Istanbul, a context that, like Qajar Persia, was not formally colonial but was nonetheless 
transformed by capitalist colonial modernity. This study of the Ottoman context is instructive 
because in early modern Istanbul, again as in Qajar Persia, the state and its constituents had to 
negotiate the unruly needs of different legal orders; in both cases, schematically speaking, there 
are “civil” (‘urf) and “religious” (shari’a) legal frameworks, though in effect the divide was not 
so neat, and in the Iranian case there was no codified ‘urf law.32 Though rich with archival detail, 
Zarinebaf’s work, like Willem Floor’s brief but detailed scholarship on changes in the legal order 
of 19th century Iran, is not specifically interested in theorizing changing notions of crime, 
criminality, pain, and punishment, beyond the rubric of “centralization” or “modernization.”33  
 Remarkably, given the copious anxiety outlined above surrounding contemporary Iran’s 
penal record, and the significance Iranian political and intellectual discourses have placed on the 
modern prison, relatively few scholarly works have been written specifically analyzing Iranian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Zarinebaf, Fariba. Crime and Punishment in Istanbul: 1700-1800. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
2011. Print. For more on the division between shari’a (religions) and ‘urf (civil/customary) courts in Qajar Iran that 
argues that in the Qajar context this division was largely formal, see Rubayʻī, Nāṣir & Aḥmad Rāhraw Khuājah. 
Tārīkh-i Zindān Dar ‘Asr-i Qājār va Pahlavi. [The History of Prison in the Qajar and Pahlavi Eras.] Tehran: 
Intishārāt-i Quqnūs, 1390 / 2011. Print. For this point regarding the lack of a codified civil law in the context of 
Qajar Iran, see the first chapter of Enayat, Hadi. Law, State, and Society in Modern Iran: Constitutionalism, 
Autocracy, and Legal Reform, 1906-1941. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Print. 33. 
33 For Floor’s work, which focuses on changing positions and duties in the legal system, see Floor, Willem. “The 
Police in Qajar Persia.” Die Welt des Islams 13 (1971): 212-229. Print. See also Floor, Willem. “Changes and 
Development in the Judicial System of Qajar Iran (1800-1925)” in Qajar Iran: Political, Social, and Cultural 
Changes, ed. E. Bosworth and C. Hillenbrand. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993. Print. 
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penitentiaries, policing, or punishment. Much of the existing scholarship that traces the 
institutional history of the modern Iranian prison is nonetheless quiet on the nature of legal 
changes in modern Iran, shifts in notions of crime or the emergence of “criminality” in the 
modern era, and the public or social effects of those transformations.34 Other texts on Iranian 
prison discourses remain solely interested in the pre-modern era,35 limit their inquiry to political 
prisoners,36 or suffer from ideological limitations in theorizing torture and state violence.37  
The most theoretically astute work on Iranian prisons and punishment, and one that has 
greatly influenced my thinking in this dissertation, is Darius Rejali’s Torture and Modernity: 
Self, Society, and the State in Modern Iran.38 Rejali’s text is Foucauldian in its theoretical 
framework, and as such links Iran’s penal record with various embodied processes of 
disciplinary modernity (schools, the military, etc.). In doing so, he argues that contemporary 
torture is not a vestige of “traditional” punitive practices but rather a modern product and 
technique of power.39 Against Foucault’s famous periodization, however, Rejali argues that the 
use of torture doesn’t disappear as a result of modern techniques of power, but rather is 
incorporated within practices and institutions of carceral modernity. As a political scientist and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Rubayʻī, Nāṣir & Aḥmad Rāhraw Khuājah. Tārīkh-i Zindān Dar ‘Asr-i Qājār va Pahlavi. [The History of Prison in 
the Qajar and Pahlavi Eras.] Tehran: Intishārāt-i Quqnūs, 1390 / 2011. Print. Rubayʻī and Rāhraw Khuājah’s text is 
very well researched and thorough insofar as it includes a great deal of detail on Iranian prisons that other scholars 
have largely ignored. Still, it is succumbs to a kind of rigid empiricism that eschews theoretical analysis regarding 
the changes that are described. What’s more, embedded in Rubayʻī and Rāhraw Khuājah’s work is an underlying 
teleology that implies that policing and punishment practices have gotten relatively more humane with time.  
35 Ẓafari, Valī Allah. Habsiyih Dar Adab-i Fārsī: Az Āghāz-i Shi‘r-i Fārsī Ta Pāyān-i Zandīih.  
[Imprisonment in Persian Literature: From the Beginning of Persian Poetry to the Zand Era.] Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 
1364 [1985]. Print. Ẓafari’s text is an unparalleled and illuminating look at themes of confinement and punishment 
in pre-modern Persian poetry, but his inquiry ends before the Qajar era, and is thus is investigating discourses on a 
completely different kind of penal apparatus than is this dissertation.  
36 Matin-Asgari, Afshin. “Twentieth Century Iran’s Political Prisoners.” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 5 
(Sep., 2006), 689-707. Print. 
37 Samdīpūr, Sa‘īd. Shikanjih dar Rizhīm-i Shāh. [Torture in the Shah’s Regime.] Tehran: Markaz-i Asnād-i 
Inghilāb-i Islāmī, 1386 / 2007. Print. Samdīpūr’s text essentially attributes torture under the Pahlavis to the essential 
evilness of that regime, rendering it difficult to consider it a legitimate scholarly text. Samdīpūr culls some 
interesting archival material in his work, but the text as a whole has serious ideological limitations. 
38 Rejali, Darius. Torture and Modernity: Self, Society, and State in Modern Iran. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1994. 
39 Rejali, Torture and Modernity. 
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theorist, Rejali uses relatively few archival sources, instead providing analytical readings of 
some important texts of Iranian modernity (including classics such as Jalal Al-e Ahmad’s 
Westoxification and Gholam Hussein Saedi’s Honeymoon).40 To be sure, Rejali makes a 
compelling case that the penal apparatus of the state is embedded within a disciplinary regime of 
power that has been responsible for producing the conditions of possibility for torture in Iran.41 
Still, because of its relatively limited range of sources, Rejali’s study lacks both specific 
historical context as well as analysis of the specific social or political worlds produced by the use 
of painful punishment in modern Iran. Though I take Rejali’s theoretical contribution as an 
important starting point, this dissertation seeks to look more thoroughly at some of the sources 
and texts that his study overlooks in order to undertake a fuller analysis of punishment in Iran. 
Another foundational monograph on Iranian prisons is Ervand Abrahamian’s Tortured 
Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran.42 Unlike Rejali’s text, 
Abrahamian’s research looks at a wide assortment of historical and archival sources, and as such 
has rightly become a definitive scholarly text on Iranian prison history. Abrahamian’s study 
begins by charting changes to Iran’s penal institution in the late Qajar period, and devotes a 
chapter to Qajar and Pahlavi era punishment practices and early prison writing. The bulk of his 
work, however, is spent on the post-1979 period, with a particular focus on political prisoners, 
prison memoirs, and the occurrence of forced public recantations in Iran. Abrahamian powerfully 
argues that these forced confessions have been the defining feature of political life in the Islamic 
Republic era, and that their prominence in the post-revolutionary era is fundamentally unique 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 For more on Rejali’s reading of Al-e Ahmad, among others, see Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
41 In the preface of his most recent book, which is a global history of torture, Rejali re-states the basic argument he 
makes in his earlier work succinctly: “Iranians relate to torture as a familiar event of modern life. They know it 
exists, and they never imagine that it is logically incompatible with telephones, central heating, weddings, elections, 
and other occasions of modern life” (xv). Rejali, Darius. Torture and Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2007. 
42 Abrahamian, Ervand. Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Recantation in Modern Iran. Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1999. Print.  
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within the Iranian context. While inspired by his essential research, the conclusions of my 
dissertation run counter to some of Abrahamian’s key suppositions. In the first place, I dwell at 
greater length on pre-revolutionary prison and legal discourses than does Abrahamian because I 
believe that the pre-revolutionary era has, on the whole, received short shrift in Iranian prison 
studies. Secondly, I look closely at state and intellectual discourses on prisoner education and 
rehabilitation, including law and criminology texts. Because his argument is skewed towards an 
interest in Iran’s political prisoners and torture, Abrahamian doesn’t examine these discourses on 
prisoner reform, or emergent fields such as legal theory, criminology, or crime literature, which 
produced one subject of modern anxiety (“the criminal”) during precisely the same era that that 
other major figure of state anxiety (“the political prisoner”) was being imagined, contested, and 
configured. Lastly, I contest Abrahamian’s periodization of expanding Iranian torture as a 
distinctly post-revolutionary trend. Abrahamian posits that the punitive record of the Islamic 
Republic is difficult to reconcile with the history that came before it. He writes in no uncertain 
terms that “Prison life was dramatically worse under the Islamic Republic than under the 
Pahlavis,” while terming the Islamic Republic’s penal record as “unprecedented” in Iranian 
history.43 Despite this claim, most research (including his own) bears out the fact that virtually 
all of the techniques that he mentions as definitive of the post-revolutionary period, including 
forced public recantations, were largely inaugurated in the aftermath of the 1953 coup in Iran and 
in many cases (whipping, bastinado, etc.) significantly earlier.44 If there is one marked 
before/after break in Iranian punishment history with regard to political prisoners and torture, it 
is the post-coup era rather than the 1979 Revolution. More importantly, I am hesitant to assign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Ibid, 167.  
44 Of course, there is one important exception: there is absolutely no evidence that anything even approximating the 
executions of Iranian political dissidents in the early 1980s or en masse in 1988 ever transpired before the Islamic 
Republic era.  
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any one regime the monopoly on the use of painful punishment techniques, because arguments 
regarding the relative malignancy or benignity of regimes can have the (perhaps unintended) 
consequence of de-contextualizing violence, leading to arguments that would see certain state 
forms as inherently evil or cruel. Indeed, the global as well as local history of modern 
punishment bears out the notion that even prison interrogators and torturers must learn their craft 
over time rather than configuring practices on the spot based on personal whims or pathologies.45 
The details of Abrahamian’s research actually seem to bear this out, but he remains nonetheless 
more concerned with making an argument about the relative intensity of state violence rather 




This dissertation has been conceived in conversation with above scholarly debates, but 
also stems from close readings of a variety of archival sources including state archives culled in 
Iran, Europe, and the United States, newspapers and journals, literary texts, works of political 
philosophy, intellectual discourses, unpublished PhD dissertations, dissident ephemera, prison 
memoirs, and popular culture. It is my argument that, through the founding of the modern police 
force, the establishment of centralized criminal and civil codes, the dramatic expansion of the 
Iranian penal apparatus, and the subsequent explosion in numbers of Iranians exposed to modern 
policing, surveillance, and confinement, the prison cell emerged in the late Qajar and early 
Pahlavi periods as an important site from which to think the nation, citizenship, and rights.  
There are numerous examples that show the importance of the prison in public discourses 
of this era. I would now like to briefly turn to two such examples, which reveal the public life of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 In his more recent book on global torture, Darius Rejali argues that we must view penal and police practice not as 
a “science” that is perfectible, but a craft that is learned over time, and through much trial and error. Rejali, Darius. 
Torture and Democracy.  
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that institution and its significance in shaping Iranian modernity. M.A. Jamālzadih’s classic 1921 
satirical short story “Persian is Sugar” [“Fārsī Shikar Ast”].46 “Persian Is Sugar” was written in 
the last years of the Qajar era in the 1910s and first published in January of 1921 in Germany in 
exilic nationalist newspaper Kāvih.47 In this story, Jamālzadih describes an encounter between 
the narrator — a literate, apparently well-educated Iranian returning to Iran from a five-year 
sojourn in Europe — and the nascent but nonetheless imposing Iranian nation-state in the 
transitional era between Qajar and Pahlavi rule. In the first moments after he arrives on the 
shores of his homeland, the narrator is greeted by the threatening figures of two “sinister” 
looking passport officials in unmistakably official sun-and-lion hats.48 The narrator is promptly 
detained, having been picked up for no apparent reason beyond appearing foreign and thus 
suspicious. After his arrest, he is thrown into a dank and uncomfortable holding cell, where he 
remains for the majority of the story. 
While imprisoned, the narrator meets a cast of characters who are clearly satirical 
archetypes. First, there is a pretentious Francophile whose grasp of the French he attempts to 
sprinkle into his Persian, not to mention his grasp of the political concepts he fumblingly 
references, is laughably crude. Next, there is a similarly blundering Arabic-spewing religious 
charlatan, whose facility with Arabic is as non-existent as the French of his foil. Both of these 
characters vie for the attention of a terrified, simple-minded peasant who, despite his relative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Jamālzadih, Muhammad ‘Alī. “Persian Is Sugar.” [“Fārsī Shikar Ast”] in Yikī Būd, Yikī Nabūd  
[Once Upon A Time] Winter Park: Kanoon Marefat Publishers, 1985. Print. Jamālzadih’s work in the decades of the 
1910 and ‘20s, and this short story in particular, is often given credit for inaugurating the modern short story genre 
in Iranian/Persianate literature.  
47 For an instructive study of the nationalist Kāvih group in Berlin see Marashi, Afshin. Nationalizing Iran: Culture, 
Power, and the State, 1870-1940. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2008. 
48 The sun and lion flag was formally made the crest of the Qajar state in 1836 by Mohammad Shah Qajar, and was 
used on the Iranian flag through late Qajar and Pahlavi periods. It was officially dropped from the face of the flag in 
1979 by the revolutionary state. For a historical look at the gendered implications of this emblem, see Najmabadi, 
Afsaneh. Women With Mustaches and Men Without Beards: Gender and Sexual Anxieties of Iranian Modernity. Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 2005. Print. 
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youth and vigor, feels utterly confused by both the unintelligible speech of his cellmates and the 
frightening condition of the prison in which he finds himself. Jamālzadih’s nationalist readership 
would have no trouble recognizing the naïve youngster as an allegory for “ordinary” Iranians or 
as a stand-in for the young nation itself, nor would they hesitate to see themselves in 
Jamālzadih’s educated narrator, who spends the entire story equally frustrated by the pretentions 
of his peers and the ham-fisted and repressive tactics of the nation that he calls home.  
Scholars have noted Jamālzadih’s epochal story for its novel use of language and its new 
short prose format. It has also been applauded as an adept satirical send-up of the pretentions of 
both “religious” and “secular” pseudo-intellectuals in early 20th century Iran by an important 
nationalist writer. For the purposes of this dissertation, however, “Persian is Sweet” is 
noteworthy for its vivid dramatization of the prison cell as an exemplary stage upon which 
relationships between the state and its citizens as well as between citizens themselves are 
mediated and produced. This story is an early example that reveals the budding sense among the 
Iranian literati that the fledgling Pahlavi state was already capable of flexing its punitive 
muscles. It shows the prison to be a site in which notions of justice, legality, despotism, rights, 
and citizenship are negotiated. Crucially, it also describes the prison cell as a space in which 
Iranians of very different backgrounds and personal inclinations share an intimacy they find in 
no other site; it is simply impossible to imagine these different characters coming together 
anywhere else. The Iranians in Jamālzadih’s short story not only come face to face with the 
disciplinary and bureaucratic arms of the state in the prison cell, but also have their relationships 
to each other and to the state mediated through that space.  
Jamālzadih’s influential story is not the only Iranian text through which we can read the 
popular effects of the prison within a transforming legal and political order. Nearly sixty years 
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after the initial publication of “Persian is Sweet,” and fifty years after the dramatic centralization 
of Iran’s civil and criminal codes, Iran’s foremost modernist poet Ahmad Shamlu published a 
one-of-a-kind dictionary of prison slang as part of his famous encyclopedia and lexicography of 
vernacular language and folklore Book of the Street (Kitab-i Kūchih).49 Shamlu’s Book of the 
Street represents a major attempt at cataloguing the poetics of everyday life in modern Iran, and 
is arguably the most thorough effort to produce a written record of modern Iranian vernacular 
language and folklore. As such, it is telling that Shamlu devotes an entry to prison slang, though 
it should not be surprising that he would be preoccupied with prison life amidst the success of a 
revolutionary movement that so publicly challenged the Iranian regime on its prison record. In 
the brief introduction to the entry on prison slang, which was initially published in Kitab-i 
Jum‘ih in August 1979,50 just a few months after the fall of the Shah, Book of the Street explains 
that the words collected and defined therein are culled from the language and idioms used by 
“ordinary criminal prisoners” in their day-to-day lives, which allows those prisoners a means of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Book of the Street was collected and published volume-by-volume over the course of decades. Between 1979 
when he began the project and 1981, when the Khomeini regime ordered the project stopped, Shamlu published five 
complete volumes of his sprawling lexicography. In these early years, some excerpts of this multi-volume 
compendium, including the entry on prison slang, were published in Kitab-i Jum‘ih (Friday Book), an iconoclastic 
revolution-era literary and cultural journal founded and edited by Shamlu in 1979. He would take up the project 
again in the 1990s from exile, and periodically publish volumes (on which he collaborated with his wife Ayda) until 
his death in 2000. Given its enormous scope, there has been surprisingly little scholarship on Shamlu’s Book of the 
Alley. For a brief but illuminating reading of Book of the Alley that links Shamlu’s vernacular poetics to the satirical 
and lexicographical work of constitutionalist writer Ali Akbar Dehkhoda, see Dabashi, Hamid. Iran: A People 
Interrupted. New York: The New Press, 2007. 97-98. Print. Literary scholar Leonardo Alishan notes, Shamlu’s 
efforts with Book of the Alley were the result of his decades long “love affair” with colloquial language and 
everyday experience, which for the poet were linked to his engage political inclinations. See Alishan, Leonardo. 
“Ahmad Shamlu: The Rebel Poet in Search of an Audience.” Iranian Studies. 18.2/4, (1985): 375-422. Print. For a 
brief overview of Shamlu life, poetry, and significance both in Iranian letters and political culture that briefly 
mentions Book of the Alley, see Karimi-Hakkak, Ahmad. “A Well Amid the Waste: An Introduction to the Poetry of 
Ahmad Shamlu.” World Literature Today. 51.2 (1977): 201-206. Print. For an important piece on attempting to 
translate Shamlu’s lexicography, see Sharif, Solmaz. (December 30, 2013). “Trying to Conjugate Displacement.” 
The Kenyon Review. Retrieved from www.kenyonreview.org/2013/12/trying-conjugate-displacement/. I take my 
translation of Kitab-i Kūchih as “Book of the Street” rather than the more literal “Book of the Alley” from Sharif’s 
insight the meaning of “kūchih” is better captured by the English word “street,” because it represents a kind of street 
poetics that the English word “alley” doesn’t convey. Sincere thanks to Arash Davari to alerting me to Shamlu’s 
prison slang text, and to Solmaz Sharif for critical conversations regarding this important work.  
50 For this entry, see Shamlu, Ahmad. “Farhang-i Zindān.” [“Prison Dictionary.”] Kitāb-i Jum‘ih 11 Murdād 1358 / 
August 2 1979: 159-161. Print. 
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communicating that can not easily be discerned by outsiders, particularly the omnipresent prison 
guards.51 The authoritative, domineering relationship of the state to the ordinary prisoner is 
further emphasized by Kitāb-i Jum‘ih’s cover art for this issue, which features the enormous and 
threatening visage of a state official looking over a handful of tiny prisoners as they wait behind 
prison bars (Figure 3). After the introduction, the text compiles and explicates a series of 
idiomatic words and expressions. A sample of the terms defined includes the following slices of 
late Pahlavi prison life: 
bālā – [literally, “up” or “above,” or if in a building “upstairs”]: military courts  
sāndivīch-i pidar [literally, “father’s sandwich]: the unique bread found in prison 
do va sih – [literally, “two and three”]: The situation is bleak. (Used in conversation or in 
giving information.) For instance, in order to communicate to each other that things are 
bleak, they say ‘it is du va sih.’ 
Mullah – [literally, a Shi’ite clergyman]: A long nail used to break a lock. 
Sūkhtih jūshānī – [literally, something that is burnt and boiled]: Same sex sexual activity 
[hamjinsbazī] 
Ame – [literally, paternal aunt]: spy 
Khān Dāyī – [literally, uncle Khan]: senior prison official 
Shāzdih – [literally, prince]: prison warden  
Zaynab – [proper name; the oldest daughter of the Prophet Muhammad. Zaynab is well 
known in Islamic lore for not being able to leave her non-Muslim husband when 
Muhammad travelled from Mecca to Medina]: someone who has lost his/her sense of self 
and no longer has the ability to bear prison life 
 
Book of the Alley’s compendium of prison slang provides what is billed as an authentic look at 
the darkly sarcastic and satirical language of the late 1970s Iranian prison population; the cover 
art featured with this compendium emphasizes the omnipresence of the state violence through 
which prisoners’ lives are mediated. The idioms included in the dictionary cover drugs, sex, 
violence, criminal culture, and the officious state agents, offices, and institutions with which 
prisoners most regularly came into contact.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Book of the Street uses the term “ordinary” prisoners (zindānī-yi ‘ādi) as distinct from political prisoners (zindānī-
yi siyāsī). This is a common distinction not only among politicized Iranians such as Shamlu, but even for the Pahlavi 
state itself throughout the twentieth century, although typically the state referred to political prisoners as “security” 
prisoners (zindānī-yi amniyatī). 
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In its emphasis on the seedier aspects of prison life, Shamlu’s lexicography directly 
counters a nearly three- decade long effort by the Pahlavi state to paint its modern penal 
apparatus as a vanguard institution of rehabilitation, education, and the reformation of criminals 
into model citizens. Beginning in the mid-1950s, even as dissident discourses increasingly railed 
against Pahlavi torture, the state publicized the work of its flagship prison reform organizations, 
the Institution for the Cooperation and Industry of Prisoners (Bungāh-i Ta‘āvun va Ṣanā‘ī’-i 
Zindāniān) and the Organization for the Protection of Prisoners (Anjuman-i Himāyat-i 
Zindāniān) as major successes in its modernizing efforts. State discourses on the prison, 
presented by one of the above institutions, championed Pahlavi prison policies in the language of 
scientific humanism and put forth the theory that modernized Pahlavi prisons were capable of 
transforming antisocial and criminal elements into useful, integrated citizens.52 These 
organizations emphasized their ability to curtail criminal tendencies among the prison population 
and argued that, thanks to Pahlavi prison reform, the days of idle, abusive prison life were 
nothing more than distant memories of an unenlightened past. The Institution for the Cooperation 
and Industry of Prisoners (ICIP) claimed that, before its establishment in 1954, prisoners lived 
illicit lives, often extorting other prisoners, and surviving prison stays marked with violence, 
drug abuse, and eventually recidivism  — the very vices that permeate Shamlu’s account of 
prison slang.53 This kind of behavior was ended, the ICIP claimed, through the Pahlavi-led 
establishment of prison factories, schools, and education facilities. Even names of carceral 
institutions were changed to reflect this newfound rehabilitative impulse; the Central Prison for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The Institution for the Cooperation and Industry of Prisoners was established in 1954. For more on the history and 
rhetoric of these state organizations, see Chapter 3 of this dissertation. For an example of the Pahlavi state’s prison 
literature regarding the activities of Institution for the Cooperation and Industry of Prisoners and the Organization 
for the Protection of Prisoners, see Bungāh-i Ta‘āvun va Ṣanā‘ī’-i Zindāniān. Fa‘ālīyat-i Sih Sālih-yi Bungāh-i 
Ta‘āvun va Ṣanā‘ī’-i Zindāniān. [Three Years of Activity of the Institution for the Cooperation and Industry of 
Prisoners.] Tehran, n.p.: 1344 / 1965. Print. 
53 Ibid, 18-20. 
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Men and Women [Zindān-i Markazī’-yi Mardān va Zanān] was changed to Place of Repentance 
for Men and Women [Nedāmatgāh-i Mardān va Zanān], while smaller prison branches stopped 
being called prison [zindān] and started being called Place of Counsel [andarzgāh].54 Still, 
despite the best efforts of the Pahlavi state, the increasing animus towards Pahlavi punishment 
techniques reveals the extent to which a view of prisons as representative failures of the modern 
state had permeated Iranian discourses by the 1970s, just half a century after the codification of 





In the 1960s-1970, the Iranian prison exploded onto the global stage as both a focus of 
Iranian revolutionaries and, crucially, as one of the inaugural campaigns for a nascent 
international human rights movement. Chapter One of this dissertation begins the story at this 
relatively late point at its most global pre-revolutionary moment, a period in which a politics of 
concern regarding the Pahlavi prison came to animate people all over the world. It was in this era 
that the first U.S. Congressional subcommittee on “human rights” in Iran was held as a response 
to a building international anxiety regarding Pahlavi use of painful punishment techniques. I 
argue that this “rights talk” was the product of a promiscuous and unwieldy interaction between 
post-World War II institutions of international law, an Iranian student movement inspired by 
anti-colonial insurgency, global left-liberalism fighting to find a “new third way” beyond 
communism and Americanism during the Cold War, and Iranian political discourses on 
punishment and policing that emerged in decades prior. This alternative accounting of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ibid, 24. Note that this euphemistic sleight of hand mirrors the use of the word penitentiary (i.e. place of 
penitence) in English, a word that has its etymological roots in Latin and the Roman Catholic Church. 
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question of rights and the Iranian prison has largely been effaced by the politics of the 
contemporary era, but it is the genealogical inheritor of modern Iranian discourses concerned 
with questions of ethics, citizenship, crime, and punishment. This chapter sets the stage for the 
rest of this dissertation, which seeks to uncover not only the history of Iran’s modern penal 
apparatus but also the genealogy of the public life of that institution.55 
In Chapter Two, I turn to the late Qajar archive to examine questions of the state and 
popular sovereignty and argue that in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, European colonial 
concern with crimes committed against their citizens in Persia led to calls for increased policing 
and punishment, particularly in the capital and in the “ungovernable” borderlands. These 
demands led, for instance, to plans by European officials to create militarized, barbed wire 
garrisons for their officers, prison-like structures that would ironically defend them against the 
perceived lawlessness outside. It was in this era that the image of the “bandit” became one of 
central concern, marking the Qajars as unfit in the eyes of reformers and foreigners alike 
precisely because their reliance on ritualized public punishment was increasingly seen as 
incapable of contending with a perceived explosion of violence and criminality.  
In Chapter Three, I read state Pahlavi discourses on the prison, particularly the literature 
of state-run institutions such as the Institute for the Cooperation and Industry of Prisoners 
[Bungāh-i Ta‘āvun va Ṣanā‘ī’-i Zindāniān], and argue that just as reformists and political 
adversaries of the state were defining their politics against and through the prison cell, the state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 My use of the term genealogy here is indebted to both Nietzsche and Foucault, because in studying the prison I 
find it important to critique and contextualize the moralist discourses that have emerged around concepts of crime, 
punishment, and the law. At the same time, per Nietzsche’s rejoinder, I am wary of mistaking the effects of modern 
punishment for its causes. Further, because this dissertation seeks to provide a genealogical account of the Iranian 
prison, the following chapters do not proceed chronologically in order to avoid the teleological logic to which so 
many studies ending at the 1979 Revolution succumb. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. On the Genealogy of Morality. 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999. Print. Foucault, Michel. “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” In Language, 




was attempting to claim the prison as a success story in its own modernizing efforts. I show that 
by extolling the social virtues of its penal factories and literacy classes, these state discourses 
mark the prison-factory as a space of rehabilitation and reform in which the bad Criminal would 
be transformed through a productive economy of the body into the good Citizen. This chapter 
also considers the establishment of the academic field of criminology, which occurred in the 
same era that the Pahlavi state was producing its major literature on crime and reform. I chart the 
rise of social scientific debates on the relative merits of certain punishment techniques, and argue 
that the findings of this new academic discipline mapped onto the state’s modernizing sentiments 
regarding productivity, citizenship, and rehabilitation.  
Chapter Four moves thematically from the individual prison cell to the Iranian security 
state established in the aftermath of the 1953 coup that allowed the Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 
monarch to retain his seat of power. These years witnessed increasing reliance on the new 
surveillance arm of the state and a resultant intensification of anti-state violence in what came to 
be known as Iran’s “guerrilla era.” In response to the exponential increase in the use of painful 
punishment in this era, I consider the role of physical pain in the making of social and political 
worlds. I look at the genre of guerrilla literature, with its focus on endurance in the face of pain 
and the resilience of the guerrilla’s body, and argue that this literature stands in contrast to the 
understanding of pain in human rights discourses as something from which to be saved. In other 
words, to echo a formulation of Susan Buck-Morss, I argue that Iranian power has produced its 
own possibilities for politics and resistance.56 Nowhere is this better exemplified than in 
revolutionary guerrilla prison writings from this era.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Buck-Morss, Susan. Thinking Past Terror: Islamism and Critical Theory on the Left. New York: W.W. Norton 
























Human Rights and the Iranian Prison: 
The International Politics of Concern in the Late Pahlavi Era 
 
 
In 2011, in a hearing before the United States Senate Subcommittee on Foreign 
Relations, a series of experts weighed in on what they argued was an Iranian government that, 
more than 30 years after the revolution of 1979, was categorically unwilling to tolerate 
meaningful dissent.57 In his opening remarks, Pennsylvania Senator Robert P. Casey Jr. spoke in 
dire terms of a number of imprisoned Iranian women’s rights and labor activists: “These are just 
a few…of those who are suffering in Iranian prisons as we speak, as we gather here today, with 
all the freedoms we enjoy in this country.”58 For Casey, the United States’ role in the affairs of 
the Islamic Republic should have been evident to his fellow lawmakers. When it came to rights 
abuses in the Islamic Republic, Casey stated, “Let me be unequivocally clear. The United States 
must continue to engage our international partners to find ways to support the democratic 
movement in Iran and to hold the Iranian regime accountable to its international human rights 
obligations.”59  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 “Human Rights and Democratic Reform in Iran.” Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South 
and Central Asian Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. One Hundred Twelfth 
Congress, First Session. May 11, 2011. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011. Print. 
58 Ibid, 3.  
59 The timing of Casey’s comments would not have escaped members of the Committee, as they came just a few 
months after President Barack Obama signed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment 
Act of 2010 into law on July 1, 2010. Of course, these sanctions were primarily launched in response to Iran’s 
apparent nuclear ambitions, but the rhetoric around sanctions against Iran has long also included references to 
human rights violations.  
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Still, despite ever-growing post-revolutionary concern about Islamic Republic rights 
abuses, the 2011 hearing was not the first meeting about human rights in Iran before a 
Congressional subcommittee. In 1976 and 1977, the Committee on International Relations of the 
House of Representatives held two special hearings on human rights — and particularly on the 
issue of political prisoner torture — in Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s Iran.60 These meetings were 
novel and often-contentious instantiations of the Carter regime’s attempts to make “human 
rights” a central tenet of American diplomacy, and took place begrudgingly despite longstanding 
U.S.-led Cold War support for the Pahlavi regime. After all, some commentators groused, 
weren’t “human rights” violations largely a problem of the “un-free” Soviet bloc? And wasn’t 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi a close ally of the American government in the fight against Soviet 
influence in a sensitive region?61 Despite this internal discord, the Carter administration 
remained steadfast, eventually driving the mounting pressure on the Shah to a fever pitch and 
leading to major political and legal concessions from the Pahlavi state in 1977-8.62  But just how 
did a U.S. President and Congressional committee come to set its sights on the then-friendly 
nation of Pahlavi Iran? How did concern for the “human rights” of Iranian prisoners gain enough 
traction to receive such high profile attention during the Cold War?  
The following chapter is an account of the events and discourses that made this politics of 
concern regarding human rights and prisoner abuse in the Shah’s Iran possible on the 
international stage. I argue that the increasing prominence of torture in Pahlavi Iran provided 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 “Human Rights in Iran.” Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee On 
International Relations House of Representatives. Ninty-Fifth Congress, First Session, October 26, 1977. 
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 
61 See in particular the testimony of Charles W. Naas, the Director of the Office of Iranian Affairs in the Bureau of 
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in the State Department.  Ibid, 27-35. 
62 Carter’s apparent commitment to human rights, which he proclaimed loudly from the first days of his presidency, 
was a historical first for a United States President. See Moyn, Samuel. “Human Rights in History.” The Nation. 6 
August 2010. Print. Carter-era pressure on the Shah added critical weight to mounting pressure to the release 
political prisoners and to allow outside agencies into Iran’s prisons. Eventually, in the late 1970s, both Amnesty 
International and the International Red Cross were allowed into Iranian prisons for a review of conditions.  
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both a rallying point for Iranian dissidents reared on earlier Iranian political and anti-prison 
discourses as well as a testing ground for emergent global human rights movement at a time 
when this movement had not yet fully cohered into the industry it is today. I argue that far from 
initiating such “rights talk” on Iran, the 1970s Congressional hearings were rather a late step in a 
nearly two decade long push led initially by Iranian dissidents, some European and American 
intellectuals, and eventually nascent human rights organizations to bring the issue of Pahlavi 
prison abuse into the global spotlight. Thanks to this large-scale effort, there was already enough 
momentum by the mid-‘70s against the Pahlavi regime’s record of political violence for even the 
most pro-Pahlavi individuals and institutions to be aware, however begrudgingly, of the growing 
storm calling for reform in the Shah’s Iran, if not the outright transformation of the Iranian 
political landscape.  
By the time of the 2011 Congressional hearings and into our current day, the notion that 
the United States would be interested in something called “human rights” and that these rights 
could be invoked in foreign policy matter has been established as commonplace. This moral and 
political common sense, however, is one that was only just forming in the mid-1970s. In recent 
years, advocates, critics, and scholars of human rights have noted such rights talk’s exponential 
proliferation. While the conventional narrative in the wake of this human rights boom has been 
triumphalist, painting human rights as universal and timeless, current revisionist historiography 
has more accurately characterized the history of human rights as a relatively recent one.63 In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 There is a growing body of literature on the history of human rights. A great deal of this literature remains 
encumbered by a hidden or not-so-hidden triumphalist belief that human rights are, indeed, timeless and universal. 
For a quintessential early example of this sort, see the 1969 UNESCO text compiled by Jean Hersch. Hersch, Jean 
(ed.), Birthright of Man. Paris: UNESCO, 1969. Print. The most influential recent scholarly account that succumbs 
to a liberal teleology of rights is Lynn Hunt’s Inventing Human Rights, in which Hunt argues that 20th century calls 
for human rights are the historical consequence of emerging modern liberal sentimental subjectivities and political 
appeals to the rights of man. Hunt’s book places the 1948 U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the 
logical outcome of a world changed by the 1776 American Declaration of Independence, the 1789 French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, and the sentimental humanism exemplified by Victorian literature. 
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Iranian case, most commentators have linked the question of human rights to the 1979 Iranian 
revolution and establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran. To be sure, the Islamic Republic’s 
record on human rights has been the topic of major international concern, as Western 
policymakers, international and Iranian NGOs, human rights watchdog groups, and expatriate 
activists have worked to “name and shame” the Islamic Republic for its apparent offenses and 
abuses.64 Despite vital contributions by activists and scholars in these fields, however, 
contemporary interest in the prisons of the Islamic Republic as well as Eurocentric contemporary 
scholarship on the rise of “human rights” have nonetheless obscured the earlier Iranian prison 
rights movement, which cannot neatly be thought of as merely an footnote or early instantiation 
of current day rights claims. I argue that these historiographical and political trends obscure the 
genealogical importance of this movement, which was as much an inheritor of legacies of the 
20th century nationalist anti-colonial movements and earlier Iranian anti-prison discourses as a 
signal of a new type of movement in its own right. Long before the advent of the Islamic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Certainly, Hunt’s text is more sophisticated than much of the triumphalist literature produced by rights organizations 
themselves. Her argument is nonetheless teleological, positing human rights movements as an obvious and 
necessary outgrowth of what she calls the “cascading” demand for rights that originated in 17-18th century 
movements. See Hunt, Lynn. Inventing Human Rights: A History. New York: Norton, 2007. Print. Historian Samuel 
Moyn has made a pathbreaking intervention inf such accounts of the history of human rights in his recent 
scholarship. In The Last Utopia, Moyn argues that, rather than being an inevitable outgrowth of either earlier liberal 
movements, human rights are a surprisingly novel formation initiated by the United Nations but “stillborn” at their 
inception in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He describes the contemporary appearance of such 
“rights talk” as a final utopian political longing in the wake of the failure of ideologies such as Marxism, 
nationalism, etc. See Moyn, Samuel. The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2010. Print. Moyn, Samuel. “Imperialism, Self-Determination, and Human Rights.” In Akira Iriye, 
Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock, The Human Rights Revolution: An International History. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012. 159-178. Print. Moyn, Samuel. Human Rights and the Uses of History. New York: 
Verso, 2014. Print. My chapter takes Moyn’s work as an essential intervention in the (re-)telling of human rights 
history, but nonetheless seeks to complicate Moyn’s timeline by arguing that rights politics in the Iranian case 
cannot be neatly folded into his Eurocentric genealogy of rights. For a useful overview on some of the recent 
historiography of human rights, see Cmiel, Kenneth. “The Recent History of Human Rights.” In Akira Iriye, Petra 
Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock, The Human Rights Revolution: An International History. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012. 27-51. Print. For an invaluable critique of the self-professed universality and “goodness” of 
human rights, particularly in light of contemporary American militarism, see Asad, Talal. “What Do Human Rights 
Do? An Anthropological Enquiry. Theory & Event. Vol. 4. Issue 4. 2000. Print.  
64 An emblematic scholarly example is Afshari, Reza. Human Rights in Iran: The Abuse of Cultural Relativism. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001. Print. For just one representative example of human rights 
activism focused on Iranian prisons, see the website of the Iran Human Rights organization. http://iranhr.net.  
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Republic, or the ascendancy of the human rights industry, Iranian prisons had become a cause 
célèbre that brought a large international Iranian student movement, armed guerrilla 
revolutionaries, liberal journalists, nascent human rights watchdog groups, British 
Parliamentarians, world-renowned philosophers, and eventually American policymakers into the 
same political orbit. As numerous student activist publications from emergent groups like the 
Confederation of Iranian Students National Union (CISNU) and the United States Iranian 
Students Association (US-ISA) proclaimed as early as the1960s, Iranian prisoners were “exposed 
to the most horrible conditions” and “continuously tortured in the most inhumane way.”65 At the 
same time, torture was not the only concern of these expatriate activists, who combined their 
concern for prisoners with broader analysis of global conditions. These student groups and 
publications would be at the forefront of this international movement against Pahlavi prisons, 
which promiscuously and irreverently mixed nascent liberal “human rights” language with Third 
Worldist, nationalist, Marxist, and Islamist discourses.66 Crucially, for these Iranian students, 
activists, intellectuals, and revolutionaries, the Iranian prison was a long-standing concern dating 
back to the advent of the modern Iranian state. In the 1960s and 1970s, these concerns came to 
overlap — sometimes comfortably, sometimes uneasily — with the growing international 
movement for something called “human rights.”  
Today, to evoke “human rights” is to conjure a litany of abuses, most prominently 
gendered violence, human trafficking, sexual slavery, and ethnic cleansing. Importantly, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 This quote is from an article printed by the U.S.-based Iranian Students Association. See “The Shah of Iran Visits 
His U.S. Imperialist Bosses!” Dānishjū. October 1969. Print. 
66 In Theology of Discontent, Hamid Dabashi argues that three revolutionary trends dominate political discourses 
and movements in modern Iran: nationalism, socialism, and Islamism. Against those who argue that the primary 
means through which modern Iranians have meaningfully organized politically is through the lens of Islam, that “In 
the course of its encounter with colonial modernity over the last two hundred years, Iran has produced three 
simultaneous revolutionary ideologies—nationalism, socialism, and Islamism.” Dabashi, Hamid. 2005. Theology of 
Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. 2nd ed. Edison, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers. xxvii. Crucially, these seemingly disparate political languages drew from each rather than running along 
parallel lines. My chapter deals with the some of particulars of in this theoretical and political encounter.  
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many, calls for such rights also evoke human rights’ disturbing complicity in the project for 
American empire, notably in the lead up to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003.67 In the 
inaugural campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s, however, the notion of “human rights” was largely 
synonymous with the perceived global explosion in the use of torture. Amnesty International 
made its organizational name in an early 1970s campaign to have the United Nations adopt its 
first resolution against torture, and its early work against torture in Greece was a formative one 
for the organization.68 It was precisely in the wake of AI’s success in bringing about the 1973 
anti-torture U.N. resolution that AI’s Secretary General Martin Ennals stated his organization’s 
position on the Shah’s Iran in extraordinary and damning terms: “No country in the world has a 
worse human rights record than Iran.”69 The rest of this chapter charts the emergence of Pahlavi 
prisons as a global concern among the various political actors. In order to do so, I chart two 
fitfully connected histories: first, the history of “human rights” discourses in the Iranian context, 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 For an important critique of the capitalist-imperialist logic of human rights, see Žižek, Slavoj. “Against Human 
Rights.” New Left Review, n.s., 34 (July–August 2005): 115-131. Print. For a critical account of U.S. warmongering 
that nonetheless does not reduce the discourse of human rights to the project of empire see Moyn, Human Rights 
and the Uses of History.   
68 For more on AI’s important early campaign to publicize torture in Greece, see Keys, Barbara. “Anti-Torture 
Politics: Amnesty International, the Greek Junta, and the Origins of the Human Rights ‘Boom’ in the United States.” 
In Akira Iriye, Petra Goedde, and William I. Hitchcock, eds., The Human Rights Revolution: An International 
History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012, 201-221. Keys argues that the effort to publicize and prevent 
Greek torture of dissidents represents a formative campaign for AI and the international human rights movement. I 
would add that the Iranian case represents a similarly formative campaign, although crucially, unlike the Greek case, 
the Iranian example was spearheaded by a sizeable grassroots campaign on the part of politically diverse Iranian 
activists, including Marxist and Islamist revolutionaries.   
69 Quoted in Faroughy, Ahmad. “Repression and Iran.” Index on Censorship, London, 3, No. 4, Winter 1974, 9-18. 
Print. 18. For a brief timeline on AI’s campaigns to have the United Nations recognize and denounce the use of 
torture, see http://www.amnesty.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights-anniversary/key-dates.  
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Human Rights in Pahlavi State Discourses 
 
By the time of his downfall, even Mohammad Reza Pahlavi understood his regime’s 
collapse to be the result of this global interest in the human rights of Iranian prisoners. In a 
memoir written just before his death and published posthumously in 1980, the then-freshly 
deposed Shah rails against what he believes to be the world’s unfair and ostensibly incorrect 
judgment of the human rights record of his regime. Terminally ill, frustrated, and obviously 
enraged at the circumstances of the Pahlavi dynasty’s unceremonious demise, the Shah mocks 
and chastises not only the leadership that succeeded his own, but also those global critics who 
censured Pahlavi policing and interrogation policies. Writing only a few short months after he 
fled the soon-to-be Islamic Republic of Iran, the erstwhile Shah writes, “Every day reports come 
of murder, bloodshed, and summary executions…All these horrors were part of Khomeini’s 
systematic destruction of the social fabric I had woven for my nation during a 37-year reign. And 
not a word of protest from American human rights advocates who had been so vocal in 
denouncing my ‘tyrannical’ regime!”70 The Shah’s hurried exit from Iran led to months of travel 
between Latin America, the United States, and finally Sadat’s Egypt, all in an effort both to gain 
access to medical care and to avoid extradition to Iran, where revolutionary forces were 
demanding his immediate return to stand trial for crimes against his people. Pahlavi describes his 
final travels at length, complaining bitterly that his former friends had all turned their backs on 
him despite his grave illness, while unjustly painting him as a dictatorial torturer. It was this 
reputation, in Pahlavi’s estimation, that led to unnecessary difficulty during his myriad border 
crossings. The beleaguered monarch writes, “The United States Consul General in Mexico City 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza. Answer to History. 2nd Edition. Trans. Michael Joseph. 1979. Stein and Day: New 
York. 1980, Print, 12. The Shah’s memoir was first written and published in French, then translated into English, 
and then finally translated into Persian.  
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waited near the plane to prepare necessary entry documents. I noticed his surprised expression 
when he saw me. This is not how he had imagined the Shahanshah, that violator of human rights 
and oppressor of peoples depicted by the media for so long.”71  
By the time that this memoir was written in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 
Revolution, the notion of “human rights” had not only acquired the international traction to be 
worth mention, but had also assumed enough weight to somehow have played a part in the 
downfall of the Pahlavi regime from the point of view of the Shah himself. In the aftermath of 
the success of the revolution, members of the Pahlavi elite similarly invoked the Shah’s human 
rights record the key to his defeat.72 Despite Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s apparent disdain for the 
budding human rights industry, however, the story of human rights discourse in Iran ironically 
has important roots with the Pahlavi family itself. In the 1960s, when “human rights” were only 
beginning to be buzzwords among the international legal community, those using the language of 
human rights as such in Iran were often members of the Pahlavi elite. Most prominently, the 
Shah’s powerful twin sister Princess Ashraf Pahlavi was a mainstay on a number of human rights 
and women’s rights bodies, working both at the United Nations in New York and appearing as a 
delegate at numerous international rights-oriented conferences during the latter years of her twin 
brother’s reign. The Princess worked extensively with the U.N., serving for sixteen years as a 
member of that body’s Human Rights Commission and spending a number of years as the 
Chairman of that Commission. Ashraf Pahlavi also spent seven years as head of the Iranian 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Ibid, 12. 
72 For instance, in an interview conducted in 1979 a few months after the Shah’s abdication, Fereydoun Hoveyda 
(Iranian ambassador to the United Nations and brother of former Prime Minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda) claims that 
“[After 1970] people were becoming more critical and there was more repression…Carter became President and 
brought up this human rights business, the Iranian Government tried to give a trimming, but a trimming was not 
enough.” Hoveyda, Fereydoun. “Reminiscences of Fereydoun Hoveyda: Oral History 1979.” Columbia University 
Oral History Collection. Jessup, Frederick Peterson, interviewer. 30. Tellingly, in a second related interview 
Hoveyda links the activism of the Iranian opposition to the work done by groups like Amnesty International, stating 
that: “About the scope of the opposition you could assess it through the actions of Amnesty International and the 
International Association of Jurists, and so on. These people went to Iran, made reports, everything was clear.” (45) 
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delegation to the United Nations. Of her experiences working with the U.N., Pahlavi writes, “I 
felt I had found the natural forum for discussing and solving the problems that concerned me 
most. The first committee I worked with was the Human Rights Committee, and…I believed 
wholeheartedly that I had become part of a body that could make a difference.”73  
The Shah’s sister also promoted her reputation among the international diplomatic 
cognoscenti, referring to herself as an “itinerant ambassador,” meeting with heads of state on 
behalf of her work with the U.N., and garnering international press coverage for her efforts.74 
Two years after the United Nations dubbed 1968 “International Human Rights Year,” a New 
York Times feature on the Princess raved that, “Given a choice between following the sun or 
spending February and March in Manhattan and more precisely in meetings 10 hours a day at the 
United Nations, the Princess says she prefers doing exactly what she is doing: presiding as 
chairman of the Human Rights Commission.”75 In these years, the Pahlavi state aggressively 
worked to promote the Princess’ successes in the fields of human and women’s rights and 
international diplomacy as markers of the regime’s progressive modern outlook. For instance, in 
1975 (the United Nations “Year of the Woman”) the Pahlavi state translated and publicized 
letters from various heads of state — including the likes of Spain’s Francisco Franco, the U.S.’s 
Gerald Ford, and Thailand’s Bhumibol Adulyadej — to Princess Ashraf applauding her for her 
women’s rights efforts.76 For the Pahlavi elite, the language of human rights had decided public 
relations benefits, providing a readily available means through which to broadcast their self-
image as “enlightened” rulers abroad.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Pahlavi, Ashraf. 1980. Faces in a Mirror: Memoirs From Exile. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. Print, 173.  
74 Ibid, 149. 
75 Teltsch, Kathleen. “She May Be a Princess, but the Shah’s Twin Is More Interested in Equal Rights.” The New 
York Times. 22 March 1970. Print. 
76 The Women’s Organization of Iran. Valī Hażrat Shāhdukht Ashraf Pahlavī Dar Bārih-yi Hūqūq-i Zanan. [Her 
Royal Majesty Princess Ashraf Pahlavi on the Rights of Women.] Tehran: The Women’s Organization of Iran, 1354 
/ 1975. Print. For a history of state-sponsored women’s organizing, including Ashraf Pahlavi’s activities, see Paidar, 
Parvin. Women and the Political Process in Twentieth Century Iran. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.  
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Perhaps the most noteworthy conference over which the Princess presided was the United 
Nations’ first International Conference on Human Rights, an event held in Tehran in 1968 to 
celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.77 In his 
opening remarks at the conference, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi boasted that Iran was the ideal 
location for a conference. Employing his usual mixture of state-nationalist bluster and rhetorical 
extravagance, Pahlavi claimed that:  
My compatriots are profoundly aware of the historic importance of the meeting 
which is opening today…They are very proud that their country should have been 
chosen as the site of the first International Conference on Human Rights. Their 
pride is the more legitimate in that, in their view, a remarkable coincidence 
underlies this choice; for I need hardly tell you that the ancestor of the documents 
recognizing the rights of man was promulgated in this very country by Cyrus the 
Great about two thousand years ago.78 
 
In spite of his grandiose oratory, there is little to suggest that Iranians were convinced by the 
Shah’s self-serving genealogy of rights. This was particularly the case among members of the 
Iranian political opposition, some of whom used the occasion of the U.N. Conference to protest 
Pahlavi penal policies. Pahlavi prisons had long been established as fodder for oppositional 
voices, as three decades of Iranian dissidents had already written communiqués from and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 For further scholarly discussion on this conference, see Burke, Roland. “From Individual Rights to National 
Development: The First UN International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran 1968. Journal of World History 19, 
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memoirs of their time in detention centers in Iran. What is significant about this 1960s moment, 
however, is the employment of the language of human rights in defense of Iranian prisoners. 
Notably, during the conference, several wives, daughters, and sisters of Iranian political 
prisoners presented a formal petition to Marc Schreiber, the Executive Director of the 
Conference and then-head of the U.N.’s Division of Human Rights. The petition listed a number 
of prisoners being held in “secret police jails” by name, decried the “inhuman treatment” meted 
out in SAVAK79 interrogation centers, particularly at Qizil Qalih in Tehran, which was located 
close to the site of the conference, and complained about the prevalence of indefinite detention 
with being charged.80 A similar message, this time in the form of an open letter written by “the 
political prisoners of Qasr Prison” was also circulated in spring 1968 and addressed to the 
Human Rights Commission of the U.N. In this letter, prisoners complained not only of “severe 
medieval torture” but also of internal exile, claiming that both leftist and Islamist prisoners had, 
“without any reason or legal ground” been sent to “areas with poor climatic conditions.”81 The 
content of these complaints was typical among Iranian dissident groups; what is noteworthy in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Founded in 1957, Sāzmān-i Iṭilāʿāt va Amnīyat-i Kishvar (SAVAK), or the Organization of Intelligence and 
National Security, was the Shah’s intelligence service.  
80 Quoted in Confederation of Iranian Students National Union. Documents on the Pahlavi Reign of Terror: 
Eyewitness Reports and Newspaper Articles. Documentation Centre of Confederation of Iranian Students National 
Union: Frankfurt, n.d. Print.  
81 Ibid, 148. The letter names members of the “Party of Islamic Peoples” as well as leftists from the “Marble Palace 
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objectively harsher and more primitive — no running water, worse food, extremely hot or extremely cold, etc. — 
and where politicized prisoners would not be able to access their comrades. For a reference to an early instance of 
internal exile, see the prison memoir of Iranian-Armenian Communist Ardeshir Avanisyan, who describes his 
imprisonment in the early Reza Shah period as a cadre of the Iranian Communist Party. Avenisyan is sent to a 
provincial prison because, in his estimation, he is too active in attempting to organize his fellow prisoners, 
particularly in hunger strikes. Avanisyan, Ardashir. Yāddāshthā-ye Zindān: Salha-ye 1928-1942. [Prison Writing: 
The Years 1928-1942] Stockholm: Hizb-i Tudih, 1979. Print. For a later example of the practice, see the memoir of 
Abbas Samakar, a militant Marxist and nominal member of Khosrow Golsorkhi’s infamous “group of fourteen” who 
was imprisoned in the early 1970s. Samakar was initially sent to Qasr Prison in Tehran, where he is one of hundreds 
of political prisoners, to a small prison in the south of Iran where he is the lone political prisoner. Samakar, Abbas. 
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these documents is the sense that members of the Iranian opposition perceived that the U.N. was 
a body interested in something called “human rights,” and was capable either of intervening on 
their behalf or at least of being embarrassed by its inconsistent rhetoric. The letter states that the 
prisoners “saw no alternative but to appeal to you…We appeal to you, who on humanistic 
grounds, have founded organisations for the defence of Human Rights, to bring pressure to bear 
on the Iranian regime so that an end could be put to these practices.”82    
These opposition petitions were, of course, unremarked upon in the state-influenced 
Iranian media of the day. Mention of the 1968 U.N. Conference did, however, make it into at 
least one Iranian newspaper. The first issue of the weekly English-language newsmagazine Iran 
Tribune, published by Iran’s primary news publishing company Kayhān for the English-speaking 
Tehrani ultra-elite as well as their foreign friends, reported that the conference had been a smash 
hit, at least insofar as all of the delegates “enjoyed every single night” dancing and carousing 
until the wee hours.83 Diplomats and foreigners were assured that the Shah’s regime had taken 
every precaution during the conference to guard them from unfriendly locals:  
In an effort to protect conference hostesses from any abuse while performing their 
duty, the ICIC organization have been very strongly reacting to any slight. One 
hostess, who had to take some delegates shopping, was treated impolitely by a 
shopkeeper when she suggested her guests also see other shops, since there was 
nothing that seemed to please the delegates. Within hours the shopkeeper had 
been picked up by the police...In fact he was only warned and freed but this 
protective attitude…is encouraging.84 
 
The United Nations conference was not the Pahlavi regime’s only foray into promoting their 
state-sanctioned vision of human rights. Later in 1968, the regime sponsored a “Human Rights 
Exhibition” in the new wing of the national Iran Bastan Museum in Tehran, with a cross section 
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83 “Tribune Tattler.” Iran Tribune. 1.1 (1968): 24. Print.  
84 Ibid, 24. 
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of “social realist painters” featuring “scenes of war, love strife, racial conflict, etc.”85 In the ‘60s, 
despite increasing urgency and unrest among various segments of the Iranian opposition, the 
Pahlavi regime contentedly deployed the language of human rights. For the Pahlavi state, this 
language was fully absorbed as a state-affirming nationalist discourse almost exclusively meant 
for display to other heads of state and foreign leaders.  
Still, despite its best efforts, the Pahlavi state was already losing momentum in the 
international public relations battle by the 1960s due to its legal and penal policies. For instance, 
the ironic location of the 1968 U.N. conference was not only mentioned by Iranian dissidents, 
but also raised the eyebrows of English philosopher Bertrand Russell, who was among the 
earliest European thinkers to rally against Pahlavi political violence in the name of “human 
rights.” In an essay from 1968 entitled “Inside the Shah’s Prisons,” Russell references 
“deteriorating conditions” in Iran which were the result of “the new wave of repression that has 
swept the country, culminating absurdly, in the world conference of human rights, held in 
Teheran from April 22 to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights.”86 
Like the Iranian dissidents mentioned above, Russell remarks on the U.N. conference’s 
incongruous geography, noting that it was held only a few blocks away from the notorious Qizil 
Qalih interrogation center in Tehran. Refuting the Shah’s genealogy of rights and echoing the 
Iranian dissident letter quoted above, Russell argues that the proximity of the conference to Qizil 
Qalih performed the dubious task of “reminding the world that, after Saigon and Athens, Teheran 
was the least appropriate choice for such a celebration”87 Here, Russell’s ethical mapping places 
Tehran in conceptual proximity to a both a right wing, anti-communist military junta (in Athens) 
and a major communist capital (in Saigon), signaling to readers that Iran’s place as a “friendly” 
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bulwark against communist encroachment would not protect it against all of its critics. Russell’s 
essay marked his ethics as standing outside of the rigid binarism of the Cold War logic; he would 
not be the last non-Communist leftist intellectual for whom human rights provided a critical 
language outside of the Marxist or American political language of the day.  
Russell’s engagement with the Iranian cause did not end here. Later in 1968, Russell sent 
a cable directly to Mohammad Reza Pahlavi outlining his displeasure with what he viewed as 
Iran’s reliance on political violence, show trials, and torture. This telegram was later further 
disseminated by the Iranian student movement abroad, which routinely publicized Russell’s 
writing on Iran. In this cable, Russell tersely writes:  
Am shocked at military persecution of fourteen men of letters, now to be 
arraigned before court-martial. This action follows cruel tortures. It will result in 
the deaths of many if you do not intervene. The civilized world will not forgive 
such a crime. Appeal to you to draw back from permitting murder. Bertrand 
Russell.88 
 
For Russell, support for Iranian prisoners was necessary work for anyone concerned with 
safeguarding those human rights cherished by “civilized” global citizens. In the press release 
detailing the particulars of the imprisoned intellectuals, Russell condemns the treatment 
dispensed by the Shah’s judicial and disciplinary apparatus. He writes:  
[The] Iranian intellectuals who have been held, now, for nine months under close 
arrest…have been imprisoned under appalling conditions, without any specific 
charges having been leveled against them, and without any of the elementary 
rights of access to legal advice, let alone to any judicial hearing. Now they are 
brought to a “Court” which must surely embarrass even the Iranian authorities by 
its brutal disregard of civilised legal conventions. The military are, apparently, to 
be jury, prosecutioner and judge in their own case against these valiant, honest 
and much persecuted men. Having beaten, whipped and half suffocated its victims 
for almost a year, the Iranian Army now intends to kill eight of them, for no better 
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45 
	  
reason than that they have retracted their “confessions,” which were extracted 
under torture.89  
 
Russell’s plea takes on a decidedly activist tone, as he calls upon readers to embark on “the 
widest possible protest campaign against this travesty of human rights. Representations should 
be made to the Iranian Government directly, and through its Embassies all over the world.”90  
 Among his countrymen in this era, Russell was principally joined in his critiques by a 
small but vocal set of activists and politicians on the British liberal left. Unlike early human 
rights activism that emerged in Europe against the Greek military junta, however, Russell and his 
British compatriots acted within the context of a larger Iranian movement against the Shah’s 
legal practices and punishment techniques. Instead, they were educated on the Shah’s policies 
largely by Iranian activists and discourses, in particular by a massive and vociferous Iranian 
student movement abroad. Indeed, it is impossible to imagine the global movement against 
Pahlavi penal policies emerging in the 1960s-1970s without the efforts of these expatriate 
students, many of whom had earned their political education through their engagement with 
earlier Iranian political discourses and in some cases directly with the Shah’s penal apparatus. It 
is to this student movement, which so decisively influenced the anti-torture activism of the late 
1960-70s, that this chapter now turns its attention. 
 
The Iranian Student Movement on the International Stage 
 
 The 1968 U.N. conference in Tehran was held at the tail end of a decade that saw major 
changes in Iran in the form of the Shah’s massive reform program (the “White Revolution”) as 
well as the bloody 1963 protests in response to those reforms, which brought politicized Shi’ism 
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and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to the national stage.91 The 1960s also saw the establishment 
of a sizeable and influential anti-Shah student movement outside of Iran, most prominently in 
Western Europe and the United States. This movement has fittingly been called “the most active 
and persistent force of opposition to the shah’s regime during the two decades prior to the 1978-
1979 Revolution.”92 It is this student movement that brought knowledge of Iranian prisons — 
culled in some cases through personal experience but largely gained through familiarity with 
long-standing discourses on the Iranian penal apparatus — to the attention of global intellectual 
figures like Bertrand Russell, European and American politicians, international rights 
organizations, and individual activists. Without the persistent work of this student movement in 
mobilizing international scrutiny of Pahlavi policies, these groups were not likely to have 
involved themselves in Iranian affairs to the same degree, if at all. Just as crucially, Iranian 
students abroad had the opportunity to engage with a broad range of non-Iranian student 
movements, borrowing both tactical and theoretical approaches from a variety of activists, e.g. 
Black power, Third Worldist, Muslim, Maoist, liberal, civil rights seeking, human rights seeking, 
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etc.93 The intermingling of these heterogeneous social and political worlds would have 
transformative effect on the Iranian opposition movement abroad, the movement against prisoner 
abuse and torture in Iran, the global human rights movement, and eventually the revolutionary 
groundswell that culminated in Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s ouster in 1979.  
 Based in Frankfurt and founded at a conference in Paris, the Confederation of Iranian 
Students, National Union [CISNU] formally joined with the United States Iranian Students 
Association (USISA) and the Organization of Tehran University Students (OSUS) in 1962, 
declaring itself the exclusive representative of Iranian students both in Iran and in the diaspora. 
This was an unprecedented merger, and one that would prove crucial in Iranian political life for 
the next decade and a half. In its early years, the Confederation was dominated by nationalist 
students loyal to Mohammad Mossadegh’s National Front, with a smaller number of students 
loyal to the Communist Tudeh (“Masses”) Party as well as some pockets of Islamist students. In 
this earlier era, CISNU actively campaigned against the Shah’s policies through appeals to the 
rule of law and the Iranian Constitution, not having yet moved to the revolutionary posture that 
would dominate Iranian opposition politics in the 1970s.94 In 1971, after a number of successful 
CISNU campaigns against the Pahlavis and in the wake of the dramatic arrival of the Iranian 
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condemn such unwarranted meddling and call for a speedy return to the rule of law.” Matin-Asgari, Afshin. Iranian 
Student Opposition to the Shah, 58.  
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guerrilla movement, membership in CISNU was officially outlawed by the Shah.95 Spurred by 
this move and radicalized by the dramatic actions of the Iranian guerrillas, CISNU made 
increasingly revolutionary demands as the 1970s unfolded.96 While the activism of CISNU was 
eventually dominated by revolutionary Marxisms — Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, Stalinism, and 
guerrilla-ism were all prominent, if sometimes conflicting ideologies — the literature of the 
student movement also leaned heavily on the apparently un-Marxist language of “human rights.” 
Members of CISNU, for instance, often called upon international bodies like the United Nations, 
particularly where the issues of the Shah’s extralegal judicial practices and the plight of political 
prisoners were concerned. Finally, in the late 1970s, immersed an atmosphere of prisoner rights 
awareness that they helped create, CISNU members experienced two of their greatest successes: 
occupying the Iranian consulate in Geneva and revealing it as a SAVAK stronghold in 1976, and 
then famously disrupting the Shah’s visit to the White House in 1977.97  
 Unlike some human rights discourses that expressed concern for prisoners in purely 
moral terms, Iranian student publications used “human rights” as a political analytic with which 
to evaluate and theorize the Iranian state-form. That is to say, for CISNU, Pahlavi human rights 
violations were the natural practical outcome of, what was in their view, a comprador capitalist-
imperialist state apparatus. Thus, in their iteration, human rights discourse was not the end of 
politics or ideology (as Moyn has theorized about the emergence of human rights discourses in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 For a close analysis of the Iranian guerrilla movement’s contribution to the anti-torture movement, see Chapter 5 
of this dissertation.   
96 CISNU was also plagued by sectarian strife, as there were much in-fighting and eventual splits between Maoists, 
Stalinists, Guevarists, Islamists, Nationalists, and those professing eclectic mixtures of any of the above. In 1975, 
the force of the guerrilla movement in Iran led to the dominance of those students who called explicitly for 
revolution in Iran and supported the guerrillas as the vanguard of that revolutionary surge. For more on these myriad 
splits, see Matin-Asgari, Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah. For a brief synopsis of the same, see Matin-
Asghari’s entry on CISNU in Encyclopedia Iranica. Matin-Asgari, Afshin. “Confederation of Iranian Students 
National Union. Encyclopedia Iranica. Web. Accessed 20 November 2014. 
www.iranicaonline.org/articles/confederation-of-iranian-students-national-union-konfederasiun-e-jahani-e-
mohasselin-wa-danesjuyan-e-irani-e.  
97 Matin-Asgari, “Confederation of Iranian Students.” Encyclopedia Iranica. For more on the Shah’s visit to the 
White House, and ISAUS actions there, see also Moradian, Neither Washington, Nor Tehran. 
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the international context), but rather an analytic through which to understand the development of 
the modern state as it developed in Iran.98 At the core of CISNU’s and ISAUS’s work was their 
analysis of SAVAK, the Shah’s formidable security and intelligence apparatus. In a 1969 
pamphlet called Dar Bārih-i SAVAK [About SAVAK], CISNU attempts to establish a historical 
periodization for the establishment and rise of SAVAK on the Iranian scene. In CISNU’s 
estimation, SAVAK’s establishment in the 1950s in Iran comes on the heels of the global rise of 
right wing nationalism, state surveillance, and especially fascism in the first half of the 20th 
century.99 As such, CISNU argues that the first Pahlavi monarch Reza Shah’s regime was part of 
a global phenomenon — linked to global capitalism and imperialism — that saw the rise of 
autocratic, centralist governments in places like Atatürk’s Turkey, Ioannis Metaxas’ Greece, and 
fascist Italy and Germany.100 From the early 1960s, the Iranian opposition outside of the country, 
both students and non-students, collected information about the practices and policies of 
SAVAK and publicized their findings for their readership, first largely in Persian and then 
eventually in English, French, German, and other European languages.101 For the opposition, this 
effort had two sometimes-contradictory aims: first, to argue that SAVAK should be understood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 This understanding of human rights complicates Samuel Moyn’s periodization in The Last Utopia, in which he 
argues that human rights discourses took center stage in the 1970s precisely due to exhaustion with the political 
utopias of the 20th century, particularly revolutionary Marxism or Third World anti-colonialism. I agree with the 
major thrust of Moyn’s influential argument, but I believe that the Iranian case provides compelling evidence that 
the periodization he provides cannot be so neatly achieved.  
99 Confederation of Iranian Students National Union. Dar Bārih-i SAVAK. [About SAVAK.] CISNU: Frankfurt, 1348 
/ 1969. Print. 3-4.  
100 Of course, it is not only the Iranian student movement that has compared Reza Shah to Atatürk in particular. For 
a recent scholarly study that also raises the comparison between Reza Shah’s rule and that of the first leader of the 
Turkish Republic, see Atabaki, T. & E.J. Zürcher. Men Of Order: Authoritarian Modernization Under Atatürk and 
Reza Shah. New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2004. Print. 
101 For some later examples of literature on SAVAK in various European languages by Iranian opposition parties, 
see Tudeh Party. SAVAK: Police Secrète Du Chah. Paris: Comité Central du Parti Toudeh d’Iran: 1976. Print. 
Kanani, Nasser.  SAVAK: Der Iranische Geheimdienst Eine Dokumentation. Münster: Periferia Verlag, 1979. Print. 
For German-language material regarding SAVAK from CISNU, see Confederation of Iranian Students. Kampf der 
Tätigkeit des SAVAK in der BRD: Dokumentation: Wie die Bundesregierung die Tätigkeit der Mörderbande des 
Faschistischen Schah-Regimes SAVAK in der BRD und Westberlin Duldet und Unterstützt. Darmstadt: Föderation 
Iranischer Studenten: 1977. Print.  
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not as a random phenomenon but rather a necessary outgrowth for a quasi-fascist Iranian state 
that wielded SAVAK’s might as “a tool of imperialism and reaction.”102 This meant researching 
and exposing SAVAK’s surveillance and interrogation tactics to their readership, including 
often-gruesome reports of torture. It is important to note that in CISNU’s theory of violence, 
torture was neither the result of a moral failing nor was it a vestige of pre-modern punishment 
techniques. Instead, for CISNU, SAVAK torture is a specifically modern technique of 
governance, a type of violence that is a direct outgrown of Pahlavi authoritarian modernity. The 
second aim for the opposition was to argue that, despite both their often-dispiriting findings and 
SAVAK’s own self-promotion, the Pahlavi surveillance apparatus was neither omnipotent nor 
omnipresent.103 Despite SAVAK’s record of extraordinary violence, CISNU argued, ordinary 
Iranians were already equipped to resist a state that was ultimately weaker than it appeared on 
the surface.104 Per this theory, the Shah’s security apparatus could only succeed through SAVAK 
perpetually asserting and performing its omnipresence and might. Accordingly, the need to 
constantly and ostentatiously reassert the state’s power is precisely what drives SAVAK to 
responding ruthlessly to even those activists taking their first small political steps. This in turn 
produces a culture of fear; it is this culture and not SAVAK as such that pushes ordinary Iranians 
towards political quietism. It is the job of the dissident, then, to reveal the “cracked” [tarak-
khordeh] power of the reactionary state.105  
The anti-Shah movement abroad with the students at the lead a found some of its most 
vocal early supporters in the form of some liberal members of the British Parliament, whose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Confederation of Iranian Students National Union. Dar Bārih-i SAVAK. [About SAVAK.] CISNU: Frankfurt, 
1348 / 1969. Print. 3-4. 
103 A version of this argument can be found in the (expatriate) National Front’s 1971 pamphlet on SAVAK. See 
National Front. Pārih-i az Asrār-i Sāzmān-i “Amnīyat” (SAVAK). Jibhih-yi Millī (Khārij Az Kishvar), 1350 / 1971. 
Print.  
104 Confederation of Iranian Students National Union. Dar Bārih-i SAVAK, 3-5. 




public pronouncements against Pahlavi policies were the first instances of European statesmen 
criticizing Iranian legal and judicial policies. From the earliest stages of this encounter between 
the Iranian students and the European left the single issue that most obviously animated the non-
Iranians was the issue of torture and prisoner abuse. Led by Member of Parliament Stan Newens, 
British parliamentarians of the Labor Party founded a group called the “British Committee for 
the Defence of Political Prisoners in Iran” in 1965 and openly stumped for the Shah to let outside 
observers into Iran’s courtrooms and prisons.106 Newens’ active involvement in Iranian politics 
came in the wake of a April 1965 assassination attempt on Mohammad Reza Shah’s life — the 
second such attempt during the monarch’s reign — in which the would-be assassin, a royal guard 
named Reza Shamsabadi, killed two palace guards before himself being shot.107 As with the 
attempted 1949 regicide, the Pahlavi regime swiftly blamed the attack on the influence of 
Marxists, in this case a number of British-educated leftist students. Shortly after the incident, 
fourteen leftist Iranian students were arrested, interrogated, and eventually tried on charges 
related to the attempted regicide.  
It was these high profile arrests and trials, backed as they were by Tehran’s claim that the 
assassination attempt was a “Peking-backed coup…planned by Iranian students in Kensington 
coffee bars,” that raised the ire of Newens and some Labor Party cohorts.108 In May 1965, fifty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 The Economist. (November 13th, 1965). Print.  
107 Two attempts were made on Mohammad Reza Shah’s life, first in 1949 then in 1965. These assassination 
attempts were of major consequence for the mid-century Iranian political landscape. The Shah blamed the 1949 
attempt on the then-strong Communist Tudeh Party, leading to the systematic suppression of the party. Similarly, the 
1965 assassination attempt was linked by the state to student activism in Europe. The 1949 incident altered Iranian 
political culture by dramatically weakening the Tudeh Party, which was then essentially dismantled in the aftermath 
of the 1953 C.I.A.-led coup that restored the Shah to the Peacock throne. The 1965 incident put student activists in 
the state’s crosshairs. Historical information regarding the 1965 attempt on Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s life has been 
drawn from the newspaper reports collected in Confederation of Iranian Students National Union. Documents on the 
Pahlavi Reign of Terror: Eyewitness Reports and Newspaper Articles. Documentation Centre of Confederation of 
Iranian Students National Union: Frankfurt, n.d. Print. 34-133. For an important critical reading of this era of the 
Tudeh, see Chaqueri, Cosroe. The Left in Iran, 1940-1957. London: Merlin Press, 2011. Print. 
108 This quote, attributed to Iran’s secret police, is from the May 9th, 1965 issue of The Observer. Collected and 
reprinted in Confederation of Iranian Students National Union. Documents on the Pahlavi Reign of Terror: 
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British MPs led by Newens began a letter writing campaign that saw them send several letters to 
Iranian ambassadors, newspapers, Parliamentarians, and the Prime Minister. Their first letter, 
written on May 7th to the Iranian Ambassador in London Ardeshir Zahedi and also published in 
The Times, claims to have “no wish whatsoever to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran.”109 
Nonetheless, the MPs demand that Zahedi “convey our disquiet to your Government” and to 
send “assurances that our fears are groundless.”110 For his part, Zahedi responds indignantly that 
the MPs have crossed the line in their tone with a representative to a “friendly country,” and that 
he “takes great exception to the manner in which this matter has been handled.”111 Briefly 
responding to the allegations despite his insistence that he is “under no obligation to reply,” 
Zahedi insists that anyone arrested in Iran receives fair and equal treatment before the law, and 
that the rumors regarding prisoner abuse are wholly inaccurate.112 The Pahlavi regime responded 
to this international pressure by launching a media offensive in the form of a series of scathing 
editorials in Iranian newspaper Iṭilāʿāt in which the “extreme left wing” MPs are told in no 
uncertain terms: “Mind Your Own Business!”113 Despite Tehran’s wishes, however, the British 
Committee didn’t stop with Zahedi. Over the next months, again led by Newens, letters were 
sent to the Prime Minister’s office, members of the Majles, and eventually to Etela’at in 
response to the editorials quoted above. In that letter, Newens advocates for human rights, 
writing “If people who stand up for human rights in any country in the world as we are prepared 
to do, are so denounced in the Iranian Press, our anxieties for the fair press treatment of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Eyewitness Reports and Newspaper Articles. Documentation Centre of Confederation of Iranian Students National 
Union: Frankfurt, n.d. Print. 46.   
109 Ibid, 81. 
110 Ibid, 81. 
111 Ibid, 81. 
112 Ibid, 81. The controversy didn’t end there. After further back and forth between Newens and Zahedi, Newens 
alerted Zahedi to the formation of the British Committee for the Defence of Political Prisoners in Iran, to which 
Zahedi curtly responded simply that the MPs should no longer have any direct communication with his office. 
113 An Iṭilāʿāt editorial also implies that at least some of the MPs are secretly homosexuals. Ibid, 92.  
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graduates who were the subject of our letter are increased enormously.”114 All of these activities 
were further publicized in the literature of the student movement abroad. Eventually, the Pahlavi 
regime would grow so irritated with Newens and fellow travelers in the Labour party that they 
would have SAVAK follow and investigate the MPs, going so far to maintain surveillance on 
their homes in England.115  
At the same time as this British-led letter-writing campaign, CISNU was staging a 
campaign of their own on behalf of the arrested Iranian students. In October 1965, they wrote an 
open letter to the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations, invoking the 1948 UN 
Declaration of Human Rights and demanding UN involvement in what they portrayed as illegal 
show trials for the arrested activists: 
As you are already aware, fourteen innocent Iranian patriots, accused of 
conspiracy to assassinate the Shah, are being tried before Teheran Military 
Tribunal. As we have stated on many previous occasions, the political trials of 
this kind held behind closed doors are not only in violation of the fundamental 
principles of the Iranian Constitution, but also in total disregard of the principles 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights — a document that has been 
approved and accepted by the Iranian Parliament.116 
  
Despite the best efforts of the Pahlavi state, the work of the Iranian students and their 
British supporters ultimately led to stunning and unprecedented success. Because of the 
Shah’s sensitivity regarding his reputation abroad, the Pahlavi state eventually lowered 
the charges against some of the accused, going as far as commuting two death sentences. 
This victory was not to be forgotten by opponents of the Shah. Three years later, in an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Ibid, 100. 
115 From a formerly classified SAVAK document.  “Secret Message From Simon to Bristol.” SAVAK #332–1274. 6 
Shahrīvar 1354 / 28 August 1975. This SAVAK communiqué warns the anonymous operative in London to exercise 
extreme caution when tailing Newens, so as not to be noticed. For more on Newens’ activism, see his recent 
autobiography Newens, Stan. In Quest of a Fairer Society. Langley Park, England: Memoir Club, 2013. Print.  
116 This entire letter, signed officially by CISNU, can be found in Confederation of Iranian Students National Union. 
Documents on the Pahlavi Reign of Terror: Eyewitness Reports and Newspaper Articles. Documentation Centre of 
Confederation of Iranian Students National Union: Frankfurt, n.d. Print. 65-69.  
54 
	  
essay on Iranian prisoner abuse, Bertrand Russell invokes this success in an effort to 
cultivate further opposition to Pahlavi repression, reminding readers, “In 1965, following 
an international outcry at the show trial of various opponents of the regime, at least two 
people escaped execution. A similar protest must now be mounted around the world to 
save the men rotting in the Shah’s prisons.”117 By the mid-1960s, the student movement 
and their European supporters had succeeded in bringing the issue of “human rights” and 
the Iranian state to public attention.  
 
Iranian Prisons and the International Human Rights Movement  
 
 At the same time that it was successfully courting the support of British liberals, the 
Iranian opposition movement abroad was finding a new set of allies among the fledgling 
international human rights movement, then still in its infancy. In June 1964, just a few months 
after the protests that saw the deaths of hundreds of Iranian protesters at the hands of the Pahlavi 
army and which led to the exile of Ayatollah Khomeini from Iran, Jan Papanek and Roger 
Baldwin — Chairman and Honorary President to the International League for the Rights of Man 
— wrote a letter addressed to U Thant, then-Secretary General of the United Nations. In their 
letter, Papanek and Baldwin decry the mistreatment that met political prisoners in Iran: 
We have in our possession the names of many Iranian citizens, some of them 
well-known in public life, prosecuted before military tribunals for acts not 
associated with violence or subversion. It is a matter of record…that political 
prisoners are tortured; that judiciary proceedings are for political ends; that indeed 
a year ago, hundreds if not thousands of persons not engaged in armed rebellion 
were shot down by the military.118 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Russell, Bertrand, “Inside the Shah’s Prisons.” 4. 
118 This excerpt was re-printed by the Confederation of Iranian Students National Union in Germany. See 




As noted above, much of the early international human rights concern regarding Iranian political 
prisoners came from Europe, the home of CISNU. By the early 1970s, however, despite 
overwhelming public support for the Pahlavi regime from various American heads of state, this 
politics of concern about Pahlavi prisons had also spread to the United States. Even a typically 
sympathetic mainstream press found reason to occasionally alter its typically positive coverage 
of the Pahlavi monarch. Much of this shift in coverage was coterminous with the increasing 
publicity around the issue of prisoner torture around the globe.  In a 1972 feature article in The 
New York Times entitled “Torture as an Institution,” James Becket, an American attorney 
working for Amnesty International, outlined what he classified as an “eruption” of torture around 
the globe.119 Becket argues that despite torture’s status as a universally condemned practice, with 
its most eloquent condemnation coming in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, not only 
had it not yet disappeared in the 20th century, but its usage had increased. He uses the Shah’s Iran 
as one example of this increase in painful penal practice, and like CISNU and Russell before him 
maps Iran onto a dubious geography of torture: 
Today reports of torture come from every quarter. One day we read about the 
burning ‘metal table’ in Iran and the trials where the only evidence are the 
confessions of those about to be executed; another day it is Uruguay where the 
recent discovery of a judicious blend of physical torture and ‘truth drugs’ has 
produced spectacular results, or Northern Ireland where the British army employs 
the same refined techniques it used in Cyprus or Aden. 
 
Even in the context of the Cold War United States, Becket firmly places anti-communist regimes 
(like the Shah’s Iran or Uruguay’s military dictatorship) in his crosshairs, naming them as major 
culprits in what he believes to be the modern “re-emergence” of torture. This is an early iteration 
of contemporary human rights discourse’s now often-critiqued moral geography, in which 
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119 Becket, James. “Torture as an Institution.” The New York Times. 4 August 1972. Print.  
56 
	  
human rights violations are painted as abuses that happen “over there” rather than “over here” in 
the United States or Europe. Becket doesn’t, however, lay the blame entirely at the feet of these 
individual regimes. Again echoing Russell’s earlier critiques, Becket instead condemns 
American involvement in the training of military and paramilitary torture units, destabilizing the 
dualist Cold War logic that would lay rights abuses squarely at the feet of the Soviet bloc. For 
Becket, this American support of torturing regimes is among the era’s great moral outrages; as 
such, it is precisely this unsavory involvement that should be targeted by U.S-based human rights 
activist. For Becket, the case of Iranian prisons is important in particular because his argument is 
predicated on the claim that American hands are not clean in the recent history of global torture.  
For Becket, like many in his time, human rights activism was inextricably and uniquely 
linked to the issue of political prisoner abuse and torture. This was a common concern of the 
major international human rights organizations of the 1970s, often at the expense of other 
apparent violations. Unlike CISNU publications that embedded a theory of political violence in a 
larger analysis of the state, the fledgling human rights industry focused its activism on the issue 
of torture as such. Public attention to the global practice of torture, typically described as a 
practice in the process of staging a troubling “re-emergence,” was drastically expanded by the 
work of Becket’s organization Amnesty International, which had its modest origins in the early 
1960s but within a decade influenced the United Nations into passing a resolution to formally 
denounce torture in 1973.120 That same year, AI published its first report on torture, devoting a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 AI reports on its campaign to have this UN resolution passed in its first International Report on Torture in 1973: 
“The first year of the campaign was successful in publicizing the widespread use of torture, in collecting more than a 
million signatures from all over the world in support of an anti-torture resolution in the United Nations, and in 
obtaining the unanimous passage of that resolution, General Assembly Resolution 3059 (XX-VIII), which calls on 
all governments ‘to become parties to existing international instruments which contain provisions relating to the 
prohibition of torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’” Amnesty International. Amnesty 
International Report on Torture. 1973. First American Edition. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1975, Print. 7. 
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number of pages to the Iranian case, which was by then a major example used by the global 
movement against torture.121 In that influential chapter on Iran, AI reports:  
It is alleged that torture of political prisoners during interrogation has been 
established practice in Iran for many years. The earliest detailed statement of 
torture known to Amnesty is dated 23 December 1963…However, opponents of 
the Iranian regime allege that torture has been taking place since the overthrow of 
Mossadegh in 1953.122  
 
Another AI report on Iran from the mid ‘70s furthered its gruesome allegations, somberly 
claiming that “Prisoners are very likely to be ill-treated…Torture does invariably occur during 
the period between arrest and trial.” In what was rapidly becoming AI’s signature style, this 
report coldly and methodically relays information regarding various techniques employed by 
Iranian interrogators, stating that “Alleged methods of torture include whipping and beating, 
electric shocks, the extraction of nails and teeth, boiling water pumped into the rectum, heavy 
weights hung on the testicles, tying the prisoner to a metal table heated to white heat, inserting a 
broken bottle into the anus, and rape.”123  
At the same time that AI was in the process of establishing itself as the premier human 
rights advocacy group on the international scene, reports of this sort were increasingly common 
among other emergent global rights watchdog groups, many of which repeated and republished 
information first publicized by the Iranian student movement or by AI. Some groups (including 
AI) felt compelled to do more than republish material from already circulating reports, instead 
attempting to send delegates — typically unwelcome by the Iranian government — to Tehran in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Amnesty International Report on Torture. 1975. The section on Iran can be found from pages 227-230. 
122 Ibid, 228. 
123 Amnesty International. Iran: An Amnesty International Briefing. Amnesty International Press: London, 1976, 8. 
The large amount of the information in AI’s early 1970s reports on Iran were culled second-hand from other human 
rights sources, former Iranian political prisoners living in Europe, or the ubiquitous Iranian student movement. In 
1970, Amnesty attempted to send an Iranian activist named Hossein Rezai to Iran with a German lawyer in order to 
investigate the legal and prison systems. The mission went poorly, as the German was expelled from the country and 
Rezai was arrested and ten years imprisonment by secret military trial. It would be several years before Amnesty 
was granted first hand access to Iranian prisons. For a brief mention of the Rezai case see Power, Jonathan. Like 
Water On Stone: The Story of Amnesty International. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 2001. Print. 144.   
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order to attend political trials and to take first-hand stock of the state of political prisoners held 
there. A motley assortment of legal experts, political activists, politicians, and public intellectuals 
took part in these fact-finding missions. Religious advocacy groups also got involved in this anti-
torture movement. For instance, in January 1976, the International Association of Democratic 
Lawyers sent a delegate named Jean Michel Braunschweig to Tehran alongside Father Michel 
Gest from the Movement of Catholic Intellectuals, Pax Romana. Braunschweig and Gest were 
particularly interested in the fates of religious opposition leaders — they asked specifically about 
Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani, and Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rafsanjani, three men who would soon become Iranian household names during and after the 
success of the revolution — but were largely met with indifference or outright obfuscation in 
attempting to see high-ranking government, business, or university leaders while in Tehran.124 
According to Braunschweig’s frustrated report, Iranian officials did everything to keep the 
observers from learning any relevant data or any upcoming trial dates:  
Concerning those under sentences of death, our visitor [the Minister of 
Information] confirmed that they would be able to lodge an appeal, but he could 
not give us any date for their next hearing, which had first to pass through a 
number of procedures. We have since learned that not only were the death 
sentences upheld on appeal and published in the Iranian press some 48 hours 
before we left for France, but that nine out of the ten were executed on Saturday 
24 January 1976 [just days after leaving Iran]. Because of the closeness of these 
dates, we are convinced that the trial took place while were still in Teheran…As 
with all the officials we met, this one explained to us that the group of terrorists 
were criminals and could not be considered political offenders.125 
 
Braunschweig and Gest’s report includes a terrifying account of SAVAK’s seeming 
omnipresence in Iran. Using the exaggerated numbers that commonly circulated in Iranian 
student materials and eventually human rights literature, the report states: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Eventually, after a number of dead ends, the lawyer and the Father managed to secure two meetings with 
representatives of the Iran’s Ministry of Information, though these meetings too yielded little information. 
125 Irandefence: News Bulletin of the Organisation for the Defence of Human Rights in Iran. March 1976 Vol. VI, 
No. I, 8. Print.  
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The political police, SAVAK, with an estimated 20,000 permanent staff and some 
180,000 informers, is everpresent (sic) at all levels of Iranian society, and no-one 
can be sure of anyone else… 
 In addition to the known, official prisons, SAVAK, especially in Teheran, 
uses a large number of locales in buildings spread about the town, as clandestine 
detention centres where interrogations are carried out on suspects who are later 
handed over to the military justice or who otherwise disappear without a trace… 
Some foreigners living near one police station assured us that they had 
many times seen blindfolded prisoners being brought in from police vehicles who 
were never seen leaving alive.126 
 
By the 1970s, the issue of torture in the Shah’s prisons was no longer merely a domestic 
(or expatriate) Iranian issue; it had fully arrived as a global cause célèbre. In this era, a number of 
well-known literary figures and public intellectuals become politicized around issues of writer 
imprisonment and torture in general and torture in Iran specifically, making the issue of torture in 
Iran a matter of even further public urgency. This was especially true among a new generation of 
American and European engagé literary figures, many of whom were affiliated with 
International PEN,127 an anti-censorship association of writers that was founded in 1921 in 
London but that grew in prominence during the human rights boom of the 1960s-1970s. During 
this period of growth, many of its members formally denounced the politically motivated 
imprisonment and torture of fellow writers around the world. Unsurprisingly for the largely 
liberal membership of PEN, this concern was often geared towards those writers facing 
harassment and repression behind the Iron Curtain. Still, numerous members of PEN lent their 
pens to the defense of those Iranian writers whom they considered to be among their global 
peers. This activism, however, would not be without its awkward moments, as PEN’s typically 
anti-Communist liberals came to find themselves championing the rights of Iranian leftists who 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Ibid, 14.  
127 The organization is now known as PEN International. See http://www.pen-international.org/our-history/ for a 
brief historical overview of the organization in its own words.  
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accepted their support but who sometimes nonetheless bristled at the politics of their strange 
literary bedfellows.  
No Iranian writer embodied this politicized literary celebrity better than then-newly 
exiled Iranian poet and essayist Reza Baraheni, who was incarcerated in Tehran’s notorious Evin 
Prison in 1973. After his release from Evin, Baraheni made his way to the U.S., where despite 
routine SAVAK harassment and surveillance he published two English-language books: 1976’s 
God’s Shadow, a book of prison poetry, and 1977’s The Crowned Cannibals, which soon 
became the best known text outside of Iran on the subject of Pahlavi prisons.128 In both books, 
Baraheni recalls particulars of his 102-day imprisonment and SAVAK interrogation, and outlines 
the Pahlavi state’s record of political violence. At the same time that he wrote prolifically on the 
issue of repression and torture in Iran,129 Baraheni engaged in behind-the-scenes work to 
advocate on behalf of Iranian prisoners through the politically engaged global literati best 
exemplified by International PEN in that era.130 While in the United States, Baraheni also joined 
the American branch of PEN and worked for a number of years with PEN’s “Freedom to Write” 
Committee, advocating on behalf of other imprisoned Iranian and international writers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Curiously, despite his celebrity, Baraheni’s texts have been little remarked upon by scholars. The only theoretical 
reading of Baraheni’s 1970s prison writing is in Darius Rejali’s Torture and Modernity, in which he analyzes The 
Crowned Cannibals as an Iranian theory of violence. Rejali argues that in this text, Baraheni is one of a number of 
important modern Iranian intellectuals (alongside Jalal Al-e Ahmad and playwright Gholam Hossein Saedi) 
attempting to answer the question, “how did we come to be like that,” i.e. torturers. See the introduction to this 
dissertation for more on Rejali’s work. Rejali, Darius. Torture and Modernity: Self, Society, and State in Modern 
Iran. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994. Afshin Matin-Asgari’s essay on Iranian political prisoners includes a 
brief mention of Baraheni’s public recantation in Iran, but doesn’t examine the content of Baraheni’s writing at 
length. Matin-Asgari, Afshin. “Twentieth Century Iran’s Political Prisoners.” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 42, No. 5 
(Sep., 2006), 689-707. Print. 
129 Along with the two above-mentioned books, Baraheni also contributed a number of articles and essays to major 
English-language magazines, newspapers, and journals. See for instance Baraheni, Reza. “Terror in Iran.” The New 
York Review of Books. 28 October 1976. Print.  
130 PEN International’s work and interest in Iranian literature or state censorship did not end in the 1970s or with the 
1979 Revolution. In 2005, PEN helped release Strange Times, My Dear, an anthology of post-revolutionary Iranian 
prose and poetry flanked by introductory essays summarizing Iranian literary and censorship trends of the period. 
This anthology includes a recent English-language poem by Baraheni, telling new generation of readers that he is 
“still active in trying to promote democratic liberties in his country.” Mozaffari, Nahid, Ed. Strange Times, My 
Dear: The PEN Anthology of Contemporary Iranian Literature. New York: Arcade, 2005. Print. 416. 
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Eventually, amidst the establishment of Iran’s post revolutionary state, Bareheni’s residence and 
employment in Canada would be secured in part by the advocacy of PEN Canada on the exiled 
writer’s behalf.131 
Baraheni’s generative connection to International PEN is exemplified by the introduction 
to The Crowned Cannibals, penned by best-selling American novelist E.L. Doctorow. The 
ideological peculiarities of this Cold War-era literary solidary is apparent in the differences in 
Doctorow’s and Baraheni’s respective writing in The Crowned Cannibals. In the introduction, 
Doctorow contextualizes Baraheni’s writing in the framework produced in the wake of the 
massive global success of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s The Gulag Archipelago — a major 
touchstone for PEN, the Freedom to Write Committee, and many of the new literary coalitions 
formed in the 1970s in the name of human rights.132 In this introduction, Doctorow doesn’t spend 
any space on the historical particulars of Pahlavi legal or penal practice or Iranian political 
culture, instead granting Baraheni an abstracted moral legitimacy afforded to the “kind of writer” 
— typified by Solzhenitsyn — who speaks truth to power, even against the harshest of 
punishments. He writes:  
 
There is a kind of writer appearing with greater and greater frequency among us 
who witnesses the crimes of his own government against himself and his 
countrymen. He chooses to explore the intimate subject of a human being’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 In an interview from 2007, Bareheni claims, “PEN Canada was instrumental in bringing me to this country 
[Canada].” See “Reza Baraheni Interview in Hart House Review.” Hart House Review. 14 October 2007. 
http://harthousereview.blogspot.com/2007/10/reza-baraheni-interview-in-hart-house.html. Web.  
132 Of course, The Gulag Archipelago was enormously controversial and its publication had major consequences for 
Soviet intellectuals, to say nothing of public or political life in the former U.S.S.R. Solzhenitsyn’s opus was 
famously championed by anti-Communists the world over and as vehemently derided by those who were 
unreservedly pro-Soviet. Perhaps most interestingly, however, The Gulag Archipelago was also a text of 
unparalleled import for those Russian (and Marxist) intellectuals who did not share Solzhenitsyn’s emergent 
conservative nationalist romanticism but who were nonetheless critical of the violence of the gulag. See in particular 
the essential review by dissident anti-Stalinist Marxist historian Roy Medvedev, first published in English in Index 
on Censorship in 1974. Medvedev, Roy. “On Solzhenitsyn’s ‘Gulag Archipelago.’ Index on Censorship. Vol. 3, 
No. 2, 1974. Print. See also Frankel, Boris. “The ‘Gulag Archipelago and the Left.” Theory and Society. Vol. 1, No. 
4 (Winter, 1974), 477-495. Print. In that article, Frankel makes the bold claim that “The only audience which can 
have a critically meaningful relationship to Solzhenitsyn’s document is the Marxist Left” (478).  
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relationship to the state. His is the universe of the imprisoned, the tortured, the 
disfigured, and the doleful authority for the truth of his work is usually his own 
body. Thus we have Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago, an account of the vast 
Soviet system of secret police labor camps.133 
 
For Doctorow, the significance of writers like Solzhenitsyn and Baraheni is not necessarily in the 
aesthetic value of their work, but in their specific capacity to “bear witness” to otherwise unseen 
and unspoken state violence. These writers are our eyes and ears in otherwise dark places “to 
which we have tenuous connection,” — and there is no confusion about just who “we” are in 
Doctorow’s formulation — which affords such writers a new title, beyond mere belle-lettrist: 
“writer-witnesses.”134 For Doctorow, these writer-witnesses are doing no less than creating “a 
new art, with its own rules, the Lieder of victims of the state.”135 Just what is the content of the 
new lieder, the “new song” of these writer-witnesses?  
It sings of regimes so repressive as to be fun-house images of civilization. It 
recounts years of solitary confinement. It tells of pliers for pulling fingernails, it 
speaks of electric currents sent into sexual organs, it describes prison cells in 
which a person can neither stand nor sit down. True, this is a necessarily small 
range of subject…but within these strictures the poet is entitled to sing with his or 
her own voice.136 
 
For Doctorow, the writer-witness achieves his subject-position as such only after brutal 
experiences of state violence, the content of which is identical across national boundaries or 
political contexts because torturers perform their sinister craft using the same means and for the 
same reasons everywhere. Doctorow writes, “torturers all have the same speech, the same 
rationale” for what they do. This leaves the writer-witness with formal and aesthetic restrictions 
in what he or she can write. Unlike the political and physical repression endured in the gulag or 
interrogation chamber, these restrictions are nonetheless freeing precisely because the writer-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Doctorow, The Crowned Cannibals, ix.  
134 Ibid, xi. 
135 Ibid, xi.  
136 Ibid, xi. 
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witness is allowed to write in his or her newly achieved “own voice.” Doctorow’s short 
introduction, then, provides a general liberal theory of political violence and the restorative 
power of writing. Doctorow claims that all torturers torture because they “hate” “the self” and 
want to destroy it, whereas the writer-witness subverts this attempt to destroy because by writing 
he or she restores “the self” to its proper centrality.137  
Doctorow wasn’t the only the well-established Western literary figure to favorably 
compare Baraheni to Solzhenitsyn. Other PEN members who advocated for Baraheni during his 
incarceration often invoked the renegade Soviet author in their public defenses of the Iranian 
poet and essayist. Baraheni’s 1976 book of prison poetry God’s Shadow reprints a letter 
published during his incarceration and written by well-known novelists Jerzy Kosinski (who 
served as President of PEN America between 1973-1975) and Joseph Heller and political 
essayist Dwight MacDonald. This letter, which was first published in December 1973 in The 
New York Times, states:  
In September 1973, Reza Baraheni, prominent poet and literary critic was arrested and 
imprisoned by the Iranian government…His hair and beard were shaved off and there are 
indications that he has been tortured. 
 Little of his writing is yet available in the West, but Mr. Baraheni is the author of 
twenty books. He is the founder of modern literary criticism in Persian. He is a journalist, 
poet, novelist, playwright, and scholar. Indeed, Mr. Baraheni is Iran’s Solzhenitsyn—
outspoken and independent. 
 As writers, scholars and individuals concerned with the right of free expression 
everywhere, we protest against the Iranian government’s harassment and imprisonment 
of one of the country’s leading authors…We call upon the Iranian authorities to release 
him forthwith from prison, restore his full rights and liberties and permit him to resume 
his academic and literary functions.138  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Doctorow’s theory of violence also contains a critical misreading of Arendt’s famous formulation of Nazism as a 
triumph of the “banality of evil” in the modern age. For Arendt, the 20th century is replete with political violence 
precisely because the modern bureaucratic state apparatus makes torture the matter of “banal” paper pushers, as 
exemplified in the figure of the decidedly “normal” seeming Adolph Eichmann. Doctorow reads this phrase as 
meaning that torture exists in places like Iran or the U.S.S.R because those societies reward murderous “maniacs,” 
making evil a banal, commonplace event. See Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of 
Evil. New York: Penguin Classics, 2006. Print. 
138 Quoted in Baraheni, God’s Shadow, 25. 
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This high-profile international advocacy on Baraheni’s behalf was instrumental in securing his 
release from custody in December 1973.139 Still, the leftist Baraheni was nonetheless discomfited 
by the comparison to the anti-communist and increasingly conservative Solzhenitsyn. In a note 
he adds to that fateful letter, Baraheni pushes back against comparisons to the Russian writer: 
“Mr. Solzhenitsyn is certainly a very great writer, but as soon as he tries to expound his political 
ideology and historical theory, he becomes so reactionary that I am hard-pressed to find any 
similarity between my ‘independence’ and his.”140 Instead, Baraheni — whose dedication in 
God’s Shadow reads like a who’s who of radical Iranian intellectuals, stating “Jalal Al-e Ahmad, 
friend, killed; Samad Behrangi, friend, killed; Khosrow Golesorkhi, friend, killed; Kermat 
Daneshiyan, killed”— places himself in an entirely different literary and political genealogy. 
Still, despite the occasional political dissonance between him and the movement that adopted 
him, Baraheni saw his international reputation grow further with the publication of these books 
and numerous articles.141 Even after the eventual success of the revolutionary movement, when 
American audiences were more captivated by the hostage crisis and the specter of political Islam 
than by any of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s supposed misdeeds, Baraheni was still reminding 
readers that “Prerevolutionary Teheran was shown to be a sick city dotted with grisly torture 
chambers.”142 Indeed, throughout in the mid-to-late 1970s and into the 1980s, Baraheni’s work 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 In God’s Shadow, Baraheni writes “I am grateful to all the American writers and poets who made my release 
possible. Their efforts were led by Jerzy Kosinski, president of the American chapter of PEN, and eventually were 
taken up by my Iranian friends in CAIFI.” Baraheni, God’s Shadow, 10. CAIFI, or the Committee for Artistic and 
Intellectual Freedom in Iran, was instrumental in this era as an Iranian activist organization that worked to advocate 
for arrested and imprisoned intellectuals and writers in Iran. (Fig. 2) For an instance of CAIFI’s influence among 
American intellectuals, see feminist writer Kate Millett’s Going to Iran, in which she briefly describes her work 
with CAIFI as “one of the most important things I’ve done.” regarding Iran. Millett, Kate. Going to Iran. New 
York:  Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1982. Print. 
140 Baraheni, God’s Shadow. 25. 
141 Baraheni also wrote a 1976 feature piece in The New York Times. This essay picks up where his books left off, 
recounting the gruesome methods of torture he and his comrades experienced in the Iran’s prisons. Baraheni, Reza. 
“Torture in Iran: ‘It Is a Hell Made for One Man by Another Man.’” 21 April 1976, Print. This article itself was 
reprinted from a longer piece published in the British periodical Index on Censorship. 
142 Bareheni, Reza. “The SAVAK Documents.” The Nation, 23 February 1980, 198-202. 
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became and remained the most widely available source on Iranian repression for countless 
international activists, intellectuals, and politicians.143 
Like Doctorow’s introduction to The Crowned Cannibals, Baraheni’s writing in that book 
also lays out a theory of political violence.144 Unlike Doctorow, however, Baraheni is interested 
in the specific conditions of possibility for state-sanctioned Iranian torture, not for torture in the 
abstract. His iconoclastic book can loosely be divided into three sections. The first is theoretico-
historical: a four-chapter outline of the history of “terror in Iran,” as well as a historical theory of 
that violence. The second takes up a poetics of pain, in the form of Baraheni’s prison memoir as 
well as a selection of his prison poetry. It is in these sections in which he reveals intimate abuse 
that Baraheni most resembles Doctorow’s “writer-witness,” insofar as he outlines his SAVAK-
led interrogation and detention in often-gruesome detail. The third section offers a brief 
intellectual genealogy of the Iranian prison in the form of translated prison writings by historical 
Iranian prisoners. Many of these short passages would have been well known in Iranian dissident 
circles, but here they provide an alternative genealogy of political struggle against Pahlavi 
prisons for Baraheni’s non-Iranian readership.  
In Baraheni’s estimation, torture in Iran is not a modern innovation, though it has taken 
on new virulence in a 20th century, particularly in the British-backed “fascist” Reza Shah 
period.145 Like the Iranian student literature discussed above, Baraheni argues that an expansion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 For instance, Kate Millett name checks Baraheni as the writer who most dramatically changed her understanding 
of the political situation in Iran. Millett, Kate. Going to Iran.  
143 Baraheni, God’s Shadow. 25. 
144 It is worth noting that while in the post-revolutionary period, there has been a deluge of Iranian prison memoirs 
published outside of Iran, in the pre 1979 period Baraheni’s work was unlike any other monograph published in 
English. Unlike the post 1979 memoirs, the overwhelming majority of which are straightforward narrations of prison 
experiences, Bareheni’s text is an unusual and far-reaching amalgam of theory, memoir, political treatise, poetry, 
translation, history, and literary mythology. In terms of genre and content, it remains one of the truly unique works 
of Iranian intellection in any language.   
145 He writes, “Iranian monarchs have always been unrestrained torturers. But torture acquired new dimensions in 
1920 with the emergence of Reza Khan as the strong man of the country backed by the British.” Ibid, 12. On Reza 
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of painful punishment techniques in Iran was a result of a global trend towards right wing 
nationalism and fascism in the first half of the 20th century. And, again echoing the historical 
logic of other opposition discourses, Baraheni argues that 1970s Iranian torture is a direct 
outgrowth of the 1953 CIA-backed coup t in Iran.146 Still, Baraheni argues, while British 
imperial interference and the American-backed 1953 coup provide specific reasons for the 
expansion of Iranian repression, one should not lay the blame for torture solely at the feet of the 
global powers. Instead, Baraheni argues that torture in Iran is a direct outgrowth of what he terms 
“Masculine History” — i.e. the patriarchal repression of women by men, and of ordinary people 
by the king. Baraheni’s gendered theory of violence is an eclectic mix of orientalist tropes 
(Iranian kings are “oriental despots,” masculine history has been the normative framework for 
Iranian politics since the ancient kings), Marxian language if not theory (the economic structure 
of “masculine history” is the “Asiatic mode of production”), and a quasi-feminist critique of 
patriarchal norms for which he uses Engels’ writings on the historical elimination of matriarchal 
societies.147 For Baraheni, repression or political terror in Iran cannot be understood without first 
understanding that the Iranian state is founded on an originary patriarchal (and cannabalistic) 
violence whose structure replicates itself in all political and power relationships; this is why on 
the state level Mohammad Reza Pahlavi must “emasculate” dissident intellectuals by 
imprisoning and torturing them, and why on the quotidian level women live in fear of men, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Shah’s similarity to the Nazis, Baraheni is even more unreserved: “I am sure the two regimes would have loved, in 
the spirit of Aryan brotherhood, to make a few experiments together, but the time was not ripe for that.” Ibid, 13. 
146 He writes succinctly, “Since August 1953, we have been under constant torture.” Ibid, 13.  
147 Baraheni quotes a passage from Marx and Engels’ selected works at length in which Engels outlines the 
“overthrow of the mother right” in the “world-historic defeat of the female sex.” Ibid, 26. For Baraheni, although 
Engels follows numerous anthropologists and historians in outlining the victory of patriarchy over matriarchy, his 
analysis is missing an essential component: a discussion of the history of Iranian monarchy. For Baraheni, the 
Iranian monarchy is patriarchy par excellence.   
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especially their husbands.148 Overturning 2500 years of masculine history, Baraheni maintains, is 
the enormous challenge before those invested in permanently ending torture in Iran.  
Despite his involvement with International PEN, Baraheni nonetheless expresses 
skepticism about the available international avenues to challenge the human rights violations of 
the Pahlavi state. Recounting a conversation he had in prison in which another prisoner hopefully 
relays a rumor that the United Nations will come investigate the grim conditions at their 
detention center, Baraheni writes that he responded wryly to this hope, “‘Princess Ashraf was the 
president of the Human Rights Commission of the U.N…No one from that commission will ever 
set foot in the Komité. The Komité is ours, the lice are ours, the heart attacks are ours, the torture 
chambers are ours.”149 Baraheni’s repetition that the problem of the Kumitih is “ours” – i.e. an 
Iranian problem that must be solved by Iranians and not outside institutions — subverts 
Doctorow’s earlier assertion that Baraheni is serving as writer-witnesses for a different “us” — 
i.e. Americans concerned with human rights abuses. For Baraheni, American readers and 
international organizations can only go so far in curing what is, essentially, an Iranian problem to 
be solved on Iranian terms.  
In order to attend to this apparent dissonance, it is necessary to take stock of The 
Crowned Cannibals self-presentation, not as the work of a rogue “Iranian Solzhenitsyn,” but 
instead, as the intellectual inheritor of a large corpus of modern Iranian political thought and 
writing. For instance, Baraheni includes a translated passage from the prison writing of Bozorg 
Alavi, a major modernist novelist, the first Iranian to ever write a prison memoir, and one of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 This is also why the contemporary regime, he argues, supports “sexist or lukewarm mystical literature, but if you 
speak about life in the streets of Teheran today, you go to jail.” Ibid, 10. 
149 The Kumitih interrogation center — or Kumitih-yi Mushtarik-i Ẓidd-i Kharābkār (“United Anti-Sabotage 
Committee”) — was among the most notorious interrogation centers in Tehran in the pre-revolutionary era. For 
more on this detention center, which has in recent years been turned into a museum, see the introduction to this 
dissertation. Baraheni, The Crowned Cannibals, 164. 
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founders of the Communist Tudeh Party.150 Throughout the book, Baraheni’s writing is deeply 
citational, as he makes ample reference to writing by Iranian intellectuals and litterateurs 
including Ali Shari’ati, Forough Farrokhzad, Ahmad Shamlu, Sadegh Hedayat, Khosrow 
Golsorkhi, and others. Significantly, his most extended engagement in The Crowned Cannibals 
is with the work of Jalal Al-e Ahmad, the legendary political essayist and Marxist-turned-
Islamist revolutionary whose most well known work Westoxification Baraheni translates, cites, 
and theorizes at length.151 Baraheni takes Al-e Ahmad’s famous formulation — that Iranians 
have been “Westoxified” (and “machine-ified”) by Western colonial incursions  — and pushes 
beyond both Al-e Ahmad’s theorization and a general Marxian conceptualization of alienation to 
argue that contemporary Iranians are in fact not only “Westoxified” but “doubly alienated.” For 
Baraheni, if Westerners are alienated from their labor through capitalist processes, Iranians 
experience double alienation because “we did not create this technology, this advanced capitalist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 For more on Alavi and the influence of his prison writing, see Abrahamian, Ervand. Tortured Confessions: 
Prisons and Recantation in Modern Iran. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999. Print. 48-71. For 
further details on Alavi’s life and work, including interviews and some translations see Raffat, Donne. The Prison 
Papers of Bozorg Alavi. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985. For Alavi’s epochal writing, see Alavi, 
Bozorg. Varaq Pārih Hā-yi Zindān [Scrap Papers from Prison]. Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1357 / 1978. Print. 
Print. Alavi, Bozorg. Panjāh-u Sih Nafar [The Fifty-Three]. Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1357 / 1978. Print. 
151 Al-e Ahmad is, of course, one of the most widely read if not the most widely read Iranian political thinker of the 
20th century. His best known text Gharbzadigī (Westoxification) was initially published clandestinely in 1961; it 
immediately transformed the Iranian intellectual landscape with its extraordinary erudition and anti-colonial critique 
of Western influence and what he termed “machine-ism.” Not only does Baraheni provide the first translations of 
Al-e Ahmad’s work into English, he also makes Al-e Ahmad’s influence clear to his English-language audience, 
explaining that “[Gharbzadigī] brought a whole generation of Iranian writers and intellectuals under its magnetic 
influence.” The Crowned Cannibals, 80. The secondary literature on Westoxification is considerable, in no small 
part because Al-e Ahmad has been championed for 35 years by the Islamic Republic as the major non-clerical 
theorist of revolution. As such, he has often been read as a “nativist” theorist seduced by romantic and ultimately 
right wing philosophical currents. For such readings, see Boroujerdi, Mehrzad. Iranian Intellectuals and the West: 
The Tormented Triumph of Nativism. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996 and Mirsepassi, Ali. Political 
Islam, Iran, and the Enlightenment: Philosophies of Hope and Despair. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010. For a more generous reading of Al-e Ahmad’s complicated oeuvre, see Dabashi, Hamid. 2005. Theology of 
Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. 2nd ed. Edison, NJ: Transaction 
Publishers. See also Dabashi’s Iran: A People Interrupted, where Dabashi discusses Al-e Ahmad’s formative 
influence on young Iranians in the 1960s and 1970s. Dabashi, Hamid. Iran: A People Interrupted. New York: The 
New Press, 2007. For a thoughtful reading of Al-e Ahmad’s political theory in the context of Iranian torture, see 
Rejali, Darius. Torture and Modernity. For Al-e Ahmad’s epochal text, see Al-e Ahmad, Jalal. Gharbzadigī 




system and the administrations and the bureaucracies involved, but they make use of us as their 
raw materials, subjecting us to a process of reification from afar.”152 He continues: 
First, we are alienated by the West because the colonial calamities bred by the 
Western world have been thrust upon us without we ourselves being or having 
become Westerners; second, the west plunders and destroys all our languages, 
literature, folklore, the identity of all our positive visions, poetic and artistic 
rhythms without replacing them with something that can originally be called 
Eastern.”153 
 
How does this “double alienation” link to the cannibalistic “masculine history” that is at 
the root of the imbalanced human relationships in Iran? Baraheni contends, “Our 
indigenous Masculine History finally turned into a pimp, a comprador pimp, and 
pandered us all to the West.”154 That is to say, in Baraheni’s theorization, the Iranian 
“pimp”-state has its way with an emasculated citizenry, and then sells out that citizenry to 
the global powers for more of the same. Baraheni’s response for what is to be done after 
his unwieldy and theoretically eclectic diagnosis is surprisingly prosaic: he recommends 
a transformation in the basic economic structure of the nation.155 Still, despite this 
anticlimactic conclusion, Baraheni’s work is significant because it both gestures to the 
complicated and multifaceted genealogy of the era’s anti-torture discourses and reveals 
the constitutive tensions in the relationship between the global human rights movement 
and the Iranian dissidents who helped produce that discourse. And, just as importantly, 
the emergence of figures such as Baraheni in International PEN led to still further 
engagement by international writers with the issue of Pahlavi penal practices. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Baraheni, The Crowned Cannibals, 82. 
153 Ibid, 83. 
154 Ibid, 83-84. 
155 Politically, Baraheni is sympathetic to the guerrilla movement but unconvinced that it can affect meaningful 
change. He credits the guerrillas for their energetic spirit and revolutionary fervor, but he argues that in a nation with 
many examples of regicide but no instances of true political transformation, spectacular political violence is not 
likely to be capable of achieving revolutionary transformation. 
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The pervasive influence of the international movement against Pahlavi prisons is typified 
not only in the activism of literary figures, but also in the unexpected ways in which Iranian 
prisons found their way into disparate cultural and literary works by American and European 
authors. This influence is typified by Tim O’Brien’s 1978 Vietnam novel Going After Cacciato, 
a text in which Iranian prisons, the terrifying SAVAK agents running those prisons, and 
gruesome punishments make central, if totally surprising, appearances.156 Going After Cacciato, 
which was recipient of the 1979 American National Book Award, is set primarily in Vietnam 
during the American invasion and war and as such has been read through exclusively the lens of 
U.S. Vietnam War literature by subsequent scholars.157 Despite the initial setting, however, the 
characters in the novel, led by Private First Class Paul Berlin, take a long and unlikely detour 
through the prisons and interrogation centers of Pahlavi Iran. O’Brien’s mobilization of Iran as a 
space of unthinkable political violence gestures to the pervasive understanding of Pahlavi prisons 
as spaces in which the worst sorts of abuses were possible. Going After Cacciato reveals the sea 
change that had occurred in international public perception of the Shah by the time of its 1978 
publication; by the late ‘70s Pahlavi prisons lived in infamy not only for politicized Iranians but 
also for a global reading public typified by readers of O’Brien, Doctorow, Kosinski, and the like. 
In order to understand the significance of Going After Cacciato, we must briefly turn to 
its plot. After one of the novel’s characters (the eponymous Cacciato) goes AWOL, the novel 
shifts between chapters in which Paul Berlin recalls the numerous deaths he has witnessed in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 O’Brien, Tim. Going After Cacciato. 1978. New York: Broadway Books, 1999. Print. 
157 For instance, see John M. Jakaitis. “Two Versions of an Unfinished War: ‘Dispatches’ and ‘Going after 
Cacciato.’” Cultural Critique. No. 3, American Representations of Vietnam (Spring, 1986), 191-210. Print. In a 
1995 essay, literary scholar Katherine Kinney reads Going After Cacciato more broadly than within just the context 
of the Vietnam War, analyzing the novel in the framework of American empire and exceptionalism. Although she 
discusses the Iran chapters of the novel explicitly, she nonetheless doesn’t concern herself with how it comes to be 
that O’Brien settles on Iran as a space of exceptional political violence. Kinney, Katherine. “American 
Exceptionalism and Empire in Tim O’Brien’s Going After Cacciato.” American Literary History. Vol. 7, No. 4 




war, and chapters in which he fantasizes about the squadron leaving Vietnam in search of 
Cacciato. It is eventually revealed that the story occurs largely in the imagination of its central 
character, who daydreams about going after his squad-mate because he is desperate to leave the 
violence of war behind. Taken on Berlin’s imaginary journey, the reader travels through 
Vietnam, Cambodia, India, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and eventually to France in search of the 
title character. Most of these imaginary locales get only brief treatment, but the squadron’s time 
in Pahlavi Iran — and especially its prisons — extends over a number of chapters.  
Upon their imagined arrival in Tehran, Paul Berlin and his squadron witness the public 
beheading of a young man just before they are themselves arrested by Iranian security forces.158 
The troop looks on helplessly as the Tehran police violently discipline the crowd, while 
contented Iranian officials calmly oversee the scene:  
On the far side of the platform, police were using clubs to form an aisle through 
the mob. They would beat their way forward, hitting hard, but then the crowds 
would swell in again, closing the aisle, and the police would then holler and hit 
harder. Up on the platform the military officers paid no attention to this. They sat 
in their chairs and made jokes and sipped sherry.159  
 
After their arrest, the Americans are taken to a police station in Tehran, where they meet Fahyi 
Rhallon, a man identified as “a captain in His Majesty’s Royal Fusiliers. A soldier…recently 
transferred to temporary duty with the Savak.”160 After Rhallon introduces himself, one of 
Berlin’s companions asks him what SAVAK is, to which Rhallon replies “Savak…it is…how do 
you say it? Internal security. Terrible duty for a man who would rather be killing Kurds.”161 
Rhallon insists that he is only ascertaining that they are in Iran legally, and that they will be on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Of course, spectacular forms of public punishment had long since been abandoned in Iran by the late 1970s. 
O’Brien is not necessarily telling readers that this sort of punishment is typical in Iran, but crucially, only that his 
character imagines it to be so. 
159 O’Brien, Tim. Going After Cacciato, 189. 
160 Ibid, 185. 
161 Ibid, 190. 
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their way soon. Berlin is worried; he assumes that his squad’s fate will be as bad or worse than 
that of the beheaded youngster. During questioning Berlin frets about SAVAK’s reputation for 
torture. The squadron is finally released after this first interrogation, but the freedom doesn’t last 
for long.162 Another arrest comes days later, after which they are violently interrogated by more 
sinister members of SAVAK, one of whom tells Berlin that the reason the young man had been 
beheaded is because he (too) was a deserter. With this, the Americans’ fate is seemingly set — 
until Paul Berlin simply decides to fantasize them out of Iran and out of the hands of SAVAK. 
Going After Cacciato, of course, is not about Iran or Iranian prisons in any strict sense. 
Instead, the beheaded boy of the opening scene is a stand-in for the deserting American soldiers; 
the Iranian military officers who contentedly execute him are analogous to Berlin and company’s 
own (American) superiors, who have sent them off to kill and be killed in war. In this sense, 
O’Brien’s novel has correctly been read in American studies scholarship as an indictment of 
American involvement in Vietnam. Why is it, then, that in order to imagine extraordinary 
political violence, O’Brien takes his characters out of Vietnam to SAVAK’s Iran? What does this 
move tell us about O’Brien and his readership’s understanding of Pahlavi Iran and its prisons? 
Importantly, Going After Cacciato’s invocation of Iran and SAVAK reveals that, for O’Brien’s 
American readership of the late 1970s, the Pahlavi state was understood as a quintessential space 
of extralegal violence, prison abuse, and torture. Further, the move from Vietnam to Iran gestures 
to the close relationship between Iran and the United States — Paul Berlin worries that the 
Iranian officials, whom he knows to be friendly to American interests, will view his squadron as 
deserters and enemies of the state. Gesturing to the dubious Cold War relationships charted by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Before their second arrest, they spend a night on the town with Captain Rhallon. Some intimations of the then-
contemporary real world unrest in Iran makes its way into O’Brien’s narrative: “Passing through a gloomy archway, 
the captain explained that a curfew had been recently imposed due to certain incidents of terrorism and sabotage.” 




intellectuals like Bertrand Russell, some of whom had already spent well over a decade decrying 
the American relationship to known torturers, O’Brien emphasizes the proximal relationship of 
the United States and Iran, both supposed bulwarks against Communism but guilty of political 
violence in their own right. O’Brien’s ethical mapping is clear: no matter how far Paul Berlin 
runs from Vietnam, he will nonetheless find himself in the American sphere of influence, where 
he likely to meet painful punishment. By suggesting that the American war effort in Vietnam can 
be understood in both the same moral and political universe as Pahlavi torture, O’Brien is able to 
both stage the horror of the Vietnam War and critically interrogate the politics that create the 
conditions of possibility for these spaces of extraordinary violence.  
 
“Human Rights” in Iran on the Eve of Revolution 
 
Even amidst the revolutionary discourse of the guerrilla era and the establishment of 
Khomeini as a leader of the Islamist and popular groundswell, by the mid-to-late 1970s, human 
rights as they were imagined on the international stage had seeped into domestic Iranian political 
discourses. In the fall of 1977, the first Iran-based organization to formally link its opposition to 
the framework of human rights as such was established. This organization, the Iranian 
Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights (ICDFHR), was founded in Tehran 
by twenty-nine members of the anti-Pahlavi opposition including the eventual first Prime 
Minister of the Islamic Republic, Mehdi Bazargan.163   
One of ICDFHR’s first organized acts was to write a letter of protest to the Secretary 
General of the United Nations in order to decry the Pahlavi regime’s apparent prison and human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 For a brief reference to this group and a list of some of its members, see Abrahamian, Iran Between Two 
Revolutions, 503. For more on Bazargan’s thought see Dabashi, Hamid. 2005. Theology of Discontent. 
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rights abuses. Incredibly, less than a decade after the 1968 U.N. Conference on Human Rights in 
Tehran, the Iranian political opposition was on the verge of permanently relegating the Pahlavi 
regime’s state-nationalist genealogy of human rights to the historical dustbin. So linked was 
Iranian Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights to questions of human rights 
and prisoner abuse in Pahlavi Iran that in 1978-79, amidst the success of the revolution and 
during the initial establishment of the political formation calling itself “the Islamic Republic,” it 
was this committee that would formally oversee the release of political prisoners from the Shah’s 
prisons, as mediated through a relationship with the fledgling Islamic Republic judiciary. (See 
Fig. 1.) 
Despite the prominence of Bazargan in the group, ICDFHR’s membership was not 
exclusively or even primarily Islamist.164 One of the other well-known members of the Iranian 
Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights was nationalist Seyyid Ali Asghar 
Javādī, a noted liberal-nationalist intellectual who in the late 1970s addressed two important 
open letters to the Pahlavi regime decrying both state corruption and the political repression of 
writers and activists.165 These letters were circulated in the political breathing room that emerged 
in the aftermath of the Carter administration’s insistence on the loosening of political restrictions 
in Iran in 1977. In one of these letters, addressed to Information and Radio Minister Nastatollah 
Moinian as well as Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Javādī repeatedly invokes the trampled upon 
“political freedoms” and “human rights [Hūqūq-i insāni] ” of the people of Iran. Javādī’s also 
invokes the international movement for the respect for such rights, tying his thought to the 
budding global movement.166 In his letters — which were circulated “in xerox copies in [the] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Perhaps unsurprisingly, given Bazargan’s former relationship to the National Front, the primary political 
characteristic of the group was its National Front styled nationalism. 
165 Javādī, Alī Asghar. Nāmih-hā [Letters]. Tehran: Tandur, 1357 / 1978. Print.  
166 Ibid, 2-3.  
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hundreds”167 — Javādī calls for a series of legal and political reforms: checks and balances 
between branches of government, an end to Pahlavi corruption, an end to the state-created 
Rastakhiz (Resurrection) Party, the establishment of legitimate opposition parties, and of course 
an end to torture and the immediate release of all political prisoners. And, although later scholars 
have not remarked on these letters at length, Javādī’s writing was invoked by British human 
rights and activists as a defining moment in the intellectual genealogy of the revolution.168   
In the years just before the success of the revolution, Javādī’s writing was also circulated 
by exilic Iranian dissident organizations eager to spread their message. One such organization, a 
human rights organization apparently unaffiliated with the student movement, any of the major 
Iranian political parties, or larger human rights NGOs, was the Committee for Human Rights in 
Iran (Kumitih-yi Difa‘ az Hūqūq-i Bashar dar Iran), or CHRI. CHRI’s statement of purpose, 
released on the occasion of the organization’s founding by Iranian expatriates in Washington 
D.C., reads:    
Our basic objective is to expose…the general social conditions, political 
imprisonments, and other crimes of the [Pahlavi] regime to such international 
organizations as Amnesty International, and to sympathetic and influential 
organizations and individuals throughout the world.169  
 
In order to work towards its stated goal, CHRI translated and published accounts of prison life in 
Iran from Persian into English. In their first publication, CHRI translated and published some of 
Javādī’s anti-Pahlavi writing, in this case, an essay that refers to Iran as a “Great Prison” and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 The Iranian Bulletins: The News Bulletins of the Committee for the Defence of Political Prisoners in Iran. 
London: Index on Censorship, 1979, v.  
168 Ibid. The 1979 Index on Censorship pamphlet goes on to claim that “The first open dissent came from people like 
Ali Asqar Javadi…who, in a series of essays written in the early months of 1977, especially one 200 pages written in 
May 1977 and addressed to the Shah, criticized the state of the nation generally and in particular the harmfulness of 
the Rastakhiz (Resurgence) Party — the country’s only political party, which was imposed by the Shah in March 
1975…Soon there followed a flood of protest literature from individuals and groups.”  
169 Committee for Human Rights in Iran. Letters From the Great Prison: An Eyewitness Account of Human and 
Social Conditions in Iran. Washington, DC: CHRI, 1978, 35.  
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outlines Pahlavi prisoner abuse and torture.170 To be sure, the trope of Pahlavi Iran-as-prison was 
not limited to CHRI literature, as by this point the Iranian opposition had successfully 
disseminated this image around the world in numerous formats and genres. (See Fig. 3 and 4) 
Indeed, despite the myriad ideological differences between various groups of revolutionaries, 
dissidents, and activists, the anti-torture discourses discussed throughout this chapter succeeded 
in branding the Pahlavi state as little more than a “great prison” for untold numbers of politically 




The link between Pahlavi prisons and the demand for human rights was by the eve of the 
revolution firmly established for politicized Iranians and their fellow travelers around the world. 
Iranian students and dissidents had, by the late 1970s, worked to link their longstanding critiques 
of Pahlavi prisons to this newly ascendant political language. The link between long-established 
Iranian dissident discourses and the call for human rights is evidenced by a 1978 statement made 
by a Paris-based Iranian expatriate group calling itself the Committee for the Defense and 
Advancement of Human Rights in Iran [“Kumitih Barāyih Difa‘ Az Hūqūq-i Bashar Va 
Pīshburdan-i Ān Dar Iran.”], which synthesizes many of the disparate political impulses in the air 
in those tumultuous months. 171 Certainly, for CDPDH, human rights was a guiding principle, but 
its notion of these rights featured the by-then-familiar promiscuity of political language and 
analysis found throughout diasporic Iranian opposition discourses.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Ibid.   
171 Kumitih Barāyih Difa‘ Az Hūqūq-i Bashar Va Pīshburdan-i Ān Dar Iran. Asāyisnāmih-yi Kumitih Barāyih Difa’ 
Az Hūqūq-i Bashar Va Pīshburdan-i Ān Dar Iran, 2nd edition. Paris: C.D.P.D.H.I, 1357 / 1978. Print. 
77 
	  
 CDPDH frames the existence of the Pahlavi state with a reference to the CIA-led coup to 
re-establish the monarchy in 1953. The goal of this coup, CDPDH asserts, was the exploitation 
of Iranian labor and the extraction of Iranian natural resources for American colonial benefit; the 
major consequence of the coup was the cutting off the Iranian masses from the right to national 
sovereignty. With this framework, CDPDH echoes the Marxist and anti-colonial logic that was 
by then long hegemonic among third world nationalists and socialists the world over as well as 
Iranian dissident groups. Its appeal, however, does not end with questions of national sovereignty 
or labor exploitation. Instead, CDPDH cites the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights and indicates 
that the Pahlavi state had lost both legal and moral legitimacy due to its continued human rights 
abuses, particularly with its prisoners. Why, according to CDPDH, is the issue of human rights 
so important? In CDPDH’s estimation, it is in the interest of the many disparate Iranian 
opposition groups to unify their budding movement. Though there are innumerable groups 
struggling against the Pahlavi regime, the pamphlet insists that human rights — particularly 
when pertaining to the issue of torture and political prisoners — has served and can continue to 
serve as a unifying cause and political idiom:  
The latest circumstances both inside and outside of the country necessitate that we 
further promote our longstanding efforts in the context of the ‘defense of political 
prisoners’ and ‘in defense of human and democratic rights for the people in the 
prison known as Iran.’ Indeed, it is now essential that all Iranian groups, 
committees, and organizations  — while maintaining their own independent 
outlook and tactical style — work together to make advancements in the defense 
of human rights…”172 
 
Different groups might have opposing outlooks or use different tactics but human rights 
provide the movement with a common goal. 
By this late 1970s moment, the language and logic of human rights had become so 
essential to the political imagination of Iranian dissidents that various combinations of 
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nationalist, Marxist, revolutionary, Islamist, and human rights discourses had become downright 
commonplace. Although they were late to the party, CDPDH was correct to note that Iranian 
political actors of various stripes were drawn to and unified by the issue of Pahlavi political 
violence and prisoner abuse, and that this movement against torture was strengthened and 
popularized internationally through its appeals to human rights. However, in examining the 
lengthy, intricate, and generative relationship between Iranian dissident discourses and the 
emergent global movement for human rights, this chapter has shown that it is not merely that 
Iranian dissidents instrumentally mobilized an already codified human rights discourse in order 
to further their political agenda. Nor is it accurate to imagine that the use of the budding 
language of human rights in the pre-revolutionary Iranian context simply reveals an early local 
instantiation of a fundamentally Western mode of thought that arrived in Iranian political 
discourses fully formed. Instead, international human rights as both political language and 
strategy was produced and transformed through its nearly two-decade long interaction with 
Iranian political movements and discourses, just as the anti-Pahlavi movement was irrevocably 
changed in its encounter with the language of human rights. It is impossible to imagine that 
either the global rise of human rights or the Iranian revolution of 1979 could have transpired in 








Fig. 1: A release form for a political prisoner held for five years before the revolution by the 
Pahlavi state and released in the aftermath of the establishment of the Islamic Republic. This 
form was officially sent to the Iranian Committee for the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights 







Fig. 2: A Pin created by the Committee for Artistic and Intellectual Freedom in Iran (CAIFI), 














Fig. 3: A political pin from the movement against Pahlavi prisons outside of Iran. Like many 
other images from this era, the image on this pin represents Iran as a giant prison from which 







Fig. 4: An image from an ISAUS pamphlet, which, like the pin above, imagines Pahlavi Iran as a 








Lawless Persia:  
The Emergent Order of Colonial Discipline in Qajar Persia 
 
 
“Prison is a term that refers to a dark, humid, and filthy room with nothing to be found all day 
and all night but a kundih173 for one’s feet and chains around one’s neck.” 




In summer of 1895, just a year before the assassination of Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar, an 
Iranian man identified only as Saduk by his British employer — one Mr. Tanfield of Lynch and 
Company175 — attacked and attempted to murder that employer in his bed with a sword. Tanfield 
awoke to find the sword-wielding Saduk perched on top of him, but despite his drowsiness, he 
managed to fend off a would-be deathblow to his head with his left hand; he escaped the attack 
with his life, though the hand was lost.176 Despite not succeeding in killing Tanfield, Saduk 
assaulted his employer so thoroughly that the Englishman lost consciousness in the arms of 
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174 Kirmānī, Nazim al-Islām. Tārīkh-i Bīdārī-yi Irānīān : Jild-i Aval (The History of the Awakening of the Iranians: 
Volume One), Tehran: Kitābfurūshī-yi Ibn Sinā, Chāpkhānih Majlis, 1954. Print. 
175 Lynch and Co. was a British company that was granted a concession by Nasir al-Din Shah in 1888 to run a line of 
steamers along the Karun river, including to the southern city of Ahvaz. It would become unpopular among both 
Iranians and Brits for its unusually poor business and labor practices in short order. For more on the history of this 
concession and company, see Shahnavaz, Shahbaz. Britain and South-West Persia 1880-1914: A Study in 
Imperialism and Economic Dependence. New York: Routledge, 2005. Print.  
176 According to Tanfield’s account, the enmity between Saduk and his employer began when Tanfield fired Saduk 
— a man he employed as his butler and assistant — for allegedly stealing a  valuable watch, money from his safe, 
and liquor. Confidential Telegraph No. 51. Sir M. Durand to the Marquess of Salisbury. Gulhek. Inclosure in No. 1, 
Statement of Mr. Tanfield, August 14, 1896. India Office Archives, London. 
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another Iranian employee, a clerk known as Yusef. Eventually, when Tanfield was carried to the 
river in order to be taken away for medical care and for safety, the local townspeople cheered 
and celebrated the company man’s numerous injuries. According to Tanfield’s account of the 
incident, the experience of being carried away with the crowd hooting and hollering was a 
harrowing one:  
While I was being carried from the house to the riverbank at Shuster a large 
crowd of people followed us rejoicing that I had been killed, stone throwing also 
began, and a stone passed close to the bed on which I was being carried. When I 
was put on the raft they lined the Shuster bank of the river and continued shouting 
abuse and throwing stones. Four ferrashes were sent by the Nizam to carry me to 
the river, but their presence did not appear to have any effect on the crowd.177 
  
In his report about the Tanfield incident to his superiors in England, J. F. Whyte, Assistant 
Political Agent for Her Britannic Majesty’s Consul in Iran, decries what he perceives as the 
general lawlessness that faced English colonial and company officers in the late 19th century in 
Qajar Persia, particularly further from the capital and in the southern provinces. Indeed, the 
Tanfield incident was just one in a series of reported attacks on Englishmen in Persia such as 
episodes reported in the province of Fars where “large quantities of British goods have been 
plundered, and several Englishmen have been more or less seriously maltreated. One, an 
Assistant Surgeon in the Telegraph Department, was deliberately waylaid and wounded by a 
musket shot. Another…was stripped of all his clothing and severely beaten. In neither case has 
anything been done to punish the offenders, though they are known.”178 Even more troubling, 
Whyte’s report on the Tanfield affair exasperatedly claims, the Qajar government seemed not to 
care or to understand that its inaction regarding known perpetrators in cases such as these was a 
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problem. It is this general context of violence and governmental inaction that Whyte comes to 
blame for attacks like the one on Tanfield. Regarding that “dreadful” incident, Whyte notes that, 
due to “the inactivity of the local authorities” in earlier incidents, “there has been another attack 
upon an Englishman, Mr. Tanfield, of Lynch and Co., who has been dreadfully wounded and 
disfigured…I have tried in vain to get the would-be murderer punished….nothing whatever has 
been done in Shuster, where the mob hooted and stoned Mr. Tanfield as he was carried down 
wounded to the river… the local authorities have taken no notice of this brutal demonstration.”179 
The above incident is not an isolated one in the annals of the colonial archive in Persia. In 
the following chapter, I investigate European colonial attitudes and strategies regarding 
perceived “lawlessness” in pre-20th century Persia. I show that the British colonial archive from 
Persia is replete with references such as the one outlined above, in which Englishmen stationed 
in Qajar lands complain of both crimes committed against their nationals and violent “riots” by 
Persians, particularly in border regions and provinces further from the capital city. Like the 
account of the Tanfield incident, other accounts also often include exasperated reports regarding 
Qajar inaction in the wake of these occurrences. The evident Qajar indifference to attacks and 
unrest, unsurprisingly, led to calls from English colonial officers stationed in Persia for more or 
better armed law enforcement agents to guard British nationals and property. For instance, one 
incident in the city of Yazd led to just such an aggravated report to the British crown regarding 
the “frequent” attacks on Englishmen in the region: “Persian Government either cannot or will 
not deal with such situations, which frequently arise, and I think that time has come when we 
should [have] Consular guards all through Persia.”180 As I reveal below, these colonial demands 
for more agents and institutions of law and punishment also led, in one instance, to blueprints for 
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180 Confidential telegraph No. 171 from Mr. Grant Duff to Sir Edward Grey. Received June 30, 1906. L/PS/10/100, 
India Office Archive, London. 
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an armed barbed-wire-and-iron-bar fortification of a British consulate, which would have created 
a prison-like structure that would, in the inverse logic of the modern prison, keep perceived 
lawlessness out rather than lock it up inside. Indeed, I argue that although colonial accounts of 
Safavid and Qajar era punishments paint the Persian government as ruthless and despotic, British 
colonial demands were typically for more rather than less punishment of and fortification against 
perceived criminality, at least when the aggrieved parties were English nationals. It is precisely 
in the late Qajar context of a colonially mediated focus on evident lawlessness in Persia that 
modernist Iranian reformers and intellectuals became particularly invested in the question of law, 
legality, and the techniques of surveillance and incarceration in their reform efforts.181  
 
“Lawlessness” and the Problem of Brigandage in Pre-20th Century Persia 
 
Complaints regarding the desultory attention to law and order in Persia are not limited to 
colonial officers. European travelers also routinely complained of “lawlessness” and incidents of 
violence in Persia. One such early modern traveler notes, for instance, that in the northernmost 
provinces in Persia, “The ruler provides no protection against murder and theft. It is lawless here. 
An offended party may, if he can, seek satisfaction. Is it possible that so close to the Russian 
Empire such unrestrained conditions exist?”182 For this traveler, the primary culprit for this 
situation is the natural Persian inclination towards Oriental despotism, a system in which no 
meaningful legality or justice can exist. Not only is there no codified law in Persia, the traveler 
bemoans, but there is nothing that even approximates natural law: “One would…think that a 
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general natural law must be observed, but this is not so. Right now in Persia national laws do not 
exist, nor do natural laws. The cruel [shahs] have made sure that through their unnatural 
activities they have justified the injustice of their successors when dealing with present and 
future subjects.”183  
In European travelogues, highway banditry is cited as a common and particularly onerous 
issue when traveling along Persian trade routes. One traveler notes, “It is not to be denied that 
brigandage is flourishing in Persia. Caravans and travellers are plundered at the very gates of 
Tehran. Want and oppression have turned the most peaceful of the population into 
highwaymen.”184 There is some evidence that the Qajar elite took the issue of brigandage 
seriously enough to punish perpetrators for infractions when possible. For instance, the 
aforementioned English traveler mentions the penalty of a governor from eastern Persia for his 
part in abetting in the robbing of a caravan:  
 
[H]e was accus’d of having been an Accomplice in the Robbery of a Caravan, 
which was going to the Indies, and was worth several Millions. He was deliver’d 
up to the Kelonter, or Prevost of the Town, who is, as it were, the Lord Chief 
Justice for Civil Matters. The Prisoner had only one Servant; He himself was in 
the Carcan, which in Persia is made of three Pieces of Wood square, put in a 
Triangular Manner, one Piece whereof is twice as long as the other two; the 
Criminal’s Neck is enclos’d in the Triangle, having his Hand at the extream [sic] 
end of the longest Piece, in a Semi-Circle of Wood that was nail’d thereto.185  
  
Travelers claimed not only that lawlessness on the border roads of Persia abounded, but also that 
those charged with establishing order were as bad as the robbers and brigands themselves. Qajar 
patrolman stationed to protect travelers, Europeans protested, couldn’t be trusted not to steal 
from itinerant voyagers. In his Qajar-era travelogue, an English traveler named E. Crawshay 
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Williams recounts mistaking some “license carrying” highway patrolmen carrying rifles for a 
“ruffianly” looking “band of robbers,” the kind that “one hears so much” about.186 Though the 
men eventually reveal themselves to be patrolmen, the author claims that no traveler should let 
his guard down when faced with such characters, because Persian policeman are extortionists 
who only protect travelers if they pay, and who may simply rob the travelers if they don’t. He 
asserts in no uncertain terms that, “Our friend the Persian policeman…will guard you excellently 
when it is in his interest to do so; he will steal from you when he thinks it is profitable; and, if 
possible, he will do both at once, and thus obtain a twofold reward for his services.”187 
According to Williams’ account, the most skilled thieves in Persia are not the famed highway 
bandits, but those officers who have nominally been placed on the roads in order to protect 
travelers from those brigands. “They are posted at intervals up and down the trade routes, 
nominally to guard the road; but actually they only do this insofar that they secure a practical 
monopoly of the available thieving and extortion thereon.”188 
Tellingly, Williams’s account puts these Persian highway officers in contrast to their 
English police counterparts, a comparison that, in the Englishman’s estimation, is quite 
unfavorable for the Persians. Having already described the Persian officers as lazy, thieving, 
conniving, and fundamentally dishonest, he goes on to describe English policemen in the most 
glowing of terms, asserting that “To the civilized Englishman the word ‘policeman’ conjures up 
visions of robust, red-faced persons, soberly but smartly cloaked in dark-blue cloth…these 
worthies are invested with a halo, almost, of unflinching integrity.”189 The contrast for Williams, 
is clear: one cannot find proper legality in Persia, and those agents and institutions put in place to 
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approximate lawfulness or to mete out punishment for criminal acts are only a mockery to their 
namesakes in “civilized” lands. Similarly, uncomplimentary references to Persian troops of the 
late Qajar era are commonplace in the colonial archive. As one Englishman stationed in the city 
of Mashhad notes in a report to the crown, “In a town like Meshed, which is full of fanatics over 
whom the [Persian] Government has no efficient control, it is evident that British subjects should 
have some means of defending themselves if attacked. As I have frequently had the honor to 
report, the starving and ill-clad horde of tatterdemalions, which constitute the so-called Persian 
Army, would, in case if an attack on the Christians, be the first to butcher us, if it were in any 
way their interest to do so.”190  
 
Prisons and Punishment in Qajar Persia  
 
We have seen these colonial reports on Persian “lawlessness,” but what was the nature of 
law and punishment in the Qajar era? Pre-twentieth century Iran did not have prisons in the 
commonly understood modern sense of the word. That is to say, Persia’s legal apparatus did not 
feature institutions in which numerous inmates would be incarcerated after trial for long 
durations of time in punishment for criminal acts. Instead, those accused of wrongdoing and still 
awaiting trial or punishment were held for short lengths of time in small dungeons, fort jails, or 
royal holding cells.191 Moreover, as numerous scholars have established, there was no centralized 
or codified law during the Qajar period, although European accounts of Persian “lawlessness” 
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tell a skewed and incomplete tale. In the pre-twentieth century eras, both ‘urf (customary law) 
and shari’a courts, as well as tribal councils, were available in different contexts to adjudicate 
matters between parties or between the state and an individual. And, although in theory ‘urf and 
shari’a courts presided over distinct spheres — that is, with ‘urf courts overseen by the Shah and 
his governors and attending to matters of the state and shari’a courts presided over by clerical 
qāzis — this strict division did not hold in practice. Individual complainants would sometimes be 
referred between types of courts,192 shahs appointed the qāzis who presided over shari’a courts, 
and ‘urf courts at least nominally purported to follow shari’a norms.193  
In the ‘urf courts, the hierarchy of decision-making was somewhat standardized, with the 
shah’s decree at the top of the juridical chain. Below the shah were his regional deputies (navāb), 
regional governors (valīān), and village leaders (kadkhudās). Village kadkhudās were authorized 
to arbitrate in minor cases, while for more serious crimes or disputes — whether the severity was 
in terms of money, state matters, or degree of the action — the accused party would typically not 
be taken to the local kadkhudā but would rather be referred to ruling state magistrates or higher 
ranking representatives of the crown.194 Notably, although shari’a courts nominally punished 
according to Islamic guidelines, the cutting off of thieves’ hands was extremely infrequent, 
except in rare cases in which the stolen goods were of an extraordinary amount or belonging to a 
particularly important personage.195 Moreover, in cases of murder, shari’a courts would often 
hand over the accused murderer to the family of the murdered to mete out justice.196 In their text 
on prisons of the Qajar and Pahlavi eras, historians Rubayʻī and Rāhraw Khuājah note that in 
both ‘urf and shari’a courts in the Qajar era, the specifics of a given case — i.e. the identity of 
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the accused, the identity of the complainant, the relative wealth of the accused, etc. — was more 
important than the abstract type or nature of the crime. That is to say, different punishments were 
meted out if the aggrieved party was an important personage, even in similar cases.197 A number 
of the above points are illustrated in the account of a German traveler in late 18th century Persia, 
who writes: 
 
Whoever is found guilty of murder, theft, or other important felonies, his life and 
goods are the mercy of the subject’s Khan. The relatives of a murdered man often 
get permission from the governor to take revenge on the murderer by killing him 
in any way they like, which often happens. Frequently, the Khan dictates the 
punishment and the usual ones are the bow string or the axe. More often things 
are more lenient. The accused who is able to give good presents can get away 
with the whip on the feet.198 
 
 
At the same time, in tribal communities, self-contained decisions regarding punishment were 
typically made by councils of tribal leaders.199 Given the diffuse nature of the juridical order in 
Qajar Persia, it should come as no surprise that punishments, even in similar cases, were often 
quite heterogeneous in nature and application.  
Still, despite historical accounts that argue that Qajar legality was largely “arbitrary”200 
and a marker of an “age of oppression,”201 law and punishment nonetheless existed in a 
constellation of common practices and techniques.202 As Darius Rejali has noted, the designation 
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of the Qajars simply as capricious and arbitrary rulers has largely been the purview of the Qajar’s 
numerous adversaries. He writes, “this understanding of Qajar rule comes down to us from the 
regime’s opponents, and they had rather obvious reasons for emphasizing the capricious nature 
of power in Qajar society.”203 There is little disagreement among the sources, however, that both 
during Safavid (1501-1736) and Qajar rule (1785-1925) in Persia, shahs had total sovereignty 
over those whom they wanted to punish. Theirs was an absolute power over the life and death of 
their subjects. Commands from shahs were, in effect, legally binding, and not subject to scrutiny 
from any other party. Eskandar Beg Monshi, the famed Safavid court historian, writes of Shah 
Abbas, for instance, that: 
From birth, [Shah Abbas] has been inclined toward despotic behavior and has had 
a quick temper; he has never been slow to punish wrongdoers. The punishment of 
wrongdoers constitutes a major part of the command of armies, the government of 
empire, and ministry to one’s people, and Shah Abbas has never been diverted, by 
worldly motives or respect for rank, from inflicting punishment…His writ 
therefore became law, and no one dared to oppose his orders for an instant.204  
 
Although shahs were the source and center of the law, it was not only shahs whose justice could 
be swift and practically unchecked; patrimonial regional leaders affiliated with the crown are 
often described as similarly ruthless in their execution of punishments. For instance, although 
some of their stories are certainly exaggerated, European travelers to Persia frequently mention 
the unequivocal manner in which Persian notables dealt with those whose actions had offended 
some high ranking personage or disturbed public order. To be sure, even when admitting the 
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apocryphal nature of circulating stories, these travellers nonetheless make note of the zeal with 
which punishment was meted out with a combination of alarm and excitement. One incredulous 
nineteenth-century English traveler to Persia relays a story that circulated during his stay in the 
capital: 
A few days before our visit to the palace, the talk of all the soldiery in Tehran, as 
we heard from several of their officers, had been that the Crown Prince, the 
Governor of Tabriz, had caused his wife to be strangled in his presence. Homicide 
or murder is a prerogative of royalty in Persia. But what was most amazing was 
the ready reception given to the report, which was regarded, even by Europeans, 
as quite authentic. The report was untrue.205 
 
Travelers also extensively note the techniques of punishment they witnessed, and 
like the anecdote regarding the highway policemen in the travelogue mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, they often unfavorably compare those techniques to the more “civilized” 
methods preferred at home. One English voyager mentions witnessing several spectacular 
Qajar-era punishment practices including public disemboweling, a method that he 
disapprovingly compares to the “cleaner” European method of beheading: 
The Prime Minister having acquainted the King, that some young Noblemen, 
being drunk, had caus’d some Disturbance near the Royal Palace; he immediately 
dispatch’d Orders to all the Soldiers and Officers, to rip open the Belly (on the 
Spot) of every Man they should find drunk in the Streets, excepting such as 
should have Permission to drink Wine, seal’d with the little Seal…They say in 
Persia, open the Belly, as we say among us, to Hang, or cut off the Head, because 
the most common Kind of Punishment is to rip open the Belly; which is done by 
plunging a Poniard into the Belly, on the Left Side, and drawing it round to the 
very Back; a Punishment that is not so quick a Dispatch as that of Beheading.206 
 
Indeed, European accounts rarely hide their disdain of Persian punishment practices, or their 
preference for their European counterparts. One traveler claims that, “If it pleases the khan to 
amuse himself with ordering different punishments, he is entirely free to do so without 
impediment. I know that people are flogged to death because the khan who imposed the 
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punishment did not like them…There is no lack of examples, even of those that are an offense to 
morality, such that they are unknown in Europe: they will not be mentioned here.”207 Even 
though this account doesn’t mention the specific techniques the traveler witnessed by name, the 
implication of these dark and “unknown” habits is abundantly clear: Persia is represented as a 
despotic and lawless land in which legal justice or order such as that found in Europe simply 
does not exist.  
But just what were the methods of punishment favored in the pre-20th century eras, and 
how were they meted out? The most widespread punishment technique noted by sources is the 
falak, or as it is known in English, the bastinado (i.e. whipping of the soles of the prisoner’s feet, 
often followed by forcing them to walk on these bloodied and swollen appendages). Although 
the bastinado was extremely popular in the pre-modern era, it has remained so long after the fall 
of the Qajars and into the present day.208 One seventeenth-century traveler to the Safavid court 
notes, “On the 14th, the King caused Two hundred Bastinado’s to be given…to the Captain of the 
Gate of the Harem,” with whom he was displeased.209 Occasionally, it is reported that a prisoner 
would be whipped on the feet so brutally that death would result from the punishment.210 
Corporal punishment was common in matters of tax and commerce, such as in this report of a 
punishment decreed by Fath Ali Shah: “When [Fath Ali Khan] demands money and the subject 
does not pay it on time, heavy corporal punishment is certain. When a short while ago the chief 
Armenian priest sold some flour to a few of the followers of Aghasi Khan…Fath ‘Ali Khan had 
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him publicly beaten on the feet.”211 Another traveler bemusedly relays another anecdote of the 
bastinado, this time given to a particularly obsequious mullah:  
The First Minister had…caus’d Two hundred Strokes to be given on the Soles of 
the Feet to a Molla, or Doctor, because some Inferior Officers of the Ordinance 
had presented Petitions to him, which this Doctor had written, and where the 
Sense was so confus’d and perplex’d with Compliments…that it was a difficult 
Matter to penetrate into the Meaning thereof, with ever so great an Attention. 
After this miserable Wretch had receiv’d so severe a Punishment, the First 
minister caus’d him to be brought before him (for he was not in a Condition to 
walk). A Great Vizier, said he to him, has other Business to do than to read thy 
sorry Compliments, and to unravel and disentangle the Chaos of the Petitions 
thou writest; Use a more simple and clear Style, or else do not write for the 
Publick; for otherwise I’ll cause thy Hands to be cut off.”212  
 
 
Certainly, the bastinado is only one of the myriad pre-20th century punishments noted by sources 
and historians. In his monumental six-volume work on Tehran, social historian Ja‘far Shahrī 
provides an extensive and eyebrow-raising list of popular Qajar punishments, executed by the 
state’s mīr ghażabs, or “masters of wrath”213 and their lackeys (farash), on the orders of the shah 
or a dignitary. 214 This inventory of painful torture techniques includes relatively recognizable or 
commonplace punishments such as branding, flogging, beating, bone breaking, sleep 
deprivation, starvation, dehydration, burning, aural torture, rape, and execution. It also includes 
more forebodingly imaginative punishment strategies, such as hanging the prisoner upside-down 
and hitting him with a stick, putting the prisoner into ice water, forcing the prisoner to drink “an 
entire pail of water,” sitting the prisoner on hot bricks until they are thoroughly “kabobed,” tying 
a rope around a prisoner’s neck with the other end tied to a horse and making the prisoner run 
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after the horse or have their neck snapped, force feeding the prisoner feces, plugging the 
prisoner’s urethra to make urination impossible, gluing the prisoner’s anus shut, making the 
prisoner walk on broken glass or nails, removing the prisoner’s eyes, burning the breasts of 
female prisoners, pouring pepper into the eyes of prisoners, sticking sharp objects underneath the 
fingernails of the prisoner, firing the prisoner out of a cannon, cutting off the prisoner’s ears, and 
many more such gruesome techniques.215 Mīr ghażabs often tortured the accused in Qajar 
prisons and dungeons (such as the one described in the epigraph of this chapter quoted from 
Kirmānī) in order to draw out confessions; the most famous of these Qajar dungeons was called 
Anbar-i Shāhī, or the Shah’s Cellar. In his classic work on the Iranian constitutional revolution, 
Ahmad Kasravi notes that in this space, prisoners were chained to each other at the neck and 
around the ankles, and forced to urinate while in these group chains.216 Finally, although torture 
was performed by mīr ghażabs and their lackeys in order to extract confessions, official 
punishments for crimes — including the bastinado and execution, among other techniques — 
were performed in public in Qajar Persia, in order to stage the spectacular power of the state over 
body, life, and death. (See Figure. 3)  
 
The Sistan Disturbances and the Fortification of the Colonial Consultate 
 
 The concern with what was perceived as “lawlessness” on the part of European travelers 
and colonial officers plagued relations between the Qajars and the European powers even into 
the Constitutional Era of 1905-1911. A late Qajar incident in the southern province of Sistan —
 an important region due to its proximity to India — is illustrative of the tensions between British 
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colonial officers and the inhabitants of the region, and reveals British techniques of addressing 
what was perceived as an untenable lack of protection for their nationals. In attempting to carry 
regulations intended to fight the spread of the plague in 1906, just a few months after the 
beginning of the Constitutional movement, the British were met with resistance on the part of the 
local populace, who opposed the anti-plague attempts of British medical officers. A telegram 
from the British consulate at Sistan asserts that, in the wake of these anti-outbreak measures, “A 
mob of Persians, incited by a fanatical native doctor, attacked the British Consulate at Seistan, 
and assaulted the Consul and a British doctor with sticks.”217 The incident quickly expanded into 
a full-blown disturbance, so much so that eventually, the British felt moved to request 
fortification of their forces at the consulate. A few days after the initial incident, officials at the 
consulate sent word that a large crowd of angry locals “wrecked [the] dispensary and clods 
struck Consul and Consulate doctor. Immediate cause was [the] attempt of Customs official to 
remove plague patient to hospital by force…”218 In the wake of these events, the British feared a 
night attack on their delegation, so they requested immediate fortification by local police or 
germanderie troops, as well as further arms with which to protect themselves.219 Eventually, 
some arms and Persian troops were dispatched on the order of the Mushir od-Dowleh Mirza 
Nasrullah Khan, who also requested that the British find those who had started the disturbances 
or pass along the names of the accused rioters to his office. The British response to the Mushir 
od-Dowleh’s request was prickly: they felt, as they had in earlier such instances, that it was the 
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express responsibility of the Qajar government to investigate, arrest, and punish those individuals 
behind the unrest.220    
 In July of that year, two months after the initial disturbances in Sistan, the situation was 
not yet fully calm. The British consulate was finally attacked at night, as had been the fear of the 
British consuls since the spring. This attack infuriated the British, so much so that they 
demanded both an apology from the Qajar government for its inability to protect them and 
further reinforcements: 
 
An attack on British Consulate at night in town excited by plague rioters is so 
serious a development, whatever may have been the motives of assailants, that we 
consider in addition to demand for apology of Persian Government and 
punishment of all persons concerned, necessity has been established for 
increasing strength of escort…and for placing adequate reserve of arms and 
ammunition in Consulate.221 
 
Anger from the British towards the Qajar crown ran high in the aftermath of this latest attack, 
particularly due to what was viewed as “the impotence of the Persian Government to afford 
protection” as well as “the refusal to allow the importation of a small number of rifles.”222 
Despite this Qajar inaction, reinforcements were eventually sent to the Sistan consulate when “it 
was…decided to send a certain number of rifles to the Consulate for the proper defence of its 
members.”223  
Eventually, the demand for armed reinforcement of the Sistan consulate due to apparent 
concerns for the “safety of British subjects,” as well as concern regarding arms smuggling and 
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potential rioting or attack, was taken to new structural level; in 1908 the English drew up 
blueprints for a fully fortified consulate, which would have served to dramatically alter the 
architectural logic of the British institution.224 Indeed, in the new blueprints, the fortified 
consulate would have transformed from a modest “irregular polygonal” building with little 
adornment into a quintessential space of disciplinary modernity, insofar as it would have 
resembled both an army barracks and a modern prison. The proposed plans included iron bars on 
windows, iron sheeting and strengthening of the main gates, strengthened outer walls, a standing 
number of armed guards, barbed wire fences (in case of siege), and a fully reinforced 
perimeter.225 The plans also called for more careful planning and maintenance of order among 
those British nationals housed at the consulate; in order to stave off external lawlessness, internal 
discipline was proposed. 
The plans for the intended changes were outlined by an officer called Lieutenant 
Molesworth, who was of the opinion that the fortified consulate would protect the British from 
rioters, common criminals, and any possible more serious attacks from foreign enemies. It was 
Molesworth’s belief that fortifications were necessary to protect the “women and children, 
clerks, native servants, followers, the hospital staff, and possibly political refugees” housed 
among the British, only some of whom could be expected to take up arms or protect themselves 
in the event of violence.226 British officers at the consulate agreed that these amendments were 
necessary, particularly because the Qajar government’s inability to stave off even criminals and 
looters seemed to be a bad portent of its ability to protect against possible foreign (particularly 
Russian) incursions.  In a message to the crown from Major R.L. Kennion, an officer stationed at 
Sistan, Kennion asserts, “Although at the present time it is difficult to imagine circumstances 
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arising, involving the Consulate in a defence against an organized attack, yet the hold of the 
Central Government over the country is very insecure.”227 For Kennion as well as his mates, the 
situation in Sistan was such that the Qajar state felt very remote. Despite some piecemeal efforts 
at creating policing institutions, the overriding sense that Sistan did not feel like part of national 
space at all, and was not protected as such. Although the planned fortification of the Sistan 
consulate was never formally undertaken, due to the economic and political exigencies of the 
day,228 it is nonetheless illustrative to note the British strategy of creating a new kind of 
disciplinary space that would produce a formal social division between an “inside” and an 
“outside” of the space as an “inside” and “outside” of the law. Inverting the logic of the modern 
prison, the fortified Sistan consulate would have created a social space in which normative 
legality could only exist within the disciplinary institution instead of outside of it, with 
criminality and violence left to remain in the “lawless” space in the failed nation beyond the 




It was not until late in the Qajar era that legal reform influenced by European models was 
advocated for by reformists anxious both to reestablish territorial and economic sovereignty for 
Persia against encroaching colonial powers.229 To be sure, reformist efforts did not occur solely 
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the cultural polemic by addressing the internal maintenance of the country. Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. Frontier 
Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804-1946. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. Print, 80. 
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in response to European complaints regarding law and order, but the importance of the 
relationship to the European powers cannot be overstated. Indeed, the first efforts at creating a 
police force along modern European lines was enacted in the late 1870s by Nasir al-din Shah on 
the heels of his second voyage to Europe, which resulted in the hiring of the Italian-born 
Austrian Conte di Montiforte, who attempted to write the first police codes for the Tehran police. 
Then, in 1912, Persia again brought in Europeans — this time, a number of Swedish officers 
under the direction of Reserve Lietenant Gunnar Westdhal — to try to more fully reform the 
institution of the police. In their ten years in Persia, the Swedes introduced some of the basics of 
the modern evidentiary and penal regime to Persia: fingerprinting, uniforms for prisoners, 
discipline in terms of food and activity in the prison; Westdhal also ended the longstanding 
practice of putting chains around the necks and blocks around the legs of prisoners in this era.230  
The influence of the European powers would continue to be felt in Iranian attempts at 
modern legal and prison reform. To be sure, when the institution of the modern prison was 
established in earnest in Pahlavi Iran in the late 1920s, it did so on the heels of Reza Shah’s 
abrogation of capitulations to the foreign powers, which for the first time rendered foreign 
nationals subject to Persian law, with the potential of being punished under that law.231 Foreign 
concern regarding the abrogation of capitulations as well as the influence of European penal 
norms greatly affected the building of early Pahlavi prisons, so much so that some foreign 
diplomats believed that prison reform was undertaken expressly with foreign nationals in mind. 
For instance, according to a telegram sent in 1935 by J. Rives Childs, American diplomatic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Kashani-Sabet’s work also provides a rubric through which to understand the anxieties present in the border region 
of Sistan in the incident described above.  
230 Rubayʻī & Rāhraw Khuājah, Tārīkh-i Zindān Dar ‘Asr-i Qājār va Pahlavi, 45-46. 
231 For more on the history and importance of the abrogation of capitulations, see Zirinsky, Michael. “Riza Shah’s 
Abrogation of Capitulations, 1927-28.” In The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society Under Riza Shah, 1921-
1941. Stephanie Cronin, ed. Routledge: New York, 2007. Print. 
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charges d’affairs, to the United States Secretary of State, Qasr was first opened in order to 
“provide suitable accommodations for European prisoners consequent upon the abandonment by 
the Powers of their capitulary rights in 1928.”232 Of course, those who would be affected by the 
establishment of the modern Iranian penal apparatus would overwhelmingly be Iranians — even 
Childs admits in his early tour of Qasr that “the prison is capable of accommodating some 1,200 
to 1,500 prisoners and this number is generally filled” with Iranians serving sentences for both 
criminal and political crimes.233 It is to the social worlds and discourses of the modern carceral 
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Fig. 2: Late Qajar-era prisoners with the ankle and neck bindings and chains that were customary 
in that time.235 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






The Humanist Prison:  
Scholarly and State Discourses on Crime and Punishment in Pahlavi Iran 
 
Scholars of modern Iranian thought have established that the concept of legality was of 
paramount importance to modernist reformist efforts beginning in the late Qajar era.237 In some 
part, this focus on legal reform came in response to the conditions I outline in Chapter Two, 
particularly the European antipathy towards apparent Qajar “lawlessness.” Despite colonial 
efforts by the British and the Russians to maintain Qajar Persia’s dependent economic and 
political status, reformists in the Qajar state pushed the Qajars towards some initial reforms in 
the mid-19th century, with further piecemeal changes advanced (and then sometimes retracted) 
until the last years of the Nasir al-din Shah’s life.238 By the end of the 19th century, reformists 
influenced by Western thought such as Malkum Khan, Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani, and others 
were arguing that qānūn — law — was the only way to progress and modernize as a nation. So 
strong was the focus of these late 19th century reformers on law and legal reform that their 
writing has been referred to as “legal fetishism” by scholars.239 Still, the reform movements of 
the 19th century in Qajar Persia were relative failures, particularly in comparison to the more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 For this argument, see the introductory chapter to Enayat, Hadi. Law, State, and Society in Modern Iran: 
Constitutionalism, Autocracy, and Legal Reform, 1906-1941. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. For a similar 
argument regarding Qajar era reform movements, see Schayegh, Cyrus. Who is Knowledgeable is Strong: Science, 
Class, and the Formation of Modern Iranian Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009. Print.  
238 Keddie, Nikki. Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan, 1796-1925. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 1999. Print. 
239 Enayat, 52. 
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widespread reforms ushered in the neighboring Ottoman state.240 Indeed, despite featuring more 
legal complexity than typically given credit for in scholarly literature that simply describes their 
rule as “arbitrary,” Qajar state structures remained largely patrimonial on the eve of the 
Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911, much to the chagrin of political reformers who had long 
advocated for wholesale changes and legal consistency in the Qajar state.241  
Throughout the turn-of-the-century Constitutional period, legal and juridical reform 
remained a “central concern” of constitutionalists, reformists, and revolutionaries alike, although 
differing notions of law and order were advanced by the diverse groups and classes who 
supported the abstract call for justice in the fight against colonially supported Qajar oppression 
[istibdād].242 Despite constitutionalist efforts, however, the constitutional period did not ease 
colonial meddling in Qajar Persia — best evidenced by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 
that carved Persia into spheres of influence — nor did it, as seen in continuing critiques from the 
era, bring legal or political stability to the country. The situation was such that in the decade after 
the constitutional movement, “many were convinced that the revolution had triggered social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 For a concise overview of late Ottoman history, including an overview of the tanzimat reforms see Hanioğlu, 
Sükrü. A Brief History of the Ottoman Empire. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print. 
241 For a sophisticated analysis of the structure of Qajar authority, see Sheikholeslami, Reza A. The Structure of 
Central Authority in Qajar Iran, 1871-1896. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 1996. Print. For a reading of Qajar rule as 
simply arbitrary that nonetheless mobilizes numerous useful sources in its claims, see Rubayʻī, Nasir and Ahmad 
Rāhraw Khuājah. Tārīkh-i Zindān Dar Asr-i Qājār va Pahlavī. [The History of Prison in the Qajar and Pahlavi 
Eras.] Tehran: Intishārāt-i Quqnūs, 1390 / 2011. Print. Rab’i and Rāhraw Khuājah’s text largely mirrors earlier 
Iranian historiographical and political trends, which see the Qajar era simply as an “age of oppression.” For these 
authors, resultantly, Qajar practice is practically synonymous with the application of injustice. On the topic of 
legality under the Qajars they write, “Even if [the adjudicator’s] desire was to carry out justice, there was always the 
distinct possibility that only injustice would be served” (16). 
242 For this quote, see Enayat, 51. For more on the legal thought of various players in the Constitutional era, see 
Enayat, 51-81. For more on Iran’s Constitutional Revolution, and the diversity of the groups who contributed to that 
movement see Janet Afary’s important study. Afary, Janet. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911: 
Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, & the Origins of Feminism. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1996. Print. For the classic early reading of this movement, see the epochal text by iconoclastic Iranian nationalist 
intellecutal Ahmad Kasravī, which remains a touchstone for studying the era. Kasravī, Aḥmad. Tārikh-i Mashrutih-i 




chaos and was not one iota better than Qajar monarchy.”243 Despite the sentiment that the post 
Constitutional years were marked by legal and political disorder, meaningful (albeit piecemeal) 
legal reforms were undertaken after 1911, including the passing of the 1912 Law of the 
Principles of Criminal Trials, and a temporary ‘urf Penal Code in 1917.244 These reforms laid the 
foundation of the more wholesale changes that were on the horizon. 
Because so many bemoaned the political situation in the aftermath of the constitutional 
era, Reza Khan’s appearance on the Iranian stage in 1921 worked to unite intellectuals and 
reformers who were disappointed with what they perceived as the anarchy and decay of the late 
Qajar period. Despite his ties to the British and his relative lack of political experience, Reza 
Khan — by 1925 to be Reza Shah — represented a strong, centralizing figure for Iranian 
reformers, statesmen, and intellectuals increasingly anxious to unify Iran’s disparate social 
forces.245 Where once the overriding calls among Iranian reformers were for justice [‘adālat], the 
early Reza Shah era saw an increased demand among intellectuals for a powerful, centralizing 
figure, a “Mussolini who can break the influence of the traditional authorities, and thus create a 
modern outlook, a modern people, and a modern nation.”246 For his part, Reza Shah understood 
the value of at least appearing to govern by the rule of law for both the emerging modern middle 
class and the international community of states, particularly the European powers. It is thus that 
the first Pahlavi shah “wanted to be seen as a ‘constitutional monarch.’ This attitude was 
reinforced by the fact that, with the abrogation of capitulations in 1928, the shah felt it necessary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Schayegh, 16. 
244 Enayat emphasizes the relatively unremarked upon significance of this era in his essential scholarship on legal 
reform in the first half of the 20th century. For a chronological table of legal reform between May 1911-June 1940, 
see Enayat, 193-197.  
245 For more on Reza Shah’s rise to prominence, establishment as first Pahlavi Shah in 1926, and policies, see the 
essays in Cronin, Stephanie, ed. The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society Under Reza Shah 1921-1941. 
Routledge: New York, 2007. Print. See also the chapters on Reza Shah in Atabaki, T. & E.J. Zürcher. Men Of 
Order: Authoritarian Modernization Under Atatürk and Reza Shah. New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2004. Print. 
246 From an article written by M. Kazemi in the first issue of Farangestan journal in 1924. Quoted in Abrahamian, 
Ervand. Iran Between Two Revolutions, 124. 
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to show the international community that his government was based on sound and predictable 
legality.”247 To be sure, it is crucial to note that Reza Shah’s investment in centralizing and 
expanding the state legal apparatus “was intimately bound up with a drive for national 
sovereignty initiated soon after he took the throne.” It was this nationalist impulse that led to the 
Pahlavi state’s decision to abrogate capitulations to the foreign powers, giving Iran tariff 
autonomy and abolishing extraterritorial legal rights for foreign nationals that disallowed 
charging Europeans and Americans for crimes committed in Iran.248 It was for these reasons that 
throughout the early years of Reza Shah’s reign, both the state and the intellectual classes were 
united in their belief that what Iran most needed was a strong central authority that could quell 
competing power claims from tribes, religious leaders, and various ethnic groups and stand up to 
European powers while at the same time finally ushering Iran into the era of law and order that 
had for so long been the desire of Iranian reform movements.  
The political victory of Reza Shah’s centralizing authoritarianism in the interwar period raises a 
question regarding the place of legal and political reform in intellectual and reformist discourses 
of the Pahlavi era. Did legal and political reform remain the central concerns of reformist 
thinkers and statesmen in the Reza Shah era and beyond? In his recent work, historian Cyrus 
Schayegh offers a critical intervention in the periodization of modern Iranian intellectual trends, 
arguing that, after the rise to power of Reza Shah in 1921, the centrality of “qānūn” — law —
 was superseded by scientific and medical discourses of modern progress. Building on Firoozeh 
Kashani-Sabet’s pathbreaking work on nationalism, humanism, health, and hygiene in Qajar and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 Enayat, 115-116.  
248 Enayat, 118-119. For more on the history and importance of the abrogation of capitulations, see Zirinsky, 
Michael. “Riza Shah’s Abrogation of Capitulations, 1927-28.” In The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society 
Under Riza Shah, 1921-1941. Stephanie Cronin, ed. Routledge: New York, 2007. Print.  
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early Pahlavi contexts,249 Schayegh contends that starting in the 1920s, reformist discourses were 
transformed by “the formation of a modern middle class determined to turn its sociocultural 
reformist strategy into the very hub of a new agenda of progress and modernization.”250 In other 
words, the rise of Reza Shah was coterminous with the establishment of a new modern middle 
class whose reformist zeal was focused less on concepts like “azādī” [freedom] or “‘adālat” 
[justice], and was instead focused on issues of hygiene, health, and cultural reform.251  
Schayegh’s assertion that the Pahlavi era ushered in the increasing prominence of the 
language of modern scientific reform is a well-founded and necessary rejoinder in the 
historiography of modern Iran, which has to date been predominantly concerned with political 
discourses. Still, Schayegh’s focus on the rise of medico-scientific reformist discourses glosses 
over a fact of central importance to the study of the early Pahlavi era: these years were marked 
by the most dramatic legal, juridical, and penal transformation in modern Iranian history, an 
overhaul to the Iranian legal apparatus significantly more extensive than any undertaken in the 
era in which modern legal reform was first expounded by Qajar intellectuals. The early Pahlavi 
era has been noted for its dramatic military reform, but it should be at least equally noted for its 
considerable legal and infrastructural change, as members of the Pahlavi state worked to 
overhaul Iran’s legal apparatus in the lead-up to the 1928 abolishment of capitulations to the 
foreign powers, in part because those powers expressed concern about the possibility of their 
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nationals being tried and detained in Pahlavi Iran without legal reform.252 The man most 
associated with the post-1927 legal reforms, Minister of Justice Ali Akbar Davar, dissolved the 
central state judiciary within two days of his appointment to the ministry in February 1927, and 
within a week secured special powers to overhaul the existing 1911 organic code, the 1911-1912 
civil and criminal procedures codes, and the 1923 law overseeing the appointment of judges; he 
also requested and received the right to employ “anyone he saw fit” to the newly formed 
judiciary.253 These frenzied Davar-initiated reforms led, unsurprisingly, to a great deal of 
bureaucratic and legal uncertainty during his seven years as Minister of Justice and beyond. Still, 
all told, between 1926 and 1940, Pahlavi Iran fully expanded, altered, and modernized its penal, 
civil, property, military, and commercial law, pushing through transformations only hinted at 
during earlier eras.254  
 The wholesale changes in the legal codes of the late 1920s-1930s irrevocably 
transformed the Iranian political and legal landscape by centralizing law, reducing the power of 
the shari’a courts, and establishing a completely overhauled judiciary with new personnel. Just 
as crucially, the revamping of Iran’s legal apparatus was coterminous with the establishment of 
an extensive modern penal system in the Pahlavi state. During this era, the Pahlavi state granted 
the national police force (shahrbani-i kol-i keshvar) full administration of Iran’s expanding 
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prison system.255 Some prisons built in earlier decades continued to be used — albeit in much 
more crowded conditions than ever before — in the first years of Pahlavi rule, including 
Tehran’s notorious if generically named Prison Number One (built in the Constitutional era) and 
Prison Number Two (built in late Qajar era), whose cells were unfavorably compared by one 
early prisoner to a coffin.256 Further, to meet its own demand for penal space, Reza Shah’s state 
immediately planned for a number of prisons: five large prisons (for 100 inmates; sized at 2700 
square meters), fifty medium-sized prisons (for 50 inmates; 1400 square meters), thirty small 
institutions (for 30 inmates; 1000 square meters), and very small prisons with five rooms (200 
square meters) to house those newly designated as criminals by the overhauled penal code.257 A 
few of these prisons were never built, while others were only built in subsequent decades. All 
told, the Reza Shah Pahlavi era (1925-1941) bore witness to the wholesale establishment of the 
modern penal system with which Iranians have lived until the current day. 
The most famous of the prisons opened in the early Reza Shah era was Qasr Prison — an 
institution that would immediately become modern Iran’s most significant penal site, and would 
be referred to by some as the “Iranian Bastille.”258  Designed by Tbilisi-born architect Nikolai 
Markov and launched under the direction of Brigadier-General of the Tehran police and long-
time Reza Shah henchman Mohammad Dargahi, Qasr opened its doors on December 2, 1929 [11 
Azar 1308] with seven cellblocks, 192 rooms, and the initial capacity to hold an estimated 800-
1000 inmates.259 The Pahlavi state intended Qasr to be its modern legal-penal crown jewel, proof 
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in the Qajar and Pahlavi Eras.], 104-130. Incredibly, just two days after Qasr held its opening ceremony, Dargahi 
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to the world that it was a progressive and civilized modern state. Markov’s blueprint for Qasr 
was inspired in part by information gleaned by members of Tehran’s police force at a London 
conference on the reform of the criminal260, while a member of Reza Shah’s modernizing state 
boasted that, finally, Iran had built a prison that would hold prisoners “without any sort of class 
distinctions.”261 As we will see throughout this chapter and dissertation, however, Qasr was 
eventually the object of an enormous body of criticism from opponents of and reformers in the 
Pahlavi state, and has since been transformed into a museum monument to Pahlavi state 
violence.262 The prison would eventually hold many hundreds of thousands of prisoners before it 
finally closed its doors in 2008.  
The monumental shifts in legal, juridical, and penal practice in the early Pahlavi era 
reveals that legality and the rule of law were no less important to early Pahlavi intellectuals and 
statesmen than they were to reformers in the pre-Constitutional era. In this era, crime and 
punishment also increased in prominence in Iranian discourses; for instance, in the wake of the 
1920s transformations in legal and penal apparatuses, frequent updates began appearing in 
Iranian newspapers informing readers of happenings in criminal court, particularly in the event 
of salacious cases.263 Following Schayegh’s insights, however, I assert that an crucial shift 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
was dismissed from his post and became the first prisoner to be imprisoned at the prison, where he was held by the 
order of Reza Shah for some months. For more on Daraghi, and his mysterious arrest and release, see the entry on 
his life in Encyclopedia Iranica. Agali, Baqer. “Daraghi, Mohammad.” Encyclopedia Iranica. 1994. Web. Accessed 
22 January 2015. Importantly, architect Nikolai Markov was also responsible for the designs of the Ministry of 
Finance, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Justice, the General Post Office, the Italian Embassy, and a number of 
churches. 
260 Sayfī Ghamī Tafrīshī, Murtiża. Polīs-i Khafiyih-i Irān 1299-1320: Murūr-i bar Rukhdādhā-yi Siyāsī Va 
Tarikhchih-yi Shahrbānī. Tehran: Intishārāt-i Quqnūs, 1367 / 1989. Print.105. 
261 This quote is attributed to Europe-educated Reza Shah statesman Ahmad Hooman, and is quoted in Rubayʻī & 
Rāhraw Khuājah. Tārīkh-i Zindān Dar ‘Asr-i Qājār va Pahlavi. [The History of Prison in the Qajar and Pahlavi 
Eras.], 104. 
262 See the introduction of this dissertation for more on the museum-ification of Qasr and other Pahlavi penal sites. 
263 See for instance the story on “Sheikh ‘Ali the Murderer” on the front page of Iṭilāʿāt newspaper from the summer 
of 1309 (1930), which describes the Sheikh’s crimes and interrogation in detail, and also includes a note written by 
the Sheikh asking a friend to bring him books and a fan. “Maktūb-i Sheikh ‘Ali Ghātil Az Zindān” [“Sheikh Ali the 
Murderer’s Writings From Prison.”] Iṭilāʿāt. 8 Murdād 1309 / 30 July 1930: 1. Print.  
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occurred in legal and penal discourses of the Pahlavi era, insofar as scientific and eventually 
social scientific discourses were increasingly mobilized in discussions of the law in the aftermath 
of the legal reforms of the Reza Shah era. Nowhere was this truer than with regard to the 
management and reform of Iran’s prisoners. As both criminal law and law enforcement 
dramatically increased in scope and scale, both the Pahlavi state and reform-minded intellectuals 
were confronted with a need to manage and cultivate a new population: the booming prison 
populace. Concerns regarding how to appropriately punish wrongdoers and manage prisoners in 
a modern state emerged in both state discourses and the literature of those who opposed Pahlavi 
prison policies. Resultantly, Pahlavi Iran saw the flowering of a number of new genres invested 
in questions of crime and punishment: the prison memoir, the social scientific criminological 
text, pulp crime fiction,264 and state literature on management and control of inmates. As in 
earlier reformist discourses, questions of law, legality, freedom, and justice were paramount in 
these new discourses — particularly to those who critiqued Pahlavi penal policy — at the same 
time that concern regarding health, hygiene, and prisoner education and reform animated the 
thoughts and writings of would-be prison reformers both inside and outside of the state. In this 
chapter, I look at a number of both critical and state-sanctioned texts, including sensational 
journalistic accounts of the prison, texts in the emergent academic field of criminology and 
criminal psychology, and state discourses on prisoner education and reform. In doing so, I argue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 The pulp crime novel is outside the purview of this chapter, but nonetheless mark an important genre born of 
legal and penal modernity in Iran. Translated works were the first crime fiction to appear in Iran, with original 
Persian-language crime novels largely appearing after Reza Shah’s forced abdication. For the most famous examples 
in this genre see the work of Parvis Ghazi Saeed. Most of Saeed’s novels were written in the 1950s and 1960s, and 
were eventually banned in the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution. For an earlier Iranian pulp crime novel, see 
Maḥmūdzādih, Mahdī. Jināyat Dar Pārk Hutil. [Crime at Park Hotel.] Tehran: Bungāh-i Maṭbū‘ātī-yi Tihrānshahr, 
1949 / 1328. Print. Interestingly, a high-ranking Pahlavi-era police officer mentions first being drawn to police work 
in the Reza Shah era because of his love of translated crime fiction, particularly Sherlock Holmes and LeBlanc’s 
Arsène Lupin. Iftikhārzādih, Yaḥyā. Nazmiyih Dar Dūrih-yi Pahlavi: Khātirāt-i Sarlashkar-i Bāznishastih-yi Pulīs 
Yahyā Iftikhārzādih [The Police During the Pahlavi Era: Memoirs of the Retired Police Chief Yahya Iftikhārzādih]. 




that in the aftermath of widespread modern legal and penal reform in Pahlavi Iran, the prison 
emerged as a central site of anxiety for both the modernizing state and its opponents, at the same 
time that it provided a unique field of experimentation for the state’s techniques in cultivating 
proper modern bodies and minds.   
 
The Prison as Problem 
 
Before Qasr opened its doors, most prisoners in Tehran were held at the Central Police 
Jail (Zindān-i Markazi- Shahrbani-i Tehran); by the late 1920s, this nominally “temporary” 
jailing facility housed twice as many prisoners as it was intended to hold.265 Overcrowding 
would be a problem at Qasr almost as quickly as it opened, and by the 1930s-1940s, critiques of 
Iran’s overflowing new prisons, specifically Qasr, were becoming increasingly widespread. 
While political communiqués266 and prison memoirs by political prisoners such as the writing of 
Bozorg Alavi — the Marxist prisoner, novelist, founding member of the Communist Tudeh 
party, and author of Iran’s earliest modern prison memoirs267 — have gained the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 The Central Police Jail was known officially as the Temporary Jail (Zindān-i Movaqat), but because it was 
located on the site that had formerly held the royal dungeon, it was colloquially referred to as “Falakeh.” 
Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions. 25. For more on early overcrowding at both the Central Jail and at Qasr in the 
early years, see Rubayʻī, Nasir and Ahmad Rāhraw Khuājah. Tārīkh-i Zindān Dar ‘Asr-i Qājār va Pahlavi.  [The 
History of Prison in the Qajar and Pahlavi Eras.] Tehran: Intishārāt-i Quqnūs, 1390 / 2011. Print. 
266 For an instance of mid-century political communications from Qasr, see the communiqués (elamiyeh) from 1952 
from the Islamist group Fadāīyān-i Islam regarding their imprisoned leader, Sayyid Mojtaba Navab Safavi. One of 
these communiqués, written between Safavi’s 1951 arrest and his 1953 release, addresses the “children of Islam and 
of Iran” and is written by members of Fadāīyān-i Islam who have gone to Qasr visit their leader and who claim they 
will stay at the prison “until the final hour Hazrat Navab Safavi spends in Qasr Prison.” Fadāīyān-i Islam. 
“Communiqué from A Group of Visitors to Hazrat Navab Safavi Written to the Brave Muslims of Iran and the 
World.” File No. 5-26-256. The Institute for the Study of Contemporary Iranian History Archives. Tehran.  
267 For Alavi’s epochal prison memoirs, see Alavi, Bozorg. Varaq Pārih Hā-yi Zindān [Scrap Papers from Prison]. 
Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1357 / 1978. Print; Alavi, Bozorg Panjāh-u Sih Nafar [The Fifty-Three]. Tehran: Amir Kabir, 
1357 / 1978. Print. Unsurprisingly, given Alavi’s status as one of Iran’s premier modernist writers, these two 
memoirs remain the gold standard for prison writing in Persian. Scrap Papers is written in vignette form, with little 
political or historical commentary, and aims to bring to life the quotidian violence and boredom of the prison cell. 
The Fifty Three was written in response to critiques of the earlier memoir that complained that it did not contain 
enough detail regarding Alavi’s arrest, imprisonment, interrogation, and trial. For an important historical reading of 
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subsequent attention, not all critiques of the modern policing or prison were written by dissidents 
or members of opposition parties. Some critiques of Pahlavi Iran’s relationship to modern 
policing were more critical of Iranians’ lack of respect for officers of the law than of the modern 
state. For instance, one writer of the era notes that “The subject of police in Iran is a weighty 
topic ripe for research and which has great importance for the people of our nation. This is 
because unfortunately, in our nation there are still people who don’t pay enough heed to the 
importance of the police officer, who is the representative and executor of the law [qānūn] in the 
country. Perhaps there are even police officers who do not realize their own worth.”268 
Much more critical accounts of the state were also written in this era. In 1946, a few 
years after the 1941 Allied invasion of Iran and the forced abdication of Reza Shah from his 
throne, a Tehran-based publisher produced an exposé of life at Qasr Prison entitled Come With 
Me to Prison [Bā Man Bih Zindān Bīyāīd].269 This short book, which promises to lay bear the 
authentic and intimate details of prison life in Tehran, was one in a series of similar texts printed 
by the same publisher; other books in the series include a self-styled tell-all on Tehran’s red light 
district, and featured such titles Come With Me to the Asylum and Come With Me to School (in 
evident anticipation of Foucauldian readings of modern power).270 That such a book could be 
published at all is the function of the relative political openness of the first years of the young 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s rule, between Reza Shah’s abdication and the rise and fall of Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. In these years, Iranians enjoyed a comparatively open public 
sphere for the only time in the Pahlavi era; newspapers flourished, publishing houses sprung up, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Alavi’s prison texts, see Abrahamian, Ervand. Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Recantation in Modern Iran. Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1999. Print. 14-16; 48-72.  
268 Amini, D. Pulīs Dar Irān. Tehran: [n.p.], 1325 / 1946. Print. 
269 Ilāhī, Hākīm. Bā Man Bih Zindān Bīyāīd. [Come With Me to Prison.] Tehran: Shirkat-i Sihāmī 1325/1946. Print. 
270 The book on the red light district is advertised on the back cover of Come With Me to Prison. The other titles are 
mentioned by the author in his introduction. Ibid, 3.  
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and books like Come With Me to Prison, which vociferously challenged the legal policies and 
institutional corruption of the modernizing state, flowered in the interregnum between Reza 
Shah’s autocracy and the emergence of the Pahlavi surveillance state.271    
 Come With Me to Prison — dedicated to the prisoners of Iran “whose only crime has 
been poverty and the lack of power” — is an occasionally salacious work of reformist agit-prop 
written after repeated visits by Ilāhī to Qasr prison and the central police jail, as well as 
conversations with both prison employees and those prisoners housed at those facilities.272 As 
such, it offers a unique look at legal reformist sentiment in the early Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 
period, and provides readers with a unique sense of how sympathetic readers viewed the modern 
penal apparatus in Iran, then still only a teenager. Ilāhī’s book went through three different 
printings, and the publishing house boasted that it could hardly keep up with reader demand.273 
Like the other texts in this publisher’s series, Ilāhī’s work gestures to the sentiment that 
Tehran, dotted with prisons, mental institutions, and brothels, is not only the capital of modern 
Iran but also the nation’s capital of crime and vice; Ilāhī even indicates that it is a center of 
iniquity precisely because it is the seat of a corrupt government. Ilāhī’s critique of Pahlavi state 
modernity does not drive him to demand the revocation of modern law. On the contrary, to lay 
bare the conditions of Tehran’s prisons is for Ilāhī to reveal the continued need for modern legal 
reform in the Pahlavi state. Crucially, many of the reforms that Ilāhī suggests in Come With Me 
to Prison are later taken up in social scientific and Pahlavi-sanctioned discourses on prison 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 For more on the relatively open political sphere of the 1940s, including the emergence of numerous political 
parties, see Abrahamian, Ervand. Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. Print. 
272 The author takes pains to give evidence of his authority and expertise, including photos of him taken with 
prisoners and prison authorities — such as the head of prison, Pasyar Samii — at Qasr. The publisher’s introduction 
to the text admits that the author is biased, but explains that this bias is born from the oppressive conditions the 
author witnessed in Pahlavi jailing facilities. Ilāhī, 1-2.  
273 Ibid, 1-2. 
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reform, though Ilāhī’s text is considerably more suspicious of the machinations of the modern 
state than those writings would be. 
In order to make a larger argument for reform, Ilāhī outlines what he argues is a “typical” 
experience for prisoner upon her entry into Iran’s penal apparatus.274 Upon capture, Ilāhī 
explains, the prisoner is first taken to Tehran’s central jail [zindān-i markazī], which is run by the 
Tehran police [shahrbānī] and is meant to be a temporary jailing facility for unsentenced 
arrestees. This is where the accused is meant to remain until interrogated, arraigned, tried, and 
sentenced, after which she would be transferred to Qasr, a prison meant to house convicted 
criminals with sentences of set length. According to the author, however, this routine is not the 
case in practice. During the prisoner’s stay at the central police jail, she encounters the first in a 
series of corrupt officers, who bribes the prisoner and tells her that she must “go see the head of 
the prison.”275 In reality, this sinister but unspecific command is designed to coerce the prisoner 
to pay a bribe for the right to stay in this temporary jailing facility, rather than being bussed to 
the more frightening Qasr. Even if a prisoner insists that she hasn’t yet been interrogated or 
sentenced, Ilāhī explains, the meaning of “democracy” [demukrāsī] in this case is clear: the 
prisoner can decide whether she will be taken to Qasr, where she might be forgotten forever, by 
simply paying the bribe.276 Prisoners who can afford to do so pay the bribe, because the police 
jail is much more comfortable than Qasr, offering better food, longer visitation periods, and 
opportunities to bribe guards to leave the facility altogether. Some prisoners, according to Ilāhī, 
are granted their outright release from the central jail without arraignment simply because they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274  According to the author, this narrative is culled directly from the autobiographical notes of an anonymous 
prisoner. Ibid, 3.  
275 Ibid, 3-4. 
276 Ibid, 4. 
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have accessed the state’s meaning of “freedom”: freedom to pay the bribe.277 This is not the rule 
of law, the author protests, but the “rule of money” [hukūmat-i pūl].278 Despite the myriad 
modern laws put on the books in the two decades before the publication of this text, Ilāhī 
complains, legality is merely a suggestion for the Pahlavi state.  
In Qasr, Ilāhī writes, filth, degradation, and corruption are even more rampant than in the 
central police jail. Upon their arrival at Iran’s premier modern prison, inmates are given one pair 
of regulation pants and one striped shirt and taken to the “grimiest” section of Qasr, cellblock 
two (of nine). The author notes that the cellblock in which the inmate is eventually housed is 
typically decided due to bribes or social status. Ilāhī was not the only writer to mention such 
differential treatment between prisoners; discrepancies in housing and overall conditions are also 
remarked upon by political prisoners of the early Pahlavi era, who noted that they were given 
preferential treatment by guards due to their superior class position.279 The quality of food in 
Qasr is very poor — moldy vegetables, no meat, no fats — and is run by a mafia-style system led 
by corrupt guards and some well-established prisoners who hoard rations and sell better food at 
extortionist prices to prisoners powerless to stop them.280 Inmates, both male and female, are 
routinely whipped or punched.281 Illicit drugs are a major problem, among both prisoners and 
guards; Ilāhī’s exaggerated claim is that “80% of prisoners and 99% of prison guards are opium 
addicts.”282 Drug dealing happens openly, and is carried out by experienced prisoners. Pre-dating 
yet gesturing to the seedy world of Shamlu’s drug-related prison slang, Ilāhī describes a scene in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 Ibid, 4-5. 
278 Ibid, 74. 
279 For one example of this phenomenon, see the prison memoirs of Bozorg Alavi. Alavi, Bozorg. Varaq Pārih Hā-
yi Zindān [Scrap Papers from Prison]. Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1357 / 1978. Print. Alavi, Bozorg. Panjāh-u Sih Nafar 
[The Fifty-Three]. Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1357 / 1978. Print. 
280 Ilāhī even claims that guards take the better foodstuffs home with them instead of rationing them to prisoners. 
Ibid, 6. 
281 Ibid, 42. 
282 Ilāhī, 5. 
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which a prisoner walks around shouting “We have the pure stuff! We have the excellent pure 
stuff!” (he is selling opium), and another (selling hashish) strolls between cellblocks shouting 
“Jangī o bangī, bangī o jangī” [“warring and banging, banging and warring”].283 There are even 
a number of rooms used for buying and selling drugs, which prisoners refer to as “dakkih” 
[shops]. Drug users and sellers feel no fear of guards, some of whom are profiting from this drug 
trade. The author describes this freedom of movement sardonically, writing, “The angel of 
freedom [firishtih-yi āzādi] is in flight at Qasr. Long live this democratic government [zindih bād 
hukūmat-i demukrāsī].284 For Ilāhī, the failure of the state to maintain law and order in prisons is 
tantamount to a larger failure to bring about those political demands — freedom, justice, etc. —
 that had for so long animated Iranian reformers. Instead, he argues, the state has produced a 
perversion of freedom in its penal institutions.  
 At the time of Ilāhī’s writing, there were nine cellblocks at Qasr.285 Cellblock three 
housed the infirmary, while what was then a small prison factory was housed in cellblock seven. 
Cellblocks five and six were the biggest, with both consisting of 28-30 rooms each holding 18-22 
prisoners.286 According to Ilāhī, these cellblocks were referred to by prisoners as the “vulture 
cells,” and often held prisoners from outside of Tehran.287 Ilāhī asserts that if the prisoner pays 
the bribe while still in the temporary jail, he would be taken to cellblock one or two, where the 
“important” prisoners are taken regardless of their crimes. These cellblocks, the author explains, 
are the least crowded, and prisoners receive better treatment there.288 The biggest yard is between 
cellblocks five and six, where prisoners gamble or smoke opium. Each cellblock has a café and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Ibid, 7. 
284 Ibid, 7. 
285 Ibid, 9. See also Rubayʻī & Rāhraw Khuājah. Tārīkh-i Zindān Dar ‘Asr-i Qājār va Pahlavi, 104-118. 
286 Ibid, 9. 
287 Ibid, 9. 
288 Ibid, 76. 
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grocery, staffed by prisoners who have often bribed wardens to be named to those lucrative 
posts. Once installed in these posts, these shopkeeper-prisoners water down or dilute food and 
tea, or take the best materials for their own use. Similarly, the meager wages paid to prisoners 
who work in the prison factory are often stolen or coerced out of the workers’ hands by 
unscrupulous guards and mafia-like prisoners.289 Remarkably, in the years after the Pahlavi state 
initiated a prison reform program in the mid-1950s, state literature would basically admit that 
many of these practices — particularly mafia-styled control of prison amenities and rampant 
drug use — were common in Iran’s prisons in years prior.290  
Given his claim to be writing on behalf of Iran’s silenced and hapless prisoners, what is 
Ilāhī’s solution for these problems? Ultimately a reform-minded modernist, Ilāhī is not interested 
in abandoning the fledgling prison factory program, nor does his critique of the modern penal 
apparatus lead him to suggest abandoning the prison as a form of punishment. On the contrary, 
Ilāhī argues for expanding the prison factory and making “honest” labor available to all 
prisoners. It is only through labor, Ilāhī argues, that the criminal can be reformed from an 
antisocial problem into useful citizen of a modern state. It is thus that Ilāhī demands that, instead 
of a “factory for pickpockets” and a “university for thieves,” the prison should be transformed 
into an institution with a true tutelary function and used to better Iranian society.291 Gesturing to 
the common practice of blaming Iranian problems on British and Russian colonial influence, 
Ilāhī argues that the broken legal system is “the fault of neither England nor Russia” but rather 
that of the corrupt officers who run the prison, lawyers who don’t stand in the way of legal 
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290 Of course, these same state discourses are typically silent on the topic of bribe taking by state officials, just as 
they are silent on continued vice or criminality among the “reformed” prison population. See Bungāh-i Ta‘āvun va 
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shenanigans, and the state which does nothing to stand in the way of that corruption.292 It is only 
through ensuring the true rule of law, Ilāhī argues, that both colonial influence and internal 
despotism — the twin concerns of the constitutional era — can finally be overcome. 
 In Qasr, in both the women’s prison and the wards for male prisoners, a major issue was 
that of detainees being held without sentencing, or in some cases even long after their sentences 
had expired; this would remain a problem at least until the end of the Pahlavi era.293 Ilāhī decries 
the legal limbo in which individuals were detained without having been arraigned, sentenced, or 
in some cases told of the state’s exact charges against them. For instance, he claims that upon his 
visit to the Qasr women’s prison, there were 57 women being held there, only five of whom had 
already been sentenced; most of the women had been in Qasr waiting to be sentenced on drug or 
prostitution charges, and many insisted on their innocence.294 Meanwhile, Ilāhī insists, untold 
hundreds of male prisoners lived in Qasr in this legal limbo.295 He writes, “Filth and misery 
covered the [female] prisoners from head to toe. Everyone complained about their uncertain 
sentences. They would say, ‘If they tell us that we have to be in prison for ten years, it would be 
better than this uncertainty [bilā taklīfī].”296 Ilāhī indicates that the sheer number of legal cases 
far exceeded the Iranian judiciary’s ability to attend to cases in a timely fashion. To be sure, the 
backlog of cases was a real problem in the years after the codification of the criminal and civil 
codes, so much so that by 1930 concerned citizens were anxiously writing to Iṭilāʿāt newspaper 
with ideas for relieving the logjam.297 The practical effects of Iran’s rapid legal modernization 
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293 For one reference to this issue in the late Pahlavi period, see Chirīkhā-yi Fadāī-yi Khalq. “Zindānha-yi Rezhim 
Va Zindāniān-i Siyāsī.” ʿAṣr-i ʿAmal. 4. 29. 
294 Ilāhī, 3. 
295 Ilāhī’s estimations regarding unsentenced male prisoners of this era varies.   
296 Ibid, 3. 
297 In August 1930, a writer referred to as Abul Fatḥ Irānī wrote to Iṭilāʿāt with ideas for helping Iran’s “heroic” but 
overburdened judges decrease their case load, signaling that in the months and years immediately after the 
transformation of Iran’s legal structure, courts were already loaded with more cases than they could handle. The 
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can perhaps be most readily seen in complaints of prolonged incarceration without trial 
sentencing that plagued the Pahlavi judiciary until its final days. 
In this era, concern emerged regarding the women’s prison, as some increasingly saw the 
effect on young children of having mothers in jail as a particularly stark failure of Pahlavi penal 
modernity. Ilāhī explains that many of the women held at the women’s prison are there with their 
young children in tow, while most other women spend their days worried about unsupervised 
youngsters at home. Despite what he considers the obviously deleterious social effects of having 
so many mothers and children in prison, Ilāhī opines that members of the Pahlavi elite are simply 
content with this situation. In September 1946, the Shah’s twin sister Princess Ashraf Pahlavi 
was sent to the women’s prison in order to take stock of conditions there; Ilāhī asserts that 
corrupt officials covered their tracks in front of the Princess by giving the typically filthy jailed 
women new chādurs [veils]. (See Fig. 1) This surface alteration seemed to satisfy the Princess 
that all was well for women behind bars.298 This particular concern for the women and children 
caught in Iran’s penal apparatus would be repeated in other critiques of Iran’s prisons. For 
instance, documentarian Kamran Shirdel, a 1960s critic of Pahlavi state modernism, paints a 
comparable picture of Tehran’s women’s prison in Women’s Penitentiary, a short 1965 film.299 
Women’s Penitentiary includes footage of scores of imprisoned women — many of whom, 
again, appear to be jailed on drug charges — raising their young children behind bars, or 
worrying about their families beyond prison walls. A social worker interviewed in the film 
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298 Ibid, 3. 
299 Despite being state funded, Shirdel’s 1960s films depict life in Tehran — particularly its prisons, poverty, and 
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About Muslim Women in Iranian Documentary.” Feminist Media Histories. 1.1 (Winter 2015): 89-111. Print.  
124 
	  
admits that having mothers in prison heightens the possibility of “psychological and emotional 
problems” for the children of these women.  
In their emphasis on broken families and “innocent” children raised behind bars, critiques 
such as Ilāhī’s and Shirdel’s offered damning appraisals of the modernizing Pahlavi state, 
precisely because they challenged the state using a longstanding discourse of Iranian 
nationalism: patriotic motherhood.300 Instead of raising the next generation of healthy patriots 
and citizens, these critiques indicate, Iranian women are instead being made to raise the next 
generation of criminals and delinquents.  
This anxiety is justified, according to Ilāhī’s account, because the conditions at Qasr’s 
juvenile prison Dār al-Ta’dīb, (“house of corrections”) are equally grim. Ilāhī claims that at Dār 
al-Ta’dīb, young boys are often subjected to “bachih-bazī” — sexual relations between men and 
young boys. Scandalously, Ilāhī indicates that boys are kidnapped on the streets of Tehran and 
brought to important prisoners for their sexual pleasure. Children as young as eight are picked up 
and shuttled to Qasr; their only crime is having attractive, “rose-colored cheeks.”301 Raised by 
criminals in prison, these sons of the modern nation state are damned to lives of vice and 
degradation. Without mothers, or with only convicts for mothers, they enter Qasr as pickpockets 
and petty thieves but are later released as hardened criminals in their own right. Anxiety 
regarding Iran’s expanding population of female convicts took further root in mid-century 
sociological discourses, with texts condemning the modern conditions that would lead to the 
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moral crisis of female criminality.302 Indeed, the very concept of female and child criminality —
 particularly the notion that as many children were learning how to engage in lives of crime 
rather than being sent to school or to work — challenged the modern state at its core. In these 
texts, the failure of the women’s and children’s prisons is represented as no less than the failure 
of project of state nationalism itself. For its part, the mid-century Pahlavi state publicized child 
criminality as a dangerous failing of individual parents, who through negligence let their children 
fall under the control of corrupting forces. A 1960s radio program broadcast by the national 
police, for instance, pleaded with parents to spend time with their children and interviewed a 12-
year old pickpocket who explained that he had been abandoned by his father and left unattended 
by his mother, leaving him to learn the art of delinquency from common street thieves.303  
 Come With Me to Prison ironically notes that Qasr is a “giant school of ethics” in which 
one must learn a “strange science” — the science of further criminal behavior, corruption, vice, 
and drug abuse.304 This echoes, albeit to different ends, a common refrain in texts by political 
prisoners of the era who assert that they received their political education at Qasr. For instance, 
Tudeh party co-founder Bozorg Alavi, who was incarcerated in the aftermath of the 1931 law 
banning communist activity, claims that,“[Qasr] Prison, for us, was truly a school. We learned 
many things there. Not only about social and political matters, but also…well, what didn’t we 
learn? For example, I learned Russian in prison. I learned English in prison. In prison…one read 
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in earnest.”305 Ilāhī’s prisoners, on the other hand, are not gaining productive skills but rather 
cementing their status as recidivists. He explains that a favorite pastime of the prisoners is to 
boast of their most outrageous crimes, and to teach others how to perform new criminal acts. A 
master lockbreaker teaches new prisoners how to break locks with silk, wires, and other 
household items. Another prisoner teaches his fellow cellmates how to break into homes by 
climbing up and down walls and what shoes to wear for this activity. Another teaches them how 
to slit throats without the victim making a sound.306 Ilāhī mobilizes this sensational detail 
towards reformist aims, arguing that it has not yet occurred to the state that, if they plan to throw 
thousands of people into prison, they should do something “productive” with them. Instead, in 
Iran’s prisons the prisoner only eats, sleeps, bribes, gambles, and abuses drugs.307 Ilāhī’s writing 
takes aim at the state that supports such a broken institution, while also tacitly admitting that 
some of his tales may be embellished or at least unbelievable at first to the reader. He writes, 
“Even if you only believe one of these stories and deny the rest, the corruption of this regime is 
clear.”308 In other words, the veracity of each anecdote is less important than the larger truth of 
lawlessness, corruption, and vice in Qasr, which inevitably lead to the same outside of prison 
walls. If Iranian society is ever to be safe from criminality, Ilāhī asserts, the only solution is the 
state investing itself in the project of transforming criminals into members of a productive 
citizenry. This would be precisely the project that the state took on in the years to come. 
 
Social Sciences and the Discourse of Criminology 
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 Concern regarding the Iranian legal and penal apparatus was not simply the purview of 
reformists and dissidents. At the same time that critical views of the modern prison such as those 
outlined above emerged, the scholarly field of criminology also took root in Iran. Criminology 
was one of many academic social scientific disciplines to emerge in the context of Pahlavi 
modernity; the language of the modern sciences (and the positivist logic of this discourse) was 
increasingly adopted with the 1920s advent of the Pahlavi state as part of complicated interplay 
between modern class formation in Iran, Reza Shah’s “modernist urge to hasten Iran’s 
modernization and improve its administration,” and the Iranian intelligentsia’s attempts to 
contend with the country’s semi-colonial status.309 The social sciences would follow not long 
after, as sociology emerged as an academic discipline in Iran in 1940, when the first class on 
sociology was offered at Tehran University’s Teacher’s College. Within a few years, the first 
academic sociological texts were published, and in 1958, a social science research center and a 
school for social work both opened their doors in Tehran.310 An important but unstudied early 
text in the emerging fields of legal theory, criminology, and the subset of those fields that would 
eventually call itself prison studies [ilm-i zindān]311 in Iran is an unpublished 1957 doctoral 
dissertation by Abolḥasan Bihpūr from Tehran University’s college of law entitled Prisons and 
Prisoners.312 This text — as well as much of the history of the Iranian social sciences in general 
and criminology in particular — has been ignored by subsequent scholarship, but it is critical 
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insofar as it reveals many of the prevailing trends in legal and criminal theory in mid-century 
Iran. 313 And, as we will see below, the rise of the social sciences is crucial to understanding mid-
century Pahlavi state reform efforts, many of which mobilized these social scientific discourses 
to legitimize state practice.  
Bihpūr introduces his specific research on prisons in Iran with a general social theory of crime 
and the emergence of the law in human cultures. In order to argue that a society cannot function 
without an efficient penal apparatus, Bihpūr argues for the essentially social character of the law. 
For Bihpūr, every individual is an integral cog in a larger system, that is, society. Society must 
exist because a fully “individualistic life is impossible…no one can obtain every necessity or 
immunity from every danger alone.” A lone individual is “helpless,” while society is that which 
“makes life possible.”314 In order to maintain the health of society, each individual must fulfill 
certain responsibilities, after which they then enjoy certain rights. With every fulfilled 
responsibility, society moves as a whole “moment by moment towards progress and excellence.” 
Despite this basic social principle, Bihpūr asks, does every member of a social body always 
fulfill those responsibilities that then allow others to enjoy the rights that come with a functional 
social world? Unfortunately, the author laments, the answer to this question is an unequivocal 
no. Though most individuals naturally fulfill their social responsibilities, there will always be 
antisocial elements who do not live up to the standards set by society as a whole. These 
antisocial elements are naturally occurring and thus impossible to eradicate; there are always 
individuals in any social body who, due to a lack of moral character and limited “love for 
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humanity” [bashar dūstī] transgress against social norms.315 Thus, all social forms will 
necessarily be vulnerable to transgressions committed by those individuals who suffer from this 
lamentable but naturally occurring moral deficiency. 
 With this social theory of transgression established, the author poses a central question: if 
society is perpetually in danger of individual violators of norms, how can responsible individuals 
or groups of people protect themselves? How can the overall moral strength of a community be 
preserved in the face of this chronic individual deficiency? The text asserts that the first building 
block for an ethical society is religion [dīn].316 Still, despite the moral refinement and strength of 
conscience that religion provides for most, it is on its own incapable of standing in the way of the 
wayward desires and lustful appetites of all of humanity.317 This is because even in a religious 
society there will be those who, for reasons having to do with ignorance, lack of religious belief, 
a poorly attuned moral compass, or just a general unwillingness to perform social duties, refuse 
to conform to the standards of that society. It is due to this social reality that a need for codified 
law arises. Social norms and religious morals are not enough, precisely because they do not have 
the power to hold transgressors responsible for their acts. Accordingly, Bihpūr writes, “Just as an 
individual needs air to breathe in order to live, so a society needs laws.”318 A legal order 
delineates the rights and responsibilities of every individual in a society, and punishes those who 
transgress against the social-turned-legal standards set by the group as a whole. Thus, without 
specifically quoting any theorists of Islamic jurisprudence or European legal philosophers, 
Bihpūr’s social theory of law nonetheless draws generally from both Islamic legal theories of 
right and responsibility, and European natural law theories that understand codified law as 
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derived from the natural emergence of norms implicit in any social order, which arise to protect 
that society from the lawlessness inherent in a pre-legal state of nature.   
Bihpūr’s text concerns itself with a popular topic in Iranian criminological discourses: the 
ethics of punishment. The author asks: why and how did prisons emerge around the world? Why 
do they exist, and what do they do? In order to answer this question, Bihpūr argues that the 
explicit purpose in punishing a criminal is two-fold: meting out justice to the transgressor and 
safeguarding society from the violations of antisocial or violent elements. In order for a 
punishment to be just, the author asserts that it must be proportional; that is, the severity of the 
punishment must match the severity of the crime. Any punishment that does any more or any 
less is not truly justice; it is itself a new crime. What’s more, in order for a punishment to be 
effective, it must be rational; that is, it must successfully dissuade others from undertaking 
harmful, antisocial, or criminal activity. Thus, the state has both a moral and a practical 
responsibility to punish transgressors properly, lest the health of the social body be 
undermined.319  
Historically, Bihpūr asserts, there have been four forms of punishment: execution, 
monetary compensation, “bodily punishments,” and incarceration.320 While in certain cases 
execution is the only form of just punishment, it is not just in every instance, such as the case of 
someone who kills while trying to protect his home or family honor, or cases for which the death 
penalty would be disproportionate.321 While monetary compensation has been used effectively in 
certain instances, this punishment form has the ethical disadvantage of unjustly placing 
disproportionate pressure on the poor. Furthermore, it is practically ineffective, insofar as it is 
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not an adequate deterrent from criminal activity for the wealthy.322 Bihpūr argues that bodily 
punishment is also inadequate, because a balance of punishment relative to the crime is 
impossible to achieve through the application of physical pain. If the length of time that the 
wrongdoer is physically punished is too short, he or she will neither learn any lesson nor be 
deterred from future error. If the wrongdoer is punished for too long, or too painfully, or too 
brutally, he or she may become ill or lose his or her mind or moral compass. All of these 
potential outcomes represent insufficient solutions from the point of view of the modern state. In 
other words, Bihpūr theorizes punishment as a kind of moral and practical equation. And, like 
any formal equation, punishment can be approached with the tools of science.  
What then should society’s response be “when faced with a thief, a traitor, a swindler 
…or those who have committed manslaughter or tens of other crimes of this sort?”323 According 
to the author, it is precisely these individuals for whom the modern prison had to be established 
around the world. “The historical leaders of society,” he writes, have decided that transgressive 
individuals must be removed from society for a set amount of time in order to re-establish a just 
and a harmonious social order.324 Prison then, represents the final step in a progressive telos of 
human punishment; the modern prison emerges in this logic as a historical answer to the question 
of how to ensure justice. Bihpūr’s teleological theory of punishment allows him to read the 
history of punishment as a progressive march from the inefficient and inhumane towards the 
socially useful and just; none of Ilāhī or Shirdel’s critiques of modernity are apparent in Bihpūr’s 
analysis. Without specifying what era it is discussing,325 the text argues that punishment was 
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325 Bihpūr provides few if any names or dates throughout his text, and much of his writing is devoid of historical 
specificity. The one reference he makes to ground his reader regarding this earlier “inhumane” era in punishment is 
to mention the Bastille as an example from these dark ages of punishment, evoking the sentiments associated with 
the French revolutionary and European liberal traditions. 
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once meted out according to the whims of individuals rather than by codified law or based on the 
type and severity of the crime.326 In this primordial, pre-legal era, “no one paid attention to 
‘criminal law’ or ‘the reform of the criminal,’ issues which are of paramount importance in the 
laws of progressive [mutaraghī] nations today.”327 Because neither legality nor the humanity of 
the prisoner were respected in this dark age, spaces that are referred to using the same word 
(“prison” / “zindān”) in the modern era refer to radically different institutions. Earlier prisoners 
were thrown into “terrifying, dank, underground dungeons” where they were subjected to such 
brutal physical and psychological torments “that the pen abstains from writing of it.”328 The life 
of the prisoner was rendered “worthless” in such spaces — that is, the prisoner was robbed of his 
or her essential humanity — while concepts like “law” and “rights” had no meaning.329  
Bihpūr states that Iran was mired in just such a pre-legal dark age before Reza Shah’s 1928 
annulment of capitulations to the foreign powers and the subsequent codification of a centralized 
criminal code. For the author, these events represent important evolutionary steps in the history 
of Iranian punishment. In earlier eras, punishment in Iran was decided by personal whim; 
whipping, branding, cutting off limbs, and execution were common. For instance, the author 
makes note of the notorious late Qajar prison: Anbār-i Shāhī (“The Shah’s Cellar”), located 
under the traditional music house in Tehran’s Ark Square (now in central Tehran), which was 
among the most well-known Qajar dungeons in the city.330 Today, Bihpūr boasts, such spaces are 
happily scarce. Just as importantly, physical torture has been outlawed. Bihpūr writes, “In 
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prisons of old so much did they torture and physically torment prisoners that they would be 
forced to confess whether or not the individual had committed crime.” Today this is no longer 
the case.331 Evolution in the move towards the rule of law can readily be seen because “human 
societies gradually moved towards progress and civilization” such that “today, punishments must 
be applied with regard to the law.”332  
Despite Bihpūr’s triumphalist tone regarding the successes of the modern humanist state, 
the prison cell emerges in his text as a site of anxiety at the same time as it is lauded as a marker 
of Iranian progress. He notes, for instance, that the health of prisoners should be of paramount 
importance to the state, but is forced to admit that Pahlavi prisons lag behind those in other 
“progressive nations” in terms of securing both the physical health and the psychological 
wellbeing of the prison population.333 Still, Bihpūr leans on his essential belief in modern 
progress to argue that health conditions in Pahlavi prisons are naturally evolving. This concern 
with the physical and psychological health of Pahlavi prisoners is echoed in other criminological 
texts of the day; indeed, criminology was from its inception intimately linked to the discourse of 
psychology.  
Another unpublished 1950s doctoral dissertation, which looks at Iran’s penal laws as they 
relate to mental health, argues that prisoner psychology is not merely a mental health issue, but 
more critically an issue of “justice,” revealing the extent to which earlier reformist concerns with 
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justice and the rule of law merged in this era with medical and social scientific language.334 
Maḥmūd Qahrimānī, the author of this text, issues a call for further research into psycho-medical 
science, which he argues is necessary for the criminal justice apparatus to correctly and justly 
deal with mentally ill persons. Unfortunately, according to Qahrimānī, the Iranian criminal 
justice system still too often looks only at the accused’s list of offenses rather than taking stock 
of their mental health and asking whether they can be held responsible for their crimes or illicit 
actions. In Qahrimānī’s estimation, this legal lacuna is also a moral lacuna, and as such 
represents a serious problem for the Pahlavi judicial system, despite the progress it has made in 
other arenas. For this author, the lesson is clear: the state must apply itself to understanding the 
field of criminal psychology in order to both adequately provide for mentally ill persons in its 
custody and to understand the pathology of crime.335 In the logic of this text, the state is a fully 
medico-custodial institution, which has both an ethical and legal responsibility for the care of its 
citizens; nowhere is this more evident than in the case of the penal apparatus, which literally 
supervises both mentally ill and socially ill (i.e. pathological) elements until such a time that they 
can be properly reintegrated into healthy society.  
Qahrimānī poses a question: does the state, which bears responsibility for guiding 
individuals within society, have the right to imprison or punish those who go astray? The self-
evident answer to this question in the modern era is yes; modern criminal theory has decided that 
humans are all capable of good and bad, and that in taking part in a criminal act, an individual is 
engaged in making a choice. Mental health issues, however, complicate this picture. Referring to 
the work of turn-of-the-century French sociologist Gabriel Tarde, Qahrimānī challenges this 
straightfoward truism by insisting that those with mental disorders cannot be held responsible for 
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their crimes because they don’t have “unity of personality” [vaḥdat-i shakhsīyat]. It is thus, 
Qahrimānī argues, that Iranian criminology and legal theory must catch up to the modern science 
of psychology, which has revealed that mentally ill persons must be cared for differently than 
sane criminals who know right from wrong.336 Qahrimānī would be pleased with the degree to 
which crime and prison studies carried on his focus on the psycho-medical sciences. A later text, 
written by Tāj Zamān Dānish, one of Pahlavi Iran’s foremost criminology scholars, prison 
reform advocates, one time instructor at the Tehran Police Academy, and eventual University of 
Tehran professor, states, “the criminal is like a patient [bimār], and just as a doctor orders 
various tests on the patient in order to diagnose their disease, the judge must collect information 
for a file on the individual personality of each offender, in order to discover the reasons and 
motivations for the crime”337 In this scholarly writing, the state is imagined as both a protector, 
examiner, and healer-reformer of individual prisoners, rather than the authority who punishes 
transgressors without regard for their physical health or psychological “personality.” In fact, in 
the logic of this discourse, punishment without examination becomes unthinkable. Instead, the 
state is imagined not only as a legal but also a moral and medical system insofar as it was 
expected to care for, discipline, and reform the individual criminal. I argue that this 
preoccupation with prisoners’ bodies and psyches represents a new strategy of power that was at 
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once invested in technologies of the body and in management of populations.338 Indeed, the 
intimate medicalization of the prisoner is undertaken in part because the booming prison 
populace represented a perpetual potential danger, wherein prisoners were alternately imagined 
as a vulnerable population in need of care (in terms of health, hygiene, access to food and clean 
water, etc.), at the same time that they were considered a potentially destabilizing social force if 
not appropriately reformed.     
  
Prison Reform in Pahlavi Iran 
 
By the mid-1950s, in an environment influenced both by these blossoming social 
scientific and legal discourses and increasingly prevalent critiques of Iranian penal policies, the 
Pahlavi regime took steps towards fortifying its status as legal-ethical custodial state vis-á-vis its 
expanding prison population. On October 9, 1954 [17 Mihr 1333], just a year after the CIA coup 
that re-established Pahlavi rule over the Peacock throne and nearly a decade before the 
Mohammad Reza Shah’s so-called White Revolution, the Iranian cabinet approved the bylaws 
for new establishment called the Institute for the Cooperation and Industry of Prisoners (ICIP) 
[Bungāh-i Ta‘āvun va Ṣanā‘ī’-i Zindāniān], a state organization concerned specifically with 
founding prison factories and education facilities and supporting the families of the 
incarcerated.339 With financial backing from another state-led institution, the Organization for 
the Protection of Prisoners (OPP) [Anjuman-i Himāyat-i Zindāniān], the ICIP initiated a prison 
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labor and education program that would soon be advertised as an important early reformist 
victory for the Pahlavi state.  
Initially, the ICIP’s work was slow going; it wasn’t until 1959 that the Institute managed 
to secure funding for the machines and tools necessary to begin its work in small and 
dysfunctional prison factories in Tehran penitentiaries, most prominently at Qasr. In that year, 
the Pahlavi state (through the OPP) gave machines, tools, and capital in excess of 285,000 Rials 
to ICIP to put towards expanding Iranian prison factories.340 The ICIP further expanded its 
presence in Tehran’s prisons by using the profits made through this initial investment. As a result 
of this expansion, by the mid 1960s, Qasr had operational factories and schools for metal works, 
automobile repair, rug production, tailoring and sewing, shoemaking, carpentry, sock darning, 
beauty salons, embroidery, rugmaking, handicrafts, and fine arts.341 That same year, there were 
at least 30 skilled experts/technicians in the Qasr prison factory who performed two crucial 
functions: educating the prisoners in specific skills and working in a management capacity. 
There were also an estimated 850 male, 95 female, and 45 youth prisoner-workers in prison work 
programs throughout Iran, the majority of them based in Tehran at Qasr.342  
 ICIP literature largely credited its mid-‘50s founding and growth to the progressive 
nature and reformist spirit of the young Pahlavi monarch, who the organization asserted was 
attempting to reform Iranian prisons along “civilized” and “humane” principles.343 In these state 
prison discourses, as in the abovementioned scholarly writing on prisons and punishment, the 
language of humanist progress often maps onto notions of useful prisoner labor and productivity 
in post-release society. Article one of the ICIP bylaws assuredly claims that the organization has 
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been established in order to “help prisoners…to secure their welfare as well as the welfare of 
their families” as well as to train those prisoners in a “useful trade.”344 A 1965 speech given by 
Major General Muḥsin Mubṣar, then National Chief of Police, given at the eighth general 
conference for the Organization for the Protection of Prisoners and later reprinted by the ICIP, 
reveals to just what extent the language of the social sciences had seeped into state discourses on 
the prison. Mubṣar begins his address by explaining that sociologists and criminologists alike 
have extensively studied the effects of punishment on society, and that instead of rehearsing 
those well-known findings, he plans to describe the steps taken by the OPP towards prisoner 
welfare. Still, before this organizational housekeeping, Mubṣar invokes the “scientific language 
that is common today and that is called dialectics” to delve into the topic of punishment [tanbih], 
so that he can “scientifically explain” the establishment and philosophy of the OPP. To do so, 
Mubṣar claims, allows him to highlight the “humanitarian efforts” [talāshhā-yi insānī] of those 
working to improve the lives of prisoners in Iran in full detail.345  
 Perhaps unexpectedly, the Chief of Police repeatedly evokes “dialectics” and the 
“dialectical method” to explain global changes in prison norms and punishment techniques 
around the world. “The dialectical method,” he states, “teaches us that every phenomenon must 
be studied in a state of flux, transformation, and evolution [takāmul].”346 Mubṣar explains that 
the cause behind any phenomenon must be studied, as must the evolution of that phenomenon. 
This is particularly true in the study of crime and punishment, because without understanding the 
reasons for the existence of criminality it is impossible for the state to enact rational 
punishments. Seemingly unaware of his theoretically untenable position, Mubṣar blends a 
nominal interest in the dialectical method with an evolutionary vision of human advancement 
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and enlightenment notions of progress and rationalism. For Mubṣar, punishment techniques are 
experiencing rapid progress due to the light shone by the “dynamic logic of humanity” in the 20th 
century. Instead of merely punishing for the sake of punishing, Mubṣar argues, enlightened 
nations and social scientists alike now strive to find the fundamental reasons for criminal activity 
and to mete out punishment rationally and effectively.347  
For Mubṣar, as for the criminological theory discussed above, it is not merely unjust to 
punish a transgressor disproportionate to her crime, but it is also impractical to do so, insofar as 
one of the goals of punishment should be to deter others from crime. A disproportionate 
punishment, instead of dissuading individuals from criminal acts, might transform the petty 
criminal into a hardened recidivist, an outcome that is dangerous for the social body as a whole. 
In Mubṣar’s logic, it is not only inhumane to torture or to punish an individual too harshly, but it 
is also inhumane to subject society at large to individuals who have been damaged by torture or 
other unfair punishments: To this end, he writes: 
The goal of punishment in earlier society was only retribution [qaṣāṣ] and revenge 
[intiqām]…with no attention to the most important thing of all, the reason for the crime. 
As a result, punishments were inhumane [ghayr-i insānī], using torturous acts without 
any results in terms of the reality of crime [in society]. Not only wasn’t any positive 
result achieved but the vengeful atmosphere also led to the committing of worse and 
more horrific crimes on the part of criminals and their families. Every day, criminality 
increased in terms of both quality and quantity.348 
 
Mubṣar does not dwell on the historical specifics of his theory of increased criminality, nor does 
he go into detail regarding the specifics of the “torturous” punishment techniques that evidently 
allowed crime to flourish in this unenlightened era. Instead, he mobilizes the language of the 
medical sciences to describe the continued fight against crime in society. Echoing longstanding 
nationalist discourses that view the state and society as a kind of embodied organism, and 
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borrowing from expanding medical and psychological discourses, Mubṣar argues that the 
criminologist studying crime has the same role in treating and curing society as a doctor does in 
treating an individual sick patient. Crime in this imaginary is a kind of social disease, and the 
criminologist a master physician looking for and eradicating the root causes of the disease. He 
states: 
Today, just as the doctor fights against a dangerous disease by before anything 
learning about its root causes and only then treating the malady, a criminologist or 
judge…must certainly use this same method in the fight against criminality. Just 
as a doctor can’t operate on a patient suffering from rheumatism by simply 
amputating their arm, a judge can’t simply eliminate or imprison one murderer or 
thief in the fight against murder and theft in general.349 
 
Of course, Mubṣar concedes, there are occasions when a doctor must amputate a rotten limb. In 
the same way, in order to save an ailing society, a judge or statesman might have to cut a fully 
rotten part of the social body. Regardless, in order to cure any ailment, one must fight the cause 
rather than the effect. Further, crime must be fought in both “negative and positive senses.” If the 
state merely puts a thief into prison without attending to his guidance [irshād] and human 
betterment, Mubṣar argues, all the state achieves is temporarily halting her criminal behavior 
through negative reinforcement. On the other hand, if the core reason that the thief has turned to 
crime is addressed, then a positive action has been taken to stop this social disease.350 It is for 
that reason that correct punishment must necessarily be a two-step process. The first step is to 
sentence the criminal to the correct punishment as determined by the “laws of society.” The 
second step requires positive steps being taken to treat the psychological causes of her 
criminality.351 Like criminological discourses in general, the Pahlavi state’s prison reform 
literature also came to increasingly rely on the emergent field of psychology in its discussions of 
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proper punishment techniques. These state discourses increasingly saw the role of the prison as 
therapeutic rather than punitive; psychology was thought to get to the root of an individual’s 
pathology, with the social and medical sciences mobilized as corrective techniques of treatment.  
The notion of the modern prison as therapeutic treatment center was repeatedly invoked 
by the Pahlavi state. In a different speech given three years later, Chief of Police Mubṣar again 
lectured members of the OPP on the necessity of viewing crime as a social disease, only curable 
through attention to the laws of the social sciences. In this speech, Mubṣar claims that Iranian 
prisons have completely transformed by the ICIP according to the recommendations of the 
“science of criminology.” He states:  
In recent years, there have been remarkable changes in the science of 
criminology. The prison system has totally been transformed, such that today the 
prison is no longer a place meant for the negation of freedom. Instead, the prison 
is a treatment center in which criminals and lawbreakers are taken into a space of 
reform in order to be educated and disciplined, and after which the social illness 
with which they enter is cured.352  
 
The field of criminology and the Pahlavi state, Mubṣar asserts, share the same fundamental 
understanding regarding prisons, that is, that prisons should not be viewed as places of 
punishment. Instead, prisons have been transformed into socio-medical facilities that surgically 
remove social illness from the social body in the form of ailing individuals, and then return those 
individuals to the society as productive and fully healed persons.  
Chief of Police Mubṣar was not the only member of the Pahlavi state to discuss the issue 
of prison reform. In 1968, the same year as the UN Conference on Human Rights held in Tehran, 
the Shah’s wife Empress Farrah Pahlavi herself addressed the General Assembly of the 
Organization for Protection of Prisoners to discuss Pahlavi prison reform. In her speech, the 
Queen explicitly evokes the Shah’s White Revolution reforms, particularly the literacy and 
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hygiene training programs of that state-run reform movement, as embodying the same 
progressive zeal that marks the Shah’s interest in remaking Iranian prisons. Emphasizing the 
“humane” treatment of all prisoners, and arguing that it is possible for the criminal to be 
reformed and absorbed into normative society, the Empress states, 
The environment of the prison should not be such that the voice of conscience of the 
prisoner should be snuffed out. If prisoners see nothing but violence [khūshūnat] inside of 
prison, and their families outside are in distress and have no refuge, then those prisoners 
will become cynical towards society and their antisocial aspects will predominate and 
they will again turn to crime.353 
  
Farrah’s speech reveals an important sentiment in the state-led prison reform movement and 
discourse on crime and punishment. In this state-sanctioned theory of crime, the criminal upon 
entering prison sits teetering on the cusp of a life of recidivism. Yet, because of the individual’s 
inherently human capacity to reform, an improved life as a useful member of society remains 
within reach. In the logic of this discourse, the state holds the key to whether the criminal 
becomes a recidivist or a functional member of society.  
By what mechanism can the state guarantee the transformation of the Bad Criminal into 
the Good Citizen? A decisive component of the response to this problem, in both criminological 
and state-reformist discourses, is labor. Prison labor is theorized as being able to restore the 
prisoner’s health, honor, social standing, and moral compass. For the state, labor offered a 
transformative mechanism through which to remake not only the criminal’s body and mind but 
also her very being. Through the mobilization of her labor power, the prisoner disciplines and 
remakes her body; once she is a laboring being, she is no longer a criminal but a worker. Without 
explicitly referencing Marx, these Iranian state discourses give a tacit nod to the Marxian notion 
that labor is a social relation. The labor of the prisoner transforms her into a worker who is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
353 Bungāh-i Ta‘āvun va Ṣanā‘ī’-i Zindāniān. Guzārish-i Az Zindānhā. [A Report From the Prisons.] Idārih-i Kul-i 
Zindānhā va Chāpgah-i Bungāh-i Ta‘āvun va Ṣanā‘ī’-i Zindāniān. Tehran, 1347 / 1968. Print. 
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connected to normative social life through that labor and through the web of responsibilities she 
forms when providing for herself and family through “honest” means. This social connection, 
then, provides a moral transformation as well, insofar as the “good” laborer has disciplined 
herself against her formerly baser instincts.  
Because it labels its efforts “social work,” ICIP literature asserts that its goal for 
expanding prison factories was not in profit making, despite its typically keen attention to the 
bottom line.354 Rather, it positioned itself as the state’s means to “train and educate” those 
Iranians who had fallen on the criminal path, so that after their release former convicts could 
“live nobly” and support themselves through their new trade.355 Within three years of its 
founding, the ICIP established new factories in both the men’s and women’s prisons in Qasr, 
with work-stations equipped for sewing, metal works, woodworks, furniture building, shoe-
making, purse-making, embroidery, basket-weaving, belt-making, straw mat making, rug-
making, sock-knitting, frame-building, hair and makeup, and handicrafts.356 (Fig. 2) The Pahlavi 
state made use of this new ready supply of cheap labor, putting Qasr’s inmates to work for the 
benefit of other state institutions. In 1963, prisoner-workers made new tables, chairs, benches, 
cabinets, bookshelves, and clothes for both Tehran and province-based members of the police 
force for “half the cost” of non-prison labor.357  
According to the logic of the ICIP, this cheap prison labor not only benefited state 
institutions, but also the individual prisoners, for whom 25 percent of the wages would be set 
aside in bank accounts set up at Iran National Bank, with another 40 percent sent to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 The state, of course, was interested in its expenditures in its prisons. See, for instance, budgetary reports from the 
early 1960s, which keep close watch on policing and penal budgets. Qānūn-i Bujih-yi Sāl-i 1345 Kul-i Kishvar. [The 
Budget Laws for 1345.] Tehran: Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī, 1345 / 1961. Qānūn-i Bujih-yi Sāl-i 1345 Kul-i Kishvar. 
[The Budget Laws for 1346.] Tehran: Majlis-i Shūrā-yi Millī, 1346 / 1962. 
355 Bungāh-i Ta‘āvun va Ṣanā‘ī’-i Zindāniān, 1965. 10. Despite their assertion to be uninterested in profit, ICIP also 
boasts of raising 4,807,594.23 Rials in a decade’s time. 
356 Ibid, 20. 
357 Ibid, 21. 
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prisoner’s family to avoid potential ruination, 10 percent given to the prisoner immediately for 
daily expenses, with the final 25% taken for the ICIP reserve fund and for the prison itself.358 By 
the early 1960s, three new prisons were planned specifically for increased space for the prison 
labor program (though some of these penal institutions had been first suggested as early as the 
1920s) — Qizil Heṣār Prison, 11 miles from Tehran in Karaj, and two 2000 capacity prisons in 
Mashad and Shiraz, both of which were based on blueprints first used at Marion Penitentiary in 
Illinois in the United States.359 In particular, Qizil Heṣār, which opened its doors in 1968, was 
designed with both maximum- and minimum-security wings and built with outdoor farm 
facilities for prisoners to learn skills related to crop management and animal farming. According 
to the logic of the Pahlavi state, these facilities would work to enhance the state’s capacity to 
engage in a transformative economy of punitive labor, without which the social illness of crime 
could not be cured. 
Along with the expansion of labor, prisoner physical and mental health emerged as a 
foremost concern of the Pahlavi state’s prison reform programs. ICIP literature routinely lists 
ambitious plans to improve health, hygiene, mental health, and dentistry facilities in Iran’s 
prisons, only some steps of which were ever undertaken, and boasts that prisoner drug abuse and 
the rampant of epidemic diseases were both curtailed through ICIP involvement. This attention 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 Ibid, 23. 
359 Ibid, 11. The relationship between the new Iranian prison facilities and Illinois’ infamous Marion penitentiary is 
one upon which it is worth dwelling. Though it is now the smallest prison in the U.S. federal prison system, USP 
Marion has served as an important if troubling blueprint for prisons around the world. Opened in 1963, just a few 
years before its design was transported to the Iranian context in 1968, Marion’s blueprint was used almost 
immediately internationally, including another prison built in 1968 in New Zealand. As Greg Mewbold writes about 
Paremoremo, the New Zealand prison based on Marion, “Paremoremo is significant because it illustrates how 
substantially American social trends have become an international phenomenon and how, more particularly, 
American modes of criminal justice have been adopted in other parts of the world.” See Newbold’s introduction in 
Richards, Stephen C., Ed. The Marion Experiment: Long Term Solitary Confinement and the Supermax Movement. 
Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press 2015, vii-ix. Richards’ entire text is required reading for anyone 
interested in Marion’s sinister influence in the architecture and application of punishment derived from the Marion 
model from Illinois to New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Israel, and beyond. See also Richards, Stephen C. “USP 




to health and hygiene was a function of Pahlavi medical-humanism, a critical component of state 
prison discourses. In this prison reform literature, to treat inmates “humanely” means that before 
any prisoner reform or education can be undertaken, the physical and mental health of the 
prisoner must be attended to.360 If the first step in prisoner reform is healthcare, then the next 
step is providing some material support to the convict’s family for the convict’s peace of 
mind.361 It is only once these basic needs are met that the prisoner can be transformed through 
the disciplinary practice of labor. By the late 1960s, the ICIP introduced sports and exercise into 
certain prison facilities, particularly at Qizil Heṣār and Qasr, which in ICIP literature of the time 
is referred to as the “central penitentiary” [nedāmatgāh-i markazī] rather than Qasr.362 Exercise, 
sports, and physical health were not the state’s only concerns with the bodies of its prisoners; 
beyond these fields, there was also a gendered component in the ICIP’s approach to prison 
education and reform. Whereas male prisoners were put to work in factories or on farms, women 
were largely taught sewing and embroidery. ICIP literature emphasizes the need to cultivate in 
female convicts a love for and skills in “art of modern cooking” as well as homemaking. This 
gendered division of labor was not administered unthinkingly, but rather as part of the ICIP’s 
belief in their own social service. That is, according to the ICIP, teaching female prisoners how 
to sew, cook, and manage homes was an important part of its mandate, because a healthy modern 
society needed women to be prepared for their lives as cooks and homemakers.363 The stated 
goal of prison reformism was the production of good citizens, and through prison practices these 
citizens would ideally be produced as gendered subjects through appropriate labor. Upon release, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
360 Bungāh-i Ta‘āvun va Ṣanā‘ī’-i Zindāniān, 1965, 18. 
361 Shirdel’s documentary mentions the ICIP’s and OPP’s attempts to provide some financial support to convict’s in 
the women’s prison. Shirdel, Women’s Penitentiary.  
362 Bungāh-i Ta‘āvun va Ṣanā‘ī’-i Zindāniān, 1968, 47. 
363 Ibid, 9-10. 
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Following the influence of social scientific and psycho-medical discourses discussed 
above, the ICIP argued that the reforms of the Pahlavi state had the effect of transforming the 
prison from an institution that cut criminals off from society to one that taught them to engage 
with it. Distancing itself rhetorically from pre-Pahlavi punishment techniques, precisely in the 
era in which dissidents and political prisoners were increasingly vocal about Pahlavi penal 
practices and torture, the state nonetheless emphasized the need to view the penitentiary as a 
place where criminals were sent “as punishment, not for punishment.” [emphasis added].364 
According to state literature, the Pahlavi regime had succeeded in transforming the prison cell 
from a dank dungeon to a therapeutic space of “social reform.”365 No less a personage than 
Queen Farrah remarked, “Most prisoners are capable of reform and cultivation [tarbiyat], and are 
regretful of their criminal actions.”366 Indeed, by mid-century, the state professed a sense of 
responsibility towards the moral and physical cultivation of each prisoner in service of society. 
This was, in prison reform discourses, the very meaning of modern progress: 
The path of evolution and progress of the philosophy of punishment in today’s 
world has taken the color of guidance for the refinement of morals and reform of 
the condition of criminals.367 
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366 Bungāh, 1968. 1.  
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At the same time, the use of painful punishment and interrogation techniques dramatically 
expanded in precisely this era during which the Pahlavi state was most vocally attempting to 
reform the prison along modern “humanitarian” lines. Few if any dissidents mentioned the 
ICIP’s supposed mandate to treat prisoners “humanely,” though dissident groups would often 
liken Pahlavi torture to barbarism. Still, the expansion of torture under the Pahlavis should be 
viewed neither as a paradox nor as hypocrisy. Nor should it be viewed, as it was by many 
dissidents of the day, as simply political response in the wake of the tumult of the 1953 CIA-led 
coup. Instead, it is important to note that torture expanded in precisely the era in which the body 
and psyche of the prisoner were taken as pliable objects to be molded and refashioned by 
techniques of prison management. It is no mistake, then, that tortured prisoners in the state 
surveillance era (1953-1979) would often note being interrogated or worked on by people calling 
themselves doctors or teachers.368 The discipline and cultivation of the bad prisoner into the good 
citizen, so important to modern liberal prison reform discourse, is pushed to its logical extreme 
through the more aggressive application of state violence through torture. And, with the 
establishment in the 1960s-1970s of forced public recantations, in which “reformed” political 
prisoners were made to profess allegiance to the state against their former comrades and to 
disavow their formerly held beliefs, Empress Farrah’s above comment that “all prisoners are 
capable of reform and cultivation” takes its most sinister shape.  
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369 “Weapons Related to the Murder of Abdol Hussein Hazir, Secretary of the Court.” Photo Archive No. 0-4308-0-








Fig 4: A modern interrogation – Tehran police interrogating detained parties in the Central 
Tehran Jail during the Reza Shah Era.370 
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Fig. 5: A photo of prisoners from the Reza Shah era. Note the uniformity in their uniforms in 









	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






“Prison is Part of Resistance”:  
Prison Discourses in the Iranian Guerrilla Era 
 
 
On February 8, 1971, after months of training in the north of Iran, a small group of armed 
leftist guerrillas stormed a germanderie post in the village of Siahkal near the Caspian Sea. This 
mission, later dubbed the Siahkal Uprising, loudly announced the arrival of significant new 
players and tactics on a political scene otherwise dominated by royalist discourses and bitter 
reminiscences of earlier leftist or nationalist failures. The operation was undertaken by a militant 
organization calling itself the Organization of Iranian People’s Fadāī Guerrillas (OIPFG)372, a 
group comprised of smaller blocs that had its humble beginnings in reading and discussion 
circles founded in the early 1960s.373 Although the Siahkal operation was a practical failure, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372 At times, the OIPFG went by slightly abbreviated versions of that moniker — People’s Fadāī Guerrillas, or 
Iranian Fadāī Guerrillas. There have also been myriad sects, schisms, and splinter groups of the OIPFG, including an 
acrimonious split in the immediate post-revolutionary period that had the group divide into so-called “Majority” and 
“Minority” factions. I use the term OIPFG to refer to the different iterations of the group as it existed during the 
1970s until the 1979 Revolution, even as its literature of the day moves between different versions of the moniker. 
Because this chapter does not concern itself with the post revolutionary period and its political schisms, I am not 
using the term OIPFG to signify the faction that uses that designation to this day except when noted as such. Much 
of the literature on the OIPFG leaves the term “Fadāī” untranslated because there is no single word in English 
capacious enough to fit the meaning of the word. The term “Fadāī” can literally be translated as “those who sacrifice 
themselves,” or “those willing to martyr themselves,” but has sometimes been translated as “freedom fighters.”  
373 Despite the importance of the guerrilla movement in general and the OIPFG in particular in Iran, there is a 
surprising paucity of available scholarship on the Fadāī movement. The most thorough monograph on the OIPFG 
(and all of its offshoots) available is Peyman Vahabzadeh’s A Guerrilla Odyssey: Modernization, Secularism, 
Democracy, and the Fadāī Period of National Liberation in Iran, 1971-1979. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
2010. Print. Vahabzadeh’s text is a well-researched and informative study, and its strength is in its analysis of the 
OIPFG’s most serious theorists: Bizhan Jazani, Massoud Ahmadzadeh, and Mostafa Sho’aiyan. For a useful general 
overview of the guerrilla movement in Iran, see Abrahamian, Ervand. Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1982. Print. 480-496. An important book looking at the leftist movement in the lead up 
to the 1979 Revolution is Behrooz, Maziar. Rebels With a Cause: The Failure of the Left in Iran. New York: I.B. 
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resulting in the arrest and execution of its perpetrators, it was nonetheless a stunning public 
relations triumph with an “unforgettable political impact” that reverberated for years to come.374 
In the aftermath of the arrest and swift execution of the Siahkal guerrillas, other would-be 
guerrilla groups — most notably the Marxist-Islamist People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran 
(PMOI) — were inspired to take concrete action for the first time.375 At the same time, 
increasingly militant student protests escalated around the country, leading to a series of April 
1971 campus police raids and over one thousand arrests of student dissidents in a number of 
universities.376 Within a few months, as Iranian students cemented themselves as some of the 
guerrilla movement’s most strident champions, Iranian universities lost their status as sanctuaries 
which police or military could not enter, and by October 1971 a new police unit known as the 
“University Guard” invaded troublesome campuses and placed them in a state of permanent 
siege.377 The political sea change inaugurated by Siahkal mobilized an entire generation of young 
Iranians to militant and revolutionary action, with religious students and activists largely drawn 
towards the PMOI and its theoretical inspiration Ali Shari’ati, while young leftists were 
predominantly drawn towards the OIPFG orbit. Indeed, Iran’s “guerrilla decade” saw a 
transformative surge in popular enchantment with the guerrilla movement, even among many 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Taurus, 1999. Print. The lone book-length study of the Fadāīyān in Persian is Maḥmūd Nādiri’s nearly 1000-page-
long, Islamic Republic-sponsored tome. Predictably, Nādiri’s text, while detailed, seeks to discredit leftist 
opposition to the Shah and is typically too biased to be of use to serious scholars. Nādiri, Maḥmūd. Chirīkhā-yi 
Fadāī-yi Khalq: Az Nukhustīn Kunish Tā Bahman-i 1357. [The People’s Fedai Guerrillas: From their First Actions 
Until Bahman 1357 / February 1979.] Tehran: Muasisih-yi Moṭāli’āt Va Pazhūhishhā-yi Siyāsī, 2008. Print. 
374 Vahabzadeh, A Guerrilla Odyssey, 28.  
375 For an excellent comprehensive history of the Mojahedin until their early 1990s incarnation, including their 
mobilization after Siahkal, see Abrahamian, Ervand. The Iranian Mojahedin. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1989. Print. Abrahamian also discuss the PMOI in Iran Between Two Revolutions. Abrahamian, Ervand. Iran 
Between Two Revolutions. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982. Print. 480-496. 
376 Vahabzadeh, A Guerrilla Odyssey, 29. For a brief look at the importance of the guerrilla movement on students in 
the 1960s-70s, see Gheissari, Ali. Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 
1998. Print. 76-78. For the domestic guerrilla movement’s long-standing relationship to the Iranian student 
movement outside of the country, see Matin-Asgari, Afshin. Iranian Student Opposition to the Shah. Costa Mesa: 
Mazda, 2001. Print. 
377 Vahabzadeh, A Guerrilla Odyssey, 29.  
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those Iranians who did not engage in active dissent. The guerrillas’ “armed propaganda” and 
apparent willingness to embrace martyrdom produced a novel ethical language and political 
culture through which a generation’s political subjectivities were formed.   
In this chapter, examining the guerrilla era, I argue that, even moreso than any single 
operation, the militants’ decade-long and popularly broadcast entanglement with the disciplinary 
and penal arms of the Pahlavi regime produced a new public ethics in response to state violence. 
In the months and years after Siahkal, a number of highly publicized trials against both Islamist 
and Marxist militants brought the Iranian guerrillas newfound levels of public recognition. 
Names such as Khosrow Golsorkhi, Kirmat Danishīān 378, and Nasir Sadiq,379 among others 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
378 Golsorkhi (a poet and journalist), Danishīān (a filmmaker and journalist), and the so-called “Group of Twelve” 
with whom they were arrested, tortured, and tried became symbols of revolutionary heroism and martyrdom soon 
after their televised trials in 1973-74. These twelve men and women – largely artists who worked in belles lettres, 
television, and film, many of whom had never met before their arrest – were detained in 1973 for allegedly plotting 
against members of the royal family. The regime theatrically staged the trial, ostensibly to show its strength by 
extracting confessions, and televised the military court proceedings and published confessions in Iṭilāʿāt newspaper. 
The move to televise the trial backfired. Although seven members of the group confessed to crimes against the state, 
pled for the mercy of the Shah, and were given reduced sentences, Golsorkhi, Danishīān, and three others refused to 
do so despite torture and the threat of death. When asked to present their defenses in front of TV cameras, Golsorkhi 
and Danishīān were defiant, giving statements in favor of Marxism-Leninism and the guerrilla struggle. The two 
men were executed soon after, with the three others who wouldn’t confess sentenced to life in prison. For a detailed 
account of the trial of the Group of Twelve, see the memoir of Abbas Samakar, one of those members given a life 
sentence. Samakar, Abbas. Man Yik Shūrishī Hastam: Khātirāt-i Zindān Va Yadbūd-i Khosrow Golsorkhi va 
Kerāmat Danishīān. [I Am A Rebel: Prison Memoirs and Reminiscences of Khosrow Golsorkhi and Kerāmat 
Danishīān.] Los Angeles: Ketab, 2001. Print. For an illuminating reading of the religious symbolism in Golsorkhi’s 
infamous statement, and its important resonances with Shi’ite iconography, see “The Karbala Complex” in Dabashi, 
Hamid. Shi’ism: A Religion of Protest. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011. Print. 73-99. For a brief account 
of the trial, see Behrooz. Rebels With a Cause, 69-70. For a mention of Golsorkhi’s revolutionary poetry in the 
context of Iranian literature of its day, see Karimi-Hakkak, Ahmad. “Introduction: Iran’s Literature 1977-1997.” 
Iranian Studies, Vol. 30, No. ¾. (Summer - Autumn, 1997), 193-213. Print. The trials of Golsorkhi and Danishīān 
were re-broadcast in full with spliced footage of interviews of Iranian workers in the aftermath of the revolution in 
Iran; this recording has also circulated widely on bootleg videos and DVDs ever since. Portions of this video can 
now be accessed via YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=buTlBLGdUfo. For a transcript of Golsorkhi’s 
defense see Golsorkhi, Khosrow. “Defa‘īat-i Khosrow Golsorkhi” [“The Defense of Khosrow Golsorkhi”]. 
Reprinted in Naẓm-i Novīn. (New York), no. 7 (Shahrīvar 1364 / August-September 1985). Print. Samakar’s text 
also reprints full transcripts of all of the Group of Twelves defenses, as well as newspaper clippings regarding the 
case. The Group of Twelve trial is probably the most notorious example of the counterproductive results garnered by 
the state through publicized anti-guerrilla efforts. As Dabashi writes, “Had it not been for the public spectacle that 
the military tribunal made of his trial and subsequent execution, Khosrow Golsorkhi would have been yet another 
name in the long annals of rebellious young Iranians who lost their lives fighting the Pahlavi monarchy to the end.” 
Dabashi, Shi’ism, 73.  
379 In the aftermath of Siahkal, the members of the PMOI quickly planned an even more spectacular act of political 
violence against the monarchy. They conspired to explode the main electrical plant in Tehran in order to ruin the 
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circulated widely among the Iranian populace. Indeed, even epochal events such as Siahkal 
gained little fanfare at first. It was not until the arrest, trial, and execution of the men who 
undertook the mission that the operation came to be popularly known, even in activist circles.380 
To be sure, this cycle of anti-state sabotage and publicized state retribution worked to create a 
central paradox of the pre-revolutionary era: the extralegal violence with which the Shah 
prominently greeted those opposing his regime chronically provided public hype for the 
militants’ cause.  
For the guerrillas, armed operations had two disparate aims. First, any given action had a 
narrow practical aim (i.e. military posts with stored weapons, specific members of the state 
picked out for assassination, etc.). Beyond these practical concerns, however, was the awareness 
that armed actions created popular ripples that far exceeded their relatively limited military 
significance. In this era, guerrilla action was termed “armed propaganda” by the OIPFG — that 
is, spectacular acts of political violence intended to foment revolutionary conditions of 
possibility — and understood as the foundation of their revolutionary praxis. For OIPFG 
theorists, political sabotage would have the effect of bringing the revolutionary cause and the 
guerrillas’ vanguard role therein to the public eye, eventually and necessarily sparking a mass 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
lavish festivities planned for the Shah’s 2500 years of Iranian monarchy celebration. Before they could carry out this 
first major action, however, over a hundred of their ranks were arrested by SAVAK. In 1972, 69 of those who were 
arrested – including Sādiq, who was a member of the Central Committee – were put on trial in military court. 
Numerous members of the Central Committee (which had been elected in 1968), including Sādiq, Sa’īd Muḥsin, 
‘Alī Mihandūst, and Masūd Rajavī, gave impassioned speeches condemning the Pahlavi state and lauding 
revolutionary guerrilla action. Significantly, Sādiq’s statement was the first to introduce the world to the name of 
their organization: the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran. As would soon happen with the Golsorkhi and 
Danishīān defenses, transcripts of these statements began circulating among university students and politicized 
Iranians not long after, and those eleven sentenced to death became seen as martyrs for the PMOI. For a full 
transcript of Sādiq’s defense, see Matn-i Difā‘iyih-i Mujāhid Shāhīd Nāsir Sādiq. [The Text of the Defense of 
Martyred Mujahed Nasir Sādiq.], n.d., n.p. Print. For Sādiq and Rajavī’s statements, see Ākharīn Difā‘āt -i Dū 
Nafar az Sāzmān-i Mujāhidīn-i Khalq-i Iran. [Final Testimonies of Two Members of the People’s Mujahedin 
Organization of Iran.] n.p.: 1972. Print. For a historical account of this epochal trial, which for a time decimated the 
PMOI, see Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 128-135. 
380 Vahabzadeh, A Guerrilla Odyssey, 29.  
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movement.381 Predictably, the Pahlavi state responded harshly once the guerrilla era was 
underway. But even before the events at Siahkal in 1971 and the mass arrests of the PMOI in 
1972, would-be guerrilla groups experienced surveillance and arrests. As early as the 1960s, 
before any group had undertaken specific acts of political sabotage, the Pahlavi state, through its 
intelligence arm SAVAK, was rounding up members of would-be guerrilla organizations, study 
groups, and student activist circles. As a result, guerrilla literature concerned itself with Pahlavi 
policing and punishment from the inception of militant activity. It is thus that, along with its new 
tactics, Iran’s guerrilla era resulted in a new wave of discourses on the Iranian prison. 
 It is precisely these prison discourses that I examine in what follows below, by tracking 
the intimate and entangled relationship of the militant movement — as well as the public and 
popular effects produced by that movement — to Pahlavi surveillance, policing, and 
incarceration. I do so by readings texts that were key in shaping and mobilizing pre-
revolutionary sentiment against the disciplinary apparatus of the Pahlavi state and ultimately the 
state itself. Others have noted the importance guerrilla groups placed on “armed propaganda,” 
which was not only a necessary practical component of the work of the guerrillas, but was also 
an essential element of the theoretical scaffolding through which guerrilla praxis was framed. In 
this chapter, I argue that guerrilla discourses on, and the guerrillas’ relationship to, the state penal 
apparatus represents a similarly fundamental ethical and affective component of guerrilla praxis 
in its own right. Indeed, the prison cell served as a space through which both the state and its 
opponents attempted to mobilize public feeling in defense of their cause. As such, the Iranian 
penal system was alternately deployed in guerrilla-era political discourses to engender feelings of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381 For a rich analysis on the theory of armed struggle and propaganda, particularly in the works of the OIPFG’s 
central (and ultimately competing) theorists Bizhan Jazani and Masoud Ahmadzadeh, see Vahabzadeh, A Guerrilla 
Odyssey. It is outside the purview of this chapter but nonetheless important to note that in the late ‘70s, the most 
decisive schism in the OIPFG was the result of differing ideas regarding the necessity of continued armed struggle. 
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revulsion at Pahlavi violence and esteem for the guerrillas, or to project political strength and 
stability for the state. To be sure, in subverting Foucault’s insight that modern punishment is an 
unseen phenomenon that remains behind closed doors rather than in public view,382 the Pahlavi 
state’s elaborately staged show trials and confessions featuring defendants clearly under duress 
reveal the importance of public opinion for both the state and its opponents. I also show that in 
guerrilla prison writings, the prison paradoxically provides a space through which to imagine 
political freedom, precisely because Pahlavi torture was theorized as fomenting revolutionary 
commitment among both the guerrilla rank and file and among ordinary Iranians. Without 
closely examining these guerrilla-era prison discourses, we can neither understand the political, 
ethical, and sentimental attachments that the guerrilla era provoked nor can we fully grasp the 
continued importance of Pahlavi prisons in post-revolutionary popular politics.  As one 
revolutionary and former political prisoner claimed of the guerrilla era, “It is resistance, after all. 
And prison is part of resistance.”383 Below, we will see just how these concepts were irrevocably 
coupled with pre-revolutionary Iranian militant movements, just as we will see that public 
punishment and spectacular surveillance were principal tools in the Pahlavi state’s attempts to 
stage its own power. 
 
The State of Pahlavi Prisons in the 1960s-1970s 
 
By the 1960s, despite meaningful expansion, Iran’s modern prisons suffered from brutal 
overcrowding even worse than that of the prisons of the Reza Shah period, which we have seen 
in previous chapters were holding many times their capacities as early as the 1920s. The general 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
382 For this influential formulation, see Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 2nd 
Edition. Trans. Alan Sheridan. 1977. New York: Vintage Books, 1995. Print. 
383 Samakar, Man Yik Shūrishī Hastam, 277. 
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wing in Qasr was “crowded, tumultuous, and noisy,” while “the temporary wing [for political 
prisoners in Qasr] was exceptionally crowded” with prisoners “all crammed into tiny rooms 
together. There was such a shortage of space that some…had to sleep in the prison corridors.”384 
By 1972, the recently opened Evin Prison was so overcrowded that at times, prisoners were 
made to sleep in makeshift tents outdoors.385 One Islamist prisoner reports that the minuscule 
solitary cells at the Kumitih-yi Mushtarik-i Ẓidd-i Kharābkār (“United Anti-Sabotage 
Committee”) Penitentiary in Tehran were pushed far beyond their capacity and made to hold up 
to four or five men.386 The state experienced perpetual shortages of solitary confinement cells for 
prisoners.387 The problem of overcrowding was certainly not limited to political prisons or the 
prisons of Tehran. For instance, in Abadan Prison, which almost exclusively housed non-
political prisoners, the inmates were kept from spending time in their cells or cell blocks, instead 
being forced to congregate in one extremely crowded yard area all day.388  
Unsurprisingly, cleanliness, hygiene, and health were constant concerns in these teeming 
prisons and interrogation centers. A former Muslim student activist describes mid-‘70s 
conditions at the Kumitih Penitentiary in Tehran as “damp and poorly lit, to the extent that it was 
often difficult to see anything at all upon entering the cells. The floors were carpeted with rugs 
that had two layers — one layer the fabric of the carpet itself, and one layer the filth and blood 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
384  Samakar, Man Yik Shūrishī Hastam, 284. 
385 Zarkārī, Yūsif. Khātirāt-i Yik Chirīk Dar Zindān: Nivishtih-i az Chirīk-i Fadāī-yi Khalq Yūsif Zarkārī. 2nd ed. 
London: Chirīkhā-yi Fadāī-yi Khalq Iran, 1391 / 2013. Print. 59. 
386 Rafī‘, Jalāl. Az Dānishgāh-i Tiḥrān tā Shikanjihgāh-i SAVAK: Guftigū bā Jalāl Rafī‘. [From the University of 
Tehran to SAVAK’s Torture Chambers.] Tehran: ‘Ibrat Museum, 1382 / 2003. Print. 24. 
387 Chirīkhā-yi Fadāī-yi Khalq. “Zindānha-yi Rezhim Va Zindāniān-i Siyāsī” ʿAṣr-i ʿAmal. 4. 30.  
388 Samakar, Man Yik Shūrishī Hastam, 364-65. Samakar was exiled first to Abadan Prison and later to Ahvaz 
Prison in the mid 1970s. In Abadan, he was the only political prisoner, and as such was treated with respect by the 
other prisoners due to his association with Golsorkhi. Exiling Tehran-based prisoners to remote prisons, particularly 
those in the south, was a long-standing tradition in Pahlavi Iran. A number of Reza Shah-era criminals were sent 
from Qasr to Bandar Abbas throughout the 1920s-1930s. For a reference to this practice, see Ilāhī, Hākīm. Bā Man 
Bih Zindān Bīyāīd. [Come With Me to Prison.] Tehran: Shirkat-i Sihāmī 1325 / 1946. Print. 12.  
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that had caked onto the rug from the feet and bodies of prisoners.”389 Conditions were typically 
dire for prisoners who needed medical attention. At the infirmary at Vakil Abad Prison in 
Mashhad, a large facility whose incarcerated populace included violent criminals, drug users, 
smugglers, and a small handful of political prisoners, “most of the medicines had expired, 
especially the antibiotics, which were rejects or unsold stock sent back by pharmacies and 
hospitals all over the country.”390 Vakil Abad Prison, one in a series of new penal institutions 
opened in mid-century Iran in the era of prison expansion and reform, opened its doors in the 
1960s with a ribbon-cutting ceremony headed by Empress Farah Pahlavi, but was, by the mid 
1970s, “dropping to pieces; the electrics, the plumbing, the showers, the toilets, the locks, the 
heaters, the fly-screens, the whole place was a mess.”391 In the Abadan Prison, prisoners were 
made to share one filthy plastic hose as a communal āftābih,392 much to the consternation of 
inmates; “naturally, it was impossible to clean oneself and still manage to avoid catching every 
illness.”393 Despite Pahlavi attempts at prison reform, and the emergence of state organizations 
for prisoner protection,394 prisons health conditions were described in much the same condition 
as that which led one mid-century commentator to note that “Dying in prison is basically 
nothing. The infirmary is there to help poor people die.”395  
Political prisoners of the early guerrilla era would often be taken to solitary cells in the 
aftermath of their arrest, and be allowed into general holding cells with other prisoners upon the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 Rafī‘, 33.  
390 Savin, Richard. Vakil Abad Iran: A Survivor’s Story. Edinburgh: Canongate / Q Press, 1979. Print, 88. Savin was 
a British man arrested and incarcerated in Vakil Abad for smuggling arms across the Iranian border, though he 
maintains his innocence throughout his account. Savin notes that the population who received the worst care at 
Vakil Abad, particularly in terms of medical care, was the large, poor, and illiterate population of Afghan prisoners.   
391 Ibid, 83.  
392 An āftābih is a spouted watering can or individual wall hose with which Iranians cleanse themselves after 
answering the call of nature. 
393 Samakar, Man Yik Shūrishī Hastam, 352. 
394 For more on organizations such as the Organization for the Protection of Prisoners, and on the emergence of 
criminological “reform” discourses, see chapter three of this dissertation.  
395 Ilāhī, Bā Man Bih Zindān Bīyāīd, 35. 
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end of their first interrogation period.396 In that era, the former category included the solitary 
cells at SAVAK-run facilities, namely Evin Prison, Qizil Qalih,397 and the Kumitih-yi 
Mushtarik-i Ẓidd-i Kharābkār in Tehran, and smaller SAVAK-run sites outside of the capital. 
After lengthy interrogation sessions that would have come complete with a dizzying array of 
painful punishment practices — including beating, electric prodding, fingernail removal, the 
bastinado, and being made to walk on those whipped feet398 — prisoners would then be moved 
to general holding cells where they would await trial, sentencing, and eventual transfer to the 
political wing of Qasr Prison in Tehran, where they would ostensibly serve out their sentences. It 
should be noted that by 1973 if not earlier, however, this was not the process for those prisoners 
who had been condemned to death. Such prisoners were held in solitary confinement until the 
moment of their execution, even in cases of extreme overcrowding.399 And, just as we have 
learned about earlier eras, the letter of the law regarding sentencing and quick trial was often 
disregarded, leaving numerous prisoners un-sentenced, un-tried, un-transferred, or simply 
forgotten; incarceration without sentencing remained a major problem for the Pahlavi penal 
apparatus until its ouster in 1979.400  
 As in earlier eras, prison served as a sort of political and social training ground for young 
activists in the early 1970s, with conversations and debates being held whenever possible and 
with new party connections being forged behind bars. In the most practical sense, the prison was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 Chirīkhā-yi Fadāī-yi Khalq. “Zindānha-yi Rezhim Va Zindāniān-i Siyāsī” ʿAṣr-i ʿAmal. 4. 29.  
397 Tehran’s Qizil Qalih was also known as “Qalih-yi Surkh,” or the Red Castle. Rizvīān, Maḥmūd, Ed. Naghmihhā 
Va Ash‘ār-i Zindānīān Dar Band-i SAVAK. [Prison Songs and Poetry from SAVAK’s Cells.] Tehran: ‘Ibrat Museum, 
1388 / 2009. Print. 13.  
398 Anonymous. “Yāddāshthā-yi Zindān.” In ʿAṣr-i ʿAmal. 5. 85-87.  For more on the methods of torture employed 
by SAVAK in this era, see Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions.  
399 Ibid, 30. The OIPFG author of this pamphlet claims that the practice of holding condemned prisoners in solitary 
confinement was put into place due to the influence some earlier condemned prisoners had on fellow inmates. 
Specifically, the author claims that the condemned members of the small Marxist group the Arman-i Khalq [The 
People’s Ideal] had a lasting effect on the daily customs of their fellow prisoners before they were executed.  
400 Ibid.  
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influential in Iranian political life in the 1960s and 1970s in part because this is where many 
politically active Iranians spent critical months or years of their lives. In the early 1970s, militant 
prisoners routinely exercised in groups, naming certain exercises after fallen comrades in 
remembrance of those who had been recently martyred.401 Abbas Samakar — one of the men 
arrested in the Khosrow Golsorkhi and Kirmat Dānishīān so-called “Group of Twelve” — recalls 
that while in the general wing at Qasr Prison, he and his comrades did group workouts in which 
specific exercises had names such as the “Vārtan move,” the “Humayun move,” and the “Kitirāī 
move,” after leftist militants who had been killed by the state.402 Such activities had the effect of 
linking even the greenest, least knowledgeable prisoners to those who had lost their lives in 
service of the revolutionary movement. These activities both created affective ties between 
prisoners and had the effect of expending excess energy that might otherwise be manipulated by 
prison guards and interrogators. In a PMOI pamphlet written in 1971, for instance, it is 
recommended that guerrillas in solitary confinement exercise as regularly and rigorously as 
possible in order to tire themselves out so that sleep comes more easily and anxiety is abated; 
this activity is suggested as a means of disciplining the body in order to better control it during 
taxing and anxiety-inducing interrogations.403  
Religious political prisoners formed their own social and intellectual circles behind 
prison walls. Individual and group Qur’an recitation and the singing of religious songs helped 
pass the time for Muslim inmates.404 Incarcerated practicing Muslims would help all prisoners 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
401 For instance, the OIPFG claimed that prisoners memorialized their fallen comrades in the Ārmān-i Khalq 
[People’s Ideal] group by naming an exercise after them. Ibid, 30.  
402 Samakar, 293. 
403 This pamphlet was written in 1971 and published in 1972. See Mujāhidīn-i Khalq, Sāzmān-i. Hūshyārī-yi 
Inqilābī: Vazīfīh-yi Yik Mubāriz Asīr dar Zindān [Revolutionary Consciousness: Responsibilities of an Imprisoned 
Militant in Prison]. Sāzmān-i Mujāhidīn-i Khalq: Tehran, 1972. Print. 27. 
404 Rafī‘, 36. In a 1972 pamphlet, the PMOI recommends Qur’an recitation for prisoners in solitary confinement as a 




keep a sense of daily time in dank facilities because they would awake at certain hours for 
prayers.405 Among these prisoners, prayer groups were common when not banned by the prison 
authorities, as were political and ethical discussion groups.406 By at least 1972-73, prison 
officials acted in response to these communal activities, and group prayer was actively 
suppressed at Qasr when it was apparent that these prayers had distinctly political and 
organizational ramifications.407 Young Muslim militants were influenced by incarcerated and 
politically minded Ayatollahs and religious leaders whom they met in penal institutions.408 
Ironically, these prayer and discussion groups often brought incarcerated activists together who 
otherwise would not have been able to meet or study freely in the surveillance-heavy world 
outside of prison.  
 Political prisoners shared books when possible, creating a makeshift library in wings four 
and five of Qasr political prison’s general holding cells in 1972. All of these books, which 
included literary, historical, sociological, and economic texts, were held in these wings of the 
prison and then loaned out systematically among prisoners. A schedule was posted to the wall of 
the wing wherein prisoners could request a book for two hours at a time; when their two hours 
were through, prisoners returned books so they could be loaned to the next borrower. Some 
books were so popular that it took weeks if not months for prisoners to get them in hand.409 A 
number of books, including Nasser Khosrow’s travelogue, a general book of philosophy, a few 
issues of Kitāb-i Haftih, and a handful of foreign magazines such as Time and Newsweek were 
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available in the general holding cells of Evin Prison in 1971-72.410 One Marxist student and 
translator who read anything that he could find in his time at Kumitih prison in 1973 notes that 
his father – a rank and file member of the Tudeh Party in the 1950s – had spent his time in Qasr 
prison reading Les Misérables aloud to the petty thieves and drug users with whom he had been 
temporarily housed as punishment.411 Within a short time, however, books and newspapers 
would be more difficult to come by as the regime put pressure on political prisoners with the 
escalation of guerrilla activity by the mid-1970s.412 The atmosphere in Pahlavi prisons would 
again change in the late 1970s, as pressure from the Carter administration and human rights 
organizations on the Pahlavi state led to the relaxation of these mid-decade measures to suppress 
political prisoners.413  
Whether in solitary confinement or in general holding, prisoners sang songs, especially 
revolutionary, religious, or regional songs. Meanwhile, both the student movement based outside 
of Iran and the militants in Iran published, recorded, and released pamphlets and recordings 
prison and protest songs as part of the cultural wing of their activism. Pamphlets and 
communiqués featuring songs and poems written in prison were released and circulated among 
the rank and file membership.414 Cassette tapes of movement music recorded by those on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 Zarkārī, Yūsif. Khātirāt-i Yik Chirīk Dar Zindān: Nivishtih-i az Chirīk-i Fadāī-yi Khalq Yūsif Zarkārī. 2nd ed. 
London: Chirīkhā-yi Fadāī-yi Khalq Iran, 1391 / 2013. Print. 145.  
411 Personal Interview, MG. 27 November 2013 
412 Personal Interview, MM. 19 November 2013. 
413 For a reference to the changed atmosphere in post 1977 Pahlavi prisons, see Samakar, Man Yik Shūrishī Hastam.  
414 One such example is OIPFG. Bih Āftābkārān: Ghazalsurūdihā-i Az Band. [To the Sunplanters: The Songs of the 
Cell.] Tehran: n.p, n.d. Print. This political pamphlet from approximately 1976 has a number of songs and poems 
written from such places as Qasr Prison and the Kumitih Penitentiary. “Aftabkaran” was a nicknamed bestowed on 
the Fadāīyān, and the poetry is replete with references to the sun arriving after a long and dark night. See also a 
recently published book of revolutionary songs popularized by religious prisoners: Rizvīān, Maḥmūd, Ed. 
Naghmihhā Va Ash‘ār-i Zindānīān Dar Band-i SAVAK. [Prison Songs and Poetry from SAVAK’s Cells.] Tehran: 
‘Ibrat Museum, 1388 / 2009. Rizvīān’s book, like so many others published by cultural institutions of the Islamic 
Republic, focuses only on certain prisoners at the expense of those groups who would later become enemies of the 
Islamic state, but is nonetheless an important document of otherwise under-documented revolutionary culture. 
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outside were circulated among political prisoners whenever conditions permitted it.415 The 
Confederation of Iranian Students even released a 7” vinyl record with prison songs for global 
consumption, the cover of which featured a visual trope that came to symbolize the era: a map of 
all of Iran behind thick prison bars with a finger menacingly pointing, telling those on the outside 




Prison poetry and songs were critical components of the affective world of the guerrillas. 
In these songs, the trope of Iran-as-prison circulated widely, with the guerillas — often linked 
through metaphor to the sun, fire, or the coming dawn after a long night — leading the way to a 
revolutionary future. For instance, a movement song written by members of the OIPFG in prison 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
415 For a reference to this practice, see Samakar, 281.  
416 Confederation of Iranian Students. n.d. Vinyl EP. Record from the private collection of Ali Bakhtiari. For more 
on the visual trope of Pahlavi Iran-as-prison, see Chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
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and circulated in the mid-1970s (among numerous other prison songs) by that group states:  
“After that / Heavy month of Murdād 417  / Your anger is asleep / In the ashes of 
summer / Oh my homeland, oh my Iran / Oh my homeland, oh my prison  / The 
flame of the sun is radiant  / Over the red storm of revolution / Like the guerrilla 
who marches ahead with anger and blood / From heart and iron and smoke and 
plow and plough / The monarchy shall topple / Shall topple”418  
 
Other prison songs focused on the act of martyrdom, extolling the virtuous sacrificial acts of 
those who had already given their lives for the movement.419 These cultural productions created 
sentimental, moral, and political ties among those inside the prison, their fellow travelers on the 
outside, and those who came into their political orbit — largely a sizeable population of students 
and intellectuals to whom these pamphlets and broadcasts were most regularly circulated. These 
songs provided interpretations of the past, present, and future: the past as lost opportunity, the 
present as both repressive prison and, relatedly, opportunity for martyrdom, and the future as a 
revolutionary time transformed by the future-oriented acts undertaken by heroic guerrillas in the 
darkness of the present day.  
 
Guerrilla Prison Writing 
 
As the militant movement grew, so too did awareness of and writing about the Pahlavi 
security apparatus among revolutionaries and activists. Guerrilla writing of 1968-1979 on 
Pahlavi prisons largely fits into two categories with two distinct functions and audiences. The 
first category is what I call internal-tutelary, and the second category is external-political. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
417 This revolutionary anthem describes Iranians as a sleeping nation-as-prison in the aftermath of the coup d’etat of 
1953, which occurred in the Iranian month of Murdād. 
418 From a poem entitled “Atash” [Fire]. See Bih Āftābkārān: Ghazalsurūdihā-i Az Band. [To the Sunplanters: The 
Songs of the Cell.] Tehran: n.p, n.d. Print. 
419 An early Islamist prison song from approximately 1970 states “Let us remember our martyrs / Who have gone on 
the road of love and hope / They are the spellbound stars / That lead us on the way to white morning.” Rizvīān, 
Maḥmūd, Ed. Naghmihhā Va Ash‘ār-i Zindānīān Dar Band-i SAVAK, 39-43. 
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literature of the time was largely either addressed to other militants or would-be activists to teach 
them what to expect from Pahlavi prisons or policing and to advise them how to behave if 
arrested, or it was addressed to “ordinary” or unaffiliated readers to expose them to cruelty of 
Pahlavi prison conditions and the bravery and martyrdom of the guerrillas in order to mobilize 
their support.420 Regardless of audience, however, one topic spans across the different guerrilla 
texts: torture. Unlike the budding international concern regarding Pahlavi torture, which I discuss 
in the first chapter of this dissertation, guerrilla discourses only rarely mobilized the nascent 
language of human rights. Instead, torture is often theorized in guerrilla discourses as a powerful 
practical roadblock that needs to be confronted and eventually overcome by the revolutionary 
movement. Often, in these guerrilla discourses, torture is not posited as a rights violation from 
which prisoners need to be freed, but rather is analyzed as a rational necessity for intelligence 
gathering within a repressive state apparatus. And, against liberal understandings of pain as 
something from which to be saved, these guerrilla discourses theorize pain as precisely (albeit 
paradoxically) that which creates conditions for revolutionary possibility by both disciplining the 
resistant guerrilla body and fomenting popular resentment towards the state. 
One early example of the internal-tutelary form in guerrilla prison writing is a PMOI 
pamphlet written in 1971 and published in 1972 entitled Revolutionary Consciousness: The 
Responsibilities of an Imprisoned Militant in Prison. Having already experienced organizational 
defeats with the high profile arrests of its leadership, struggling to deal with the realities of 
prison abuse and forced confession, and aware of the growing public interest in the guerrilla 
movement, the organization published this pamphlet in an apparent attempt to educate its 
membership on the possibility of arrest, interrogation, and incarceration. In the first essay in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
420 It should be noted that I use this distinction schematically, because in many cases, these two aims were merged in 
single essays or texts. 
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pamphlet, an anonymous author argues that arrest and incarceration are unavoidable aspects of 
revolutionary struggle, and that as such the prison should be conceptualized as a vital front in the 
revolutionary surge. If a guerrilla is arrested, he or she should not despair that his or her part in 
the struggle is over; on the contrary, a new and equally important battle against the enemy has 
just begun.421 There is, however, a constitutive difference in the confrontation between torturer 
and tortured and every other potential battle:  
The laws of this battlefield are different than those of every other battle. For 
instance, in a military battle, when two soldiers face off against each other, 
victory or defeat is dependent the obliteration [nābūdī] of one party…In the battle 
between the torturer and the tortured, the killing of the prisoner does not count as 
a victory for the torturer. Victory for the enemy is not in killing the revolutionary, 
but in retrieving information from that person.422  
 
Here, torture is theorized as an instrumental function of state surveillance, undertaken for 
practical reasons having to do with gathering intelligence. That is, to employ a Nietzschean 
critique of this logic, the ends of torture (information) are confused as the cause of that activity. 
As such, torturers are imagined to be rational actors whose behavior is coherent and predictable 
given the desired result of their punitive labor. It is from this theoretical starting point that the 
PMOI offers its readers detailed instructions on how to approach interrogation and painful 
punishment techniques. Unsurprisingly, since the end goal of the interrogator is presumed to be 
intelligence gathering, the author insists that no accurate information of any kind be given to the 
authorities, no matter how trivial the details may seem to the arrested party. Any piece of 
information, the author stresses, may be used to railroad the accused or to trick another prisoner 
into believing that the state has meaningful information regarding clandestine activities. 
Crucially, the demand for tight-lipped resistance under torture, while largely driven by tangible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 Mujāhidīn-i Khalq, Sāzmān-i. Hūshyārī-yi Inqilābī: Vazīfīh-yi Yik Mubāriz Asīr dar Zindān [Revolutionary 
Consciousness: Responsibilities of an Imprisoned Militant in Prison]. Sāzmān-i Mujāhidīn-i Khalq: Tehran, 1972. 4.  
422 Ibid, 14. 
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safety concerns, is also presented as having popular political ramifications. The author argues 
that accounts of guerrilla prison resistance galvanize ordinary Iranians and can eventually be part 
of the necessary spark that leads to mass mobilization, whereas confessions dispirit both other 
militants and ordinary people alike.423 This position is of central importance in an era and 
theoretical framework in which the leap from small cells of armed revolutionaries to a mass 
movement was believed to be possible through spectacular acts of public political sabotage. 
Here, the PMOI posits prison as a space through which the solitary act of even one guerrilla has 
the transformative capacity to foment mass movement outside of prison.  
The logic of this position regarding the move to mass politics is combined with the 
instrumental explanation of the prevalence of torture in Iran and pushed to its logical conclusion: 
“If resistance under torture takes the form of a [movement-wide] tradition, the enemy will be 
disappointed by the process of torture and will eventually find no gain in torturing. Little by 
little, with resistance, torture will decrease.”424 It is within the context of this certain decrease of 
torture that mass mobilization becomes increasingly possible. From this perspective, then, not 
divulging critical information while under torture not only has concrete implications for the 
immediate safety of members of the guerrilla movement, who would be at risk if a comrade gave 
up sensitive information to his or her interrogator, but also has larger implications regarding both 
the future of torture and the success of the revolutionary movement. 
Importantly, for the author, confession during interrogation not only hurts the movement, 
but also puts the individual prisoner in a further danger vis-à-vis his or her interrogator: “In the 
face of someone who has submitted to him, the enemy shows no respect, instead showing [the 
prisoner] all the more contempt. The slightest hint of surrender will only increase the intensity of 
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the torture, because the interrogator will feel that the prisoner is on the verge of total break.425 On 
the contrary, when faced with someone who maintains an adversarial stance and refuses to 
capitulate despite physical and psychological abuse, the interrogator shows increased respect.426 
In order to withstand torture, the would-be militant must study and prepare him or herself for the 
wide range of SAVAK’s psychological tactics before even being arrested. This means gaining 
familiarity with the wide range of techniques employed by SAVAK on whom they interrogate. 
The essay argues that SAVAK interrogators rely on psychological tricks in order to foment 
confusion and self-doubt in the prisoner. The reader is urged not to believe anything he or she is 
told by the interrogator. For instance, an anecdote is relayed of interrogations in which doctors 
(or “apparent doctors”) have been brought in to try to convince the prisoner that he or she has 
been injected with a truth serum that will lead to a full confession. These sorts of psychological 
techniques are used on the battlefield of torture because, the PMOI argues, “Torture tactics are 
more often about scaring and shattering the nerves of the prisoner than they are about the use of 
bodily violence [khoshunat-i jesmani].”427 But just as torture has the capacity to transform the 
prisoner into a collaborator, so too does it have the capacity to break the torturer if the prisoner 
is capable of withstanding the punishment long enough to frustrate his or her interrogator:  
In reality, the torture-battle is tied to the psychological state of both participants. 
The interrogator will only continue torturing as long as he believes that the 
complete surrender of the prisoner is possible. Thus, the prisoner must to show 
precisely enough fortitude throughout the interrogation so as to convince the 
interrogator that life is not important for him/her, that submission is impossible, 
and that indeed his/her ultimate goal is to be martyred in their hands. If 
convinced of this, the state is will be disappointed in its efforts and will 
invariably shorten the length of time the prisoner is tortured.428 
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Again, torture is posited both as battle and as rational action, fought on the tortured body of the 
prisoner in a war for information. If there is a concerted movement-wide effort to say nothing 
under torture, the state will simply be forced to abandon torture as a method of interrogation. 
Thus, the guerrilla body-in-pain bears a crucial and multifaceted revolutionary responsibility, 
precisely because withstanding more pain today will reduce the application of pain to other 
bodies tomorrow, as the apparent efficacy and use of torture decreases. By not capitulating, the 
tortured body serves not only as political vanguard for a not-yet-born mass movement, but also 
as a surrogate for future prisoners, absorbing pain so that other bodies won’t have to. To 
succumb and confess means that those future bodies, tragically and avoidably, will be subjected 
to similar painful interrogation techniques.429 Thus, in this economy of pain, the imprisoned 
guerrilla is performing essential embodied labor, without which neither the end of torture nor the 





As part of their efforts to educate their own cadres and to connect their struggle with an 
ethical reading public, the Marxist Fadāīyan published two important but largely unstudied book-
length prison memoirs during the critical years between the Siahkal Uprising and the 1979 
Revolution. The first, 1972’s Khātirāt-i Yik Chirīk Dar Zindān: [Memoir of a Guerrilla in 
Prison], was written by a young OIPFG cadre named Yūsif Zarkārī in the heady months after 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429 This seemingly straightforward calculus is stated no uncertain terms: “[A]ny resistance truly causes the torture of 
others to be lessened, while any confession will invariably lead to the torture of others.” Ibid, 11.  
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Siahkal and the wave of arrests that followed.430 One of the earliest long-form texts released by 
the OIPFG, Zarkārī’s text is a significant entry in the internal-tutelary strain of Iranian guerilla 
discourses insofar as it serves more as instructional manual than as autobiography or even 
propaganda text. Zarkārī spends the majority of Memoir of a Guerrilla in Prison dispassionately 
outlining tactics and strategies in policing, surveillance, arrest, and torture. The second prison 
memoir published by the OIPFG is 1974’s widely read Hāmāsih-i Muqāvimat  [Epic of 
Resistance] by the female guerrilla Ashraf Dihqānī. Dihqānī’s memoir was published in the 
aftermath of her implausible escape from Qasr Prison two years after her initial 1971 arrest, 
interrogation, and incarceration.431 In part because of the exposure garnered by her spectacular 
escape from the otherwise long arm of the Pahlavi state and in part because of its relatively 
widespread circulation, Dihqānī’s memoir immediately became (and has remained) one of the 
OIPFG’s most widely read texts.432 Epic of Resistance circulated widely, was translated into a 
number of languages, has gone through a number of reprints, and remains well known with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430 Zarkārī, Yūsif. Khātirāt-i Yik Chirīk Dar Zindān: Nivishtih-i az Chirīk-i Fadāī-yi Khalq. Sāzmānhā-yi Jibhih-yi 
Millī-yi Irān dar Khārij Az Kishvar (Bakhsh-i Khāvar Mīyānih). [S.I.], 1352 / 1973. Print. Zarkārī’s memoir has 
recently been re-published for the first time since its original release by members of the 1970s OIPFG who still 
operate in some form under that name including Zarkārī’s fellow prison memoirist, Ashraf Dihqānī. For this edition, 
which includes a new introduction by Dihqānī, see Zarkārī, Yūsif. Khātirāt-i Yik Chirīk Dar Zindān: Nivishtih-i az 
Chirīk-i Fadāī-yi Khalq Yūsif Zarkārī. 2nd ed. London: Chirīk-i Fadāī-yi Khalq-i Iran, 1391 / 2013. Print. 
Surprisingly, Zarkārī’s writing has been completely ignored both by scholars of the OIPFG and scholars of the penal 
system in Iran. Despite his importance to these interlocked histories, Zarkārī is not mentioned by Vahabzadeh or 
Behrooz in their studies of the Fadāiyān, nor is he mentioned by Abrahamian, Rejali, or others in their scholarship 
on Iranian prisons. This scholarly silence comes despite the fact that Zarkārī’s peers acknowledged his influence on 
their understanding of Pahlavi prisons and policing in their own day. For one reference in the era to Zarkārī’s 
influence, see the prison notes of anonymous leftist guerrilla published in 1973 or 1974. Anonymous. “Yāddāshthā-
yi Zindān.” In ʿAṣr-i ʿAmal. 5. 78-93. This anonymous guerrilla references Zarkārī as an imprisoned guerrilla whose 
writing would have been familiar to anyone invested in the movement. 
431 Dihqānī, Ashraf. Hāmāsih-i Muqāvimat [Epic of Resistance]. Tehran: Nashr-i Mardum, 1353 / 1974. Print.  
432 It is because of the reputation garnered from this book and the events described therein that Dihqānī is described 
by Vahabzadeh as a “household name” among Iranian militants. There is some evidence that the OIPFG would have 
given Zarkārī’s text the same treatment they were to give to Dihqānī’s had they had the means in 1971-72. In 
Dihqānī’s introduction to the 2013 edition of Zarkārī’s text, she relays an anecdote regarding the publication of the 
two memoirs: “After the publication of Epic of Resistance, Comrade Hamid [Ashraf, then leader of the OIPFG] 
spoke approvingly of the appropriate and attractive print of that book with its red-colored titles and professional 
lettering, and said yearningly... ‘Would that it had been possible to publish Comrade Yūsif Zarkār’s book as nicely 
and with such nice lettering…unfortunately, at the time such a thing was impossible’” Zarkārī, 2012, 23. 
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politicized Iranians to this day.433 Principally concerned with the intimate details of painful 
prison practice, Dihqānī’s text has a different sort of pedagogical function than does that of 
Zarkārī. Epic of Resistance posits the seemingly paradoxical — or at least anti-liberal —position 
that, rather than weakening the prisoner, painful punishment techniques serve to strengthen the 
imprisoned militant through a process of cultivating the guerrilla body.  
 
Yūsif Zarkārī’s Memoir of a Guerrilla in Prison 
 
Yūsif Zarkārī, whose father died when he was nine years old, was born in 1952 on the 
eve of the U.S.-led coup in Iran and raised in Tehran to a Turkish-speaking Azerbaijani-Iranian 
family.434 In 1971, a nineteen-year old Zarkārī was arrested by SAVAK, interrogated, tortured, 
and imprisoned after only a short time as a member of the Marxist OIPFG. According to his 
narrative in Memoir of a Guerrilla in Prison, Zarkārī convinces his interrogators of his relative 
ignorance of the armed movement, and eventually earns his outright release in 1972 after a 
comparatively brief incarceration. Boasting that he manages to trick SAVAK by turning his 
captor’s ethnocentric assumptions about the inferiority of Azeri Turks against them, Zarkārī 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433 For an English translation, see: Dihqānī, Ashraf. Torture and Resistance in Iran: Memoirs of the Woman 
Guerrilla Ashraf Dihqānī. [s.l.]: The Iran Committee, 1978.  For a French translation, see: Dihqānī, Ashraf. 
Camarade, N’oublie Pas Le Vol, L’oiseau est Mortel: Souvenirs D’une Révolutionnaire Évadée de la Prison du 
Chah d’Iran. [s.l.]: Commission Conjointe des Peuples Iraniens et Palestinien, [n.d.]. Notably, Dihqānī is also 
referenced in some post-revolutionary prison writing as an exemplary model of resisting collusion with the state in 
the face of brutal torture. For instance, in Monira Baradaran’s Haqiqat-i Sadeh [Plain Truths.], a post-revolutionary 
prison memoir, Baradaran recounts a story in which a prison guard taunts her for not being as brave in her resistance 
as Dihqānī. Baradaran, Monira. (Raha. M.) Haqīqat-i Sādih. [Plain Truth.] 2nd ed. Lindenallee, Germany: Nima 
Verlag, 1379 / 2000. Print. In her own day, Dihqānī was lauded as exemplary in guerrilla discourses precisely 
because her fortitude under torture was so extraordinary, and her escape so incredible. In the anonymously authored 
PMOI pamphlet mentioned above, the author references Ashraf Dihqānī as a particularly heroic example of 
resistance under torture. The author writes, “In trying to torture her, Ashraf’s torturers were themselves tortured. All 
of them exhausted themselves, and still she said nothing.” Mujāhidīn-i Khalq, Sāzmān-i. Hūshyārī-yi Inqilābī: 
Vazīfīh-yi Yik Mubāriz Asīr dar Zindān, 1972. 54. 
434 All autobiographical information from Ashraf Dihqānī’s introduction to Zarkārī’s text. Dihqānī, Introduction to 
Khātirāt-i Yik Cherīk Dar Zindān. 9-27. 
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pretends to be a dim-witted and trusting youngster led astray by manipulative associates. It is 
through this charade, and by appearing to comply with SAVAK’s demands by feeding them 
(evidently false) information that Zarkārī secures his eventual freedom. This freedom, however, 
would be short-lived; Zarkārī immediately rejoined the ranks of the OIPFG and was killed by 
agents of the Shah in a shootout in Isfahan in 1973 at the age of twenty-one.  
With the guerrilla movement exponentially growing in popular exposure if not actual size 
in 1971-1972, and with many of early leaders and theorists of the movement already in prison or 
killed, innumerable would-be militant individuals and groups (both inside and outside of Iran) 
sought to join efforts with the OIPFG and PMOI. It is precisely this inexpert but increasingly 
radicalized readership that Yūsif Zarkārī addresses throughout Memoir of a Guerrilla in Prison, 
coldly recounting the details of his arrest and incarceration in order to communicate hard won 
lessons at a time that saw increasing police presence across universities, youth clubs, and 
religious centers. Zarkārī describes the early guerrilla movement as inexperienced, writing, “The 
armed movement was an undeveloped organism that was forced to mature under the crushing 
blows of the anti-revolutionaries.”435 Still, if the greenness of the guerrilla rank and file (and its 
student sympathizers) can be evidenced by the wave of arrests that rocked Iranian campuses and 
streets in the early 1970s, the Iranian state certainly had almost as much to learn in the militant 
era as did its adversaries. In a recent essay introducing a new edition of Zarkārī’s memoir — the 
first such reprint since its initial 1972 publication — Ashraf Dihqānī, Zarkārī’s fellow 
imprisoned guerrilla and prison memoirist writes: 
In his book, Comrade Zarkārī discusses the inexperience of the revolutionaries at 
the beginning of the struggle. He stresses that a great number of the arrests in this 
early stage were due to a lack of knowledge on the part of the revolutionaries 
regarding the enemy’s tactics. This is, in fact, an undeniable truth…Of course it 
should be added that in that particular historical moment, when everything was so 
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novel and first in the process of being developed, anti-revolutionary forces were 
as inexperienced in the new tactics as were their revolutionary counterparts. To be 
sure, with the passage of time they too gained experience in carrying out their 
reactionary crimes.”436 
 
It is in this context of novelty and inexperience that Zarkārī’s text was written, and as such it 
focuses on practicable tactical advice for the young movement. Notably, Zarkārī spends little 
space describing the Pahlavi state’s cruelty or violence, a favorite topic of that era’s guerrilla and 
student movement literature. Neither does he put forward anything approximating a political 
program. Instead, Zarkārī begins by rehearsing the major theoretical position of the young 
guerrilla movement: the absolute primacy of action (and the revolutionary importance of gaining 
experience through that action) over the navel gazing philosophizing of the earlier generation of 
Iranian leftists. He writes, “The events at Siahkal were like a fertile storm that then became a 
turning point in politics. The old dead ends were destroyed and a new path was opened for the 
freedom fighters [mubārizīn] of Iran. Armed struggle not only put an end to conjectural studying 
and theorizing behind closed doors, it also rendered the theories of that group of inactive 
intellectuals…unheeded.”437 Zarkārī’s argument represents the major guerrilla position and 
intervention of the day, insofar as young Fadāī militants sought to represent a break with the 
quietism of the Communist Tudeh (Masses) Party and the entirety of the Iranian left in the wake 
of the 1953 coup.438 Here, Zarkārī doesn’t name the Tudeh or any of its major theorists by name, 
but the implications of his words are clear: revolutionaries can no longer be expected to sit idly 
by and hope for conditions to change before they act; they must act in order for those conditions 
to change. To put it simply, for the OIPFG the action was the theory. And, because that action 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 Dihqānī, Ashraf. Introduction to Khātirāt-i Yik Cherīk Dar Zindān. 13.  
437 Zarkārī, 32.  
438 For a theoretical assessment of this break with the Tudeh, see Vahabzadeh, A Guerrilla Odyssey. 
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often led to arrest and torture, tactics to deal with the Pahlavi security apparatus were 
immediately a major concern of guerrilla theory and praxis. 
Zarkārī recounts the circumstances surrounding his arrest, which he believes to have 
stemmed from a lack of discipline in his actions. Indeed, discipline — coded as revolutionary 
vigilance, and touching on everything from comportment to dress to timeliness — is a recurrent 
theme in Zarkārī’s text. As such, Zarkārī carefully lays out strategies for militants in their various 
organizational comings and goings. He emphasizes the importance of remaining in regular 
contact with any member of the group with whom one is planning an action. If a comrade 
otherwise in routine contact falls out of touch even briefly with the member or members of the 
group with whom they are regularly meeting, that person or group can then destroy or move any 
incriminating evidence in case their associate has been arrested. If a comrade misses a set 
appointment time — typically according to Zarkārī, appointments were set two at a time — the 
next appointment should be skipped in the event that the comrade is in police custody and being 
used as bait for unsuspecting associates. Zarkārī lists examples of other fallen or arrested 
comrades who did not heed the instructions he lists and warns that their fate awaits those who do 
not heed his advice. These fallen comrades are, for Zarkārī, revolutionary martyrs to be 
remembered and lionized, but in order to actually defeat the Pahlavi state, the movement needs 
cadres capable of avoiding unnecessary sacrifice.  
 Typically, rank and file members of armed political groups only had contact with a few 
or even one other member of that group. They would see each other at set meeting times and 
places to get new information, assignments, or materials. An early strategy of the Pahlavi 
security forces was to arrest a suspected militant and then pressure him or her — typically 
through the threat or the use of violence — to share details of his or her next anticipated meeting. 
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The arrested individual would then be made by SAVAK to travel to that meeting spot and wait 
for his or her comrade while security officers lurked in the wings. When the unsuspecting 
guerrilla arrived, SAVAK would then pounce, arresting that person as well. This process would 
then be repeated by authorities hoping to eventually uncover and foil larger plots or groups. 
Zarkārī was similarly forced to give information about his meeting times and associates, though 
in Memoir of a Guerrilla in Prison he asserts that he routinely fed incorrect information to 
SAVAK agents during grueling interrogation sessions. As a result, Zarkārī recounts being taken 
to various meeting points around Tehran — often with tens of SAVAK agents and occasional 
gendarmes in tow — but never to a spot where a comrade was actually waiting for his arrival.  
 Absolute precision in movement is emphasized throughout the text. Guerrillas are warned 
to always be on time, to never forget a meeting or miss a meeting, to wait at the precisely agreed-
upon spot, to have a sense of the ordinary comings and goings of the meeting spot in advance, 
and to pay heed to every small detail.439 What is termed “revolutionary vigilance” in these texts, 
then, is a technique of disciplining the guerrilla body. Zarkārī notes that SAVAK will typically 
greatly outnumber their target; for Zarkārī there were twenty-five SAVAK agents sent after him 
in unmarked Ford and Landrover cars, having been tipped off to a meeting location by an 
arrested associate.440 Thus, attentiveness in examining the surroundings, including cars and 
persons, is emphasized as an important strategy in helping to allow a guerrilla avoid capture. 
Zarkārī lists what he believes to be reasons for his arrest; he asks readers to take extra care where 
he did not. The reasons that he lists include:  
1. Not paying attention to Zayd’s’ [the comrade with whom Zarkārī was to meet 
and who had informed on their meeting to the authorities] outer appearance (he 
had gotten skinner, and he looked extremely upset), 2. Not paying enough 
attention to the suspicious activities around our meeting place 3. Despite the fact 
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that Zayd was pretending not to see me, I went right towards him. 4. Not having 
anything with which to defend myself, including cyanide…which I would use to 
commit suicide in the event of capture.441  
 
Zarkārī reminds his readers that a guerrilla must be thoughtful in every one of his or her actions, 
particularly because the authorities have already limited the guerrilla movement’s opportunities 
and access so dramatically. Before undertaking any action, a guerrilla must consider every 
possibility from every angle:  
When you are on your way to a meeting, think about what you are doing…Who 
will I see at this meeting? Is it the first set meeting time [with this person] or 
second? Is there anything that implies that the situation is suspicious? Do I know 
the area of the meeting well? Do I have enough cyanide? Is my weapon 
completely ready?442 
 
Because the stakes are high, and because the state has significantly more resources than do the 
guerrillas, there is no room for error. Disciplined movement in is of paramount concern. 
Upon his arrest, Zarkārī was taken to the new but already notorious Evin Prison, where 
he was interrogated while awaiting sentencing.443 Evin had first opened its doors in 1971, with 
an initial plan for a capacity of 320 prisoners. 300 of these prisoners were to be held in two large 
communal blocks, with the other 20 to be held in solitary cells. By 1977, however, Evin had 
expanded many times over, and held over 1,500 prisoners, with 100 or more prisoners held in 
solitary confinement.444 It is in Evin that Zarkārī is tortured during long and grueling 
interrogation sessions during which he is punched, kicked, slapped, burned, and subjected to 
Iranian modernity’s most popular painful practice: the bastinado. In order to prepare others for 
the same treatment, Zarkārī outlines every physical abuse that he receives. He also meticulously 
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prisoners without trial or past their trial for many months and even years. At no point in the Pahlavi era was the legal 
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444 Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions, 105.  
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reports the interrogation questions that he was asked as well as his responses, which he claims 
helped him avoid divulging sensitive information while under duress:  
Q: Who do you have meetings planned with, and when and where? A: With a 
person whose name I don’t know…Q: How will this person arrive at the meeting 
place? A: It’s not clear. He comes a different way each time. Sometimes on foot, 
sometimes on a motorcycle, sometimes on bicycle…Q: What color is his 
motorbike…Q: If you are not successful in your first meeting, when is the time 
and place for the second meeting?445 
 
Later, Zarkārī is again questioned, this time in writing. He again reproduces the questions from 
this examination in detail, telling readers to remember what he has been asked in the event that 
they too are forced to answer similar questions:   
1. Your identity is completely known to us. List all of your activities in detail 
below. 2. Write all of the specifics of your relationship to Person A. 3. Write all of 
the details regarding Person B, including his address. 4. Write the names of all of 
the [political] books and pamphlets you have read. 5. You have been accused of 
membership in a group with communal outlook and procedures. Detail all of your 
activities with this group…7. Detail all information regarding any cellars and 
secret storage spaces, arms and explosives, photocopiers and typewriters, or 
pamphlets, books, and publications.446  
 
Zarkārī reminds his readers that it is essential to give as much incorrect or out-of-date 
information to the authorities as is possible. To do so under extreme physical duress, Zarkārī 
admits, without incriminating friends and allies is nearly impossible. This is a markedly different 
position than that of the PMOI pamphlet mentioned above, which claims that strength of 
character is all one needs to avoid confessing under torture. What, then, can a militant do in order 
to prepare for painful interrogation? Zarkārī argues that it is necessary to invent false names, 
places, and stories before one is arrested and to memorize this information and practice 
“confessing” these lies as though they are the truth.447 For Zarkārī, it is unhappily apparent that 
no amount of revolutionary fervor can erase the demoralizing affects of acute and painful torture. 
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To discipline oneself by repeatedly practicing for this “moment of truth” is a way to gird oneself 
against the possibility of breaking and divulging incriminating information, or forgetting the lies 
one has invented under duress in police custody. Thus, Zarkārī’s text presents an ethics of 
guerrilla praxis in which one cannot simply be a committed revolutionary through a belief in the 
cause, but must practice for a moment when one’s body is tested through painful punishment. 
“Discipline” in this formulation is an embodied ethical practice in which the militant transforms 
his or her capacity to endure pain through repetition even before he or she is interrogated, rather 
than something he or she “has” when faced with torture.448   
This call for disciplinary practice was crucial by 1972 when Zarkārī’s text was first 
published, because the growing sense among heavily surveilled Iranian militants and student 
activists was that it was not a question of if but when they would undergo arrest and torture. As a 
result, texts like Zarkārī’s provide detailed instructions for how to interact with the Pahlavi state. 
The information that these guerrilla prison discourses spread both in writing and through word of 
mouth cannot be taken for granted as having already been established as organizational common 
sense for the young movement in the early 1970s. On the contrary, it was precisely through these 
multiplying entanglements with the state security apparatus that a militant common knowledge 
about the Pahlavi policing and prisons arose. Some texts, like Zarkārī’s, advise an ethics of 
embodied practice in order to transform ordinary individuals into resistant subjectivities. Other 
political pamphlets and communiqués also outlined straightforward strategies on how to endure 
the painful SAVAK punishments; for instance, in one common example, militants are warned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448 This theorization of disciplinary practice has remarkable resonances to Saba Mahmood’s theorization in a much 
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not to eat or drink after arrest in order to more quickly pass out under torture.449 One former 
student activist and political prisoner with ties to the OIPFG claims that, in the early years of his 
student activism, older, more experienced comrades would pass along certain strategies in 
meetings on the University of Tehran campus. He recounts being repeatedly told to wear as 
many layers of clothing as possible to any street protest in order to better withstand beatings 
from police agents attempting to keep student activists in line through the use of batons, rifle 
butts, and truncheons.450 Due to the prevalence of accounts such as Zarkārī’s, even those political 
prisoners being arrested and interrogated for the first time began to experience prison as a sort of 
uncanny déjà vu, precisely because the world inside of the prison was so intimately described 
and so conceptually important in guerrilla discourses. One such example of Zarkārī’s 
influence in particular — the published prison notes of an anonymous leftist guerrilla from 1973 
or 1974 — rewards Zarkārī’s conviction that his text would provide a useful blueprint for others 
who followed in his path.451 In this essay, the guerrilla describes an incredible scene in which, 
because he had read Zarkārī’s text, the “atmosphere [upon first entering an interrogation center] 
was extremely familiar. In the face of all of their [SAVAK’s] actions, I was prepared. I was only 
surprised when they would leave out a step.”452 Alongside this emergent guerrilla common 
knowledge regarding the Pahlavi penal apparatus came a shared sense of humor regarding the 
guerrillas’ plight. For example, in the early 1970s young political prisoners referred to the 
SAVAK-run Qizil Qalih penitentiary in Tehran as “Hotel Saqi” or “Café Saqi” after the 
notorious prison warden there.453 This reference can be read as more than mere gallows humor, 
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450 MM, Personal interview, 11 November 2013. 
451 Anonymous. “Yāddāshthā-yi Zindān.” [“Prison Notes.”] In ʿAṣr-i ʿAmal. 5. 78-93.  
452 Ibid, 92. 
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because the prison cell was, after all, a premier social space for young activists to congregate in 
these years of the Pahlavi security state. Indeed, far from being the space of social death it is 
often assumed to be, prison had, on the contrary, become a premier site of social and political 
life. 
 
Ashraf Dihqānī’s Epic of Resistance 
 
 Born in Azerbaijan in 1949 to a working class family, Ashraf Dihqānī was politicized in 
the mid-‘60s through the influence of her older brother Bihrūz, who was a friend of leftist writer 
Samad Behrangi.454 Along with her brother, Dihqānī joined the ranks of the OIPFG in its early 
years, and was arrested, interrogated at Evin, and eventually imprisoned in Qasr Prison in 1971. 
It was from Qasr that she engineered her unlikely escape in 1973.455 Dihqānī remains arguably 
the most widely known “household name” from Iran’s guerrilla decade. In her own day, her 
prison writing was translated widely, quoted in anti-Shah literature around the world456, and 
often referenced by her peers.457 Unsurprisingly, Dihqānī’s escape from Qasr prison was the 
topic of a great deal of early lore among a sympathetic reading public, and the story circulated 
widely due to its incredible and unlikely nature. As I argue in the first chapter of this dissertation, 
the anti-Pahlavi movement was perpetually caught between wanting to advertise the absolutist 
brutality of SAVAK and the Shah’s prisons and wanting to inspire others to action by showing 
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456 For one such example, see Political Prisoners in the Oil States: Bahrain, Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia. Gulf 
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weaknesses in the armor of the state penal and policing apparatus. Dihqānī’s memoir was in part 
so popular because it managed to do both.458  
Despite Dihqānī’s notoriety, Epic of Resistance — by far Dihqānī’s if not the OIPFG’s 
most widely read text — has received little scholarly attention. In Tortured Confessions, Ervand 
Abrahamian mentions the text only in passing to note that it is the first prison memoir in Iran 
written by a woman.459 In his study on the OIPFG, Peyman Vahabzadeh discusses Dihqānī’s 
political career in some detail, outlining the decisive role she played in the schism in the OIPFG 
in the post-revolutionary period, but nonetheless gives Epic of Resistance short shrift. There are, 
I believe, two major reasons for this omission. The first is political, and related to Dihqānī’s role 
in the split of the OIPFG into two factions: the Majority and Minority factions, the latter of 
which was led by Dihqānī and refused to abandon armed struggle.460 Dihqānī’s insistence on the 
use of political violence long after most other militant groups had abandoned its efficacy has 
been described by most of her former comrades as embarrassing and suicidal adventurism not fit 
to meet the political needs of the day. Most scholars have similarly concluded — not incorrectly 
— that Dihqānī’s continuing theoretical defense of armed struggle is “banal,” “naïve,” and 
“unsophisticated.”461 The second and key reason for the scholarly inattention to prison texts 
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459 Abrahamian, Ervand. Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Recantation in Modern Iran. Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1999. Print. Interestingly, the overwhelming majority of post-revolutionary prison memoirs – a 
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460 In the immediate aftermath of the revolution’s success, the faction that came to be known as the OIPFG Majority 
abandoned armed resistance in order to move the struggle into the political field. Dihqānī and her associates refused 
this major tactical and philosophical shift, and also refused, unlike the Majority, to back the Khomeinist movement. 
Indeed, Dihqānī remains adamant about the centrality of armed action to any successful political program to this 
day. For a historical overview of this split, see Vahabzadeh, 149-155. For an example of Dihqānī’s current 
unchanged position, see her introduction to the new edition of Zarkārī’s memoir. Of course, the main players in the 
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in the aftermath of the revolution.  
461 Vahabzadeh, A Guerrilla Odyssey. While I am sympathetic to Vahabzadeh’s critique of Dihqānī’s theoretical 
contribution, it should nonetheless be noted that he interviews those members of the Fadāīyān most closely 
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typified by Dihqānī (as well as other texts I read in this chapter) is their perceived intellectual 
insignificance to Iranian Marxism specifically and to political theory in general. To be sure, these 
texts largely do not have the theoretical sophistication of the works of Bizhan Jazani or Masoud 
Ahmadzadeh. Still, it was this prison literature and not the theorists’ work that made its mark as 
the most widely circulated guerrilla writing. Against this scholarly silence, I argue that these 
popular prison texts represent the major contributions of the guerrilla movement, insofar as they 
best reveal the powerful nexus of politics, ethics, and sentiment typified by the movement at the 
height of its popularity. This dismissal of Dihqānī as a political theorist has led to a critical 
oversight of the cultural and popular effects of her work on the politics of an era with which she 
became synonymous for so many.  
Published two years after Zarkārī’s prison writings, Ashraf Dihqānī’s text begins with her 
capture by SAVAK agents, her detention, and her immediate introduction to the most intensely 
painful aspects of Pahlavi interrogation tactics. The first portion of Epic of Resistance is 
specifically concerned with the body as disciplined through relationships of pain. Dihqānī is 
primarily concerned with bearing the pain — which in the first interrogations are meted out by 
whipping the soles of Dihqānī’s feet and then agonizingly making her walk the corridors of Evin 
— long enough to give her comrades an opportunity to find a new hideout.462 It is not only for 
this practical reason that Dihqānī bears the punishment. As she explains, her experience has a 
double pedagogical significance; Dihqānī tells us that she endured the physical abuse not only 
because she knew that her writing would inspire further anti-Pahlavi activity, but also because it 
had the effect of disciplining her into a still more committed militant. In this sense, Dihqānī’s 
praxis opposes the liberal logic that posits pleasure as an opposite of pain. Rather, she welcomes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
associated with the Majority Faction (namely, Farrokh Negahdar and Mehdi Fatapour) but doesn’t speak to Dihqānī 
herself.  
462 Dihqānī, Hāmāsih-i Muqāvimat. 15. 
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and even celebrates pain because it has the capacity to discipline her into a more ethical subject. I 
should be careful to note that my aim here is not to glorify Dihqānī’s actions in the same terms 
that she does — that is, as heroic resistance. My argument is predicated on an understanding that 
insists that power produces its own responses (among them resistance), and that these inherently 
socially mediated responses produces new forms of embodied personhood as well as political 
collectivity.   
It is noteworthy that Zarkārī’s and Dihqānī’s texts have markedly different relationships 
to questions of pain and discipline. Zarkārī acknowledges that, due to the sheer magnitude of 
pain inflicted on political prisoners, torture is impossible for many of even the most committed 
militants to endure. As such, he is primarily concerned with tactics for surviving interrogation 
despite pain. This is why he insists to his readership — those who will soon experience painful 
punishment — that they must engage in an ethics of practice that will allow them to withstand 
torture even if their own will fails. They must train their thoughts and actions before arrest, when 
they are not in pain, in such a way that what they want to say under interrogation simply spills 
out of them while under duress as though it is the truth. Dihqānī, on the other hand, takes it as an 
a priori fact that a “true” revolutionary will not break under torture, regardless of painful 
punishment. For Dihqānī, the disciplinary action is not to be practiced alone, before 
imprisonment, but rather through the process of painful punishment itself. Because one’s 
commitment is enough to guard one against confessing, torture itself is the disciplinary 
mechanism through which an already strong militant is changed into an even more capable anti-
state subject. 
Epic of Resistance is an important entry into the 1970s wave of state and anti-state 
confessional literature, insofar as Dihqānī’s testimony — complete with its narrative of resisting 
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torture and eventual escape — represents the other side of the coin of the forced confessions of 
that era, many of which were widely publicized by a state attempting to publicly stage its own 
power. Dihqānī’s text is, at its core, a work of political propaganda. Still, despite her self-
presentation as an unyielding revolutionary in an unbeatable, inevitable movement, cracks 
appear from beginning. There are number of moments in the book, for instance, where Dihqānī 
laments the effectiveness of the “enemy’s whip” in breaking down the resolve of her seemingly 
committed fellow prisoners, Marxist, Islamist, and otherwise. The state with which she came 
face-to-face in Evin and Qasr was concerned not only with detaining Dihqānī, but also with 
producing her as a reformed and repentant subject. In this era, the Pahlavi state intensified the 
practice of coercing confessional public statements by its political detainees, a pedagogical 
practice that would later be pushed by the Islamic Republic to still further extremes of 
publicity.463 Indeed, the state sought to do so using the very embodied disciplinary practices that 
Dihqānī believed were instead transforming her into an ethical revolutionary subject. These 
disciplinary encounters — seen in part as a battle for the support of ordinary Iranians — took 




 In Epic of Resistance, Ashraf Dihqānī describes her experience of physical pain in great 
detail. She writes that during her first interrogation:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
463 For more on this practice, see Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions. For some examples of a post-revolutionary 
political “confession,” see the text of the televised confessions of members of the PMOI. Confessions of Some 
Highranking MKO Terrorists As Aired on IRI TV. Tehran: Sāzmān-i Tablīghāt-i Islāmī, 1982. Print. 
Print. For Tudeh party confessions, see The Promised Defeat of Marxism: Confessions of Leaders of the Dissolved 
Tudeh Party of Iran. 1984, [Tehran] (n.p.). Print. 
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The mercenaries tied me to the bed. The room was full of them. They had come to watch, 
and if necessary, to help one another. It seems that the torture of a revolutionary girl was 
interesting for them...The main torturer was Captain Niktab, and others helped him. The 
whip was passed from person to person. They had me tied to a bed and were whipping 
the soles of my feet. I was in a great deal of pain.464 
 
The figure of the body in pain is invoked repeatedly and consistently throughout guerrilla prison 
discourses. But what is this embodied experience of state-inflicted pain, and what does it — and 
its representation — do? What does it mean to name pain or torture as such? And what kind of 
political collectivities do these expressions of pain engender? In The Body in Pain, her influential 
meditation on pain and torture, Elaine Scarry argues that pain is an obstinately private 
experience. Because pain cannot be shared or even grasped by anyone who is not experiencing 
that precise sensation, it is inherently unspeakable and unknowable linguistically. This is why, 
for Scarry, the torture cell is a black void that does not communicate.465 She writes, “Whatever 
pain achieves, it achieves in part through its unsharability, and it ensures this unsharability 
through its resistance to language.”466 In other words, for Scarry pain falls outside of the scope of 
social relations. Left outside of language, pain ostensibly produces no social effects.  
Scarry departs from Wittgenstein’s pivotal discussion of the linguistic limits inherent to 
the naming of human sensations, and in particular painful feeling.467 Amidst a discussion of these 
limits, Wittgenstein asks, “What gives us so much as the idea that living beings, things, can 
feel?” [emphasis in original].468 Here, Wittgenstein is concerned with the gap between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 Dihqānī, Hāmāsih-i Muqāvimat, 46.  
465 Scarry, Elaine. The Body in Pain: The Making and the Unmaking of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1985.  For an important critique of the political implications of Scarry’s work, see the chapter “Torture and Taboo” 
in Moyn’s Human Rights and the Uses of History. Moyn, Samuel. Human Rights and the Uses of History. New 
York: Verso, 2014. Print. 
466 For Scarry, to be in pain is the marker of absolute certainty, to hear of another’s pain is the marker of absolute 
uncertainty; this lack of sureness occurs at the level of language. Thus, pain’s unspeakability (and thus 
unknowability) is the foremost constitutive marker of that experience. Scarry, The Body in Pain, 4.  
467 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations (Third Edition). Trans. G.E.M, Anscombe. Upper Saddle 
River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1958. Print. 
468 Ibid, 57. 
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experience and linguistic expression for all privately felt sensations. Wittgenstein discusses 
painful feeling at great length, precisely because he wishes to theorize how human beings come 
to “know” (and thus speak) their pain, as well as to “know” (or not know) when they are 
confronted by another’s body-in-pain.469 Wittgenstein argues that pain is mediated through 
language — itself inherently a social concept — and specifically through the practice of naming. 
But pain is not only a question of pure language, if such a thing exists. What is named pain lives 
in the body and bears a relationship to the world outside of the private experience of that body. 
In Wittgenstein’s formulation, we get closer to apprehending Bozorg Alavi’s meaning in his 
assertion that, in Reza Shah’s prisons, “When I see someone being whipped, I feel as though I 
myself am enduring the beating.”470 (There are, as Wittgenstein reminds us, outward signs of 
pain, such as screaming, crying, or bleeding.) Alavi’s and Wittgenstein’s understanding mirrors 
what Veena Das has argued is the ethical component of naming and understanding pain.471 I 
argue that what is evident, though not explicitly stated, in Wittgenstein’s work is that the 
application, expression, and knowledge of pain are arbitrated through the world of the social, 
which is itself produced through power’s effects (though of course power is not particularly the 
concern of Wittgenstein’s philosophy). In other words, we come to know pain through the social 
world, which itself is mediated through relations of power. Similarly, Talal Asad argues that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
469 For Wittgenstein, the question is in part one of naming and thus of shared language. He writes, “What would it be 
like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to 
teach a child the use of the word ‘tooth-ache.’’ Well, let’s assume that the child is a genius and itself invents a name 
for the sensation!—But then, of course, he couldn’t make himself understood when he used the word.—So does he 
understand the name without being able to explain its meaning to anyone?—But what does it mean to say that he has 
‘named his pain?’—How has he done this naming of pain?! And whatever he did, what was its purpose?” Ibid, 92. 
470 Alavi, Bozorg. Varaq Pārih Hā-yi Zindān [Scrap Papers from Prison]. Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1357 / 1978. Print. 
471 For Das, understanding or believing in another’s pain is a question of ethics. She writes, “The absence of any 
standing languages of pain is perhaps symptomatic of the fact that I cannot separate my pain from my expression for 
it—another way of saying this is that my expression of pain compels you in unique ways—you are not free to 
believe or disbelieve me—our future is at stake.” Das, Veena. Life and Words: Violence and the Descent into the 
Ordinary. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2007. Print. 39. She further writes, “[t]he denial of the 
other’s pain is not about the failings of the intellect but the failings of the spirit. In the register of the imaginary, the 




although the pain felt by an individual cannot be identically experienced by an outside observer, 
however empathetic (that is to say, that there is “always an irreducible excess in pain”), this 
excess cannot and does not encompass the entire social complex of painful feeling.472 This is 
because for Asad, pain is an action rather than something that is merely applied to or 
experienced by a passive subject. Asad’s concern is to subvert a liberal secular reading of pain as 
a private experience that which much be eliminated by an agentive (rather than passive) 
individual in order to engender its opposite, namely pleasure. I further contend that pain-as-
action and the social relations mediated by pain produce the conditions of possibility that create 
new political worlds, which often present themselves as politics-in-opposition. This complicates 
a Foucauldian notion of discipline, in which power produces individual subjects through 
institutional techniques of governance. In the Iranian prison, I argue, disciplinary power reveals 
itself to have an unintended social and political capacity. In other words, to evoke Susan Buck-
Morss, power Pahlavi prisons produced their own possibilities for politics and resistance.473 
Let us refer briefly back to Dihqānī’s Epic of Resistance. During a particularly 
treacherous interrogation, Dihqānī is left alone for a moment with a guard who is charged only 
with watching her. She writes, “The ropes around my ankles were so tight that the my blood 
couldn’t flow and my feet had turned black and blue. The bones against which the rope was 
pulling around my ankles and also my wrists — which were also tied tightly — were in extreme 
pain [dard-i shadīd]. I couldn’t move my head at all…In any case, I was left like this with one of 
the guards. The entire time we were together the guard appeared very uncomfortable. I felt 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472 See the essay “Thinking About Agency and Pain” in “Asad, Talal. 2003. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, 
Islam, Modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.  
473 Buck-Morss, Susan. Thinking Past Terror: Islamism and Critical Theory on the Left. New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company, 2003.   
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limitlessly happy.”474 At other points in the text, Dihqānī laughs in the faces of those torturing 
her, recalling Foucault’s insight about laughter, law, and the power over life and death.475 Here, 
the endurance of pain is represented as a practice through which Dihqānī — and the political and 
ethical collectivities forming around her — can be transformed. And, as I note above, it was in 
large part around the issue of Pahlavi penal practice that anti-state activity cohered. Though it 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474 Dihqānī, Hāmāsih-i Muqāvimat.  144.  
475 “[D]iscourses of truth that provoke laughter and have the institutional power to kill are, after all, in a society like 
ours, discourses that deserve some attention. These everyday discourses of truth that kill and provoke laughter are at 
the very heart of our judicial system.” Foucault, Michel. Abnormal: Lectures at the College de France 1974-1975. 




Fig. 2: A political cartoon of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi as a masked man hiding a prison.476 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
476 Anonymous. Ṭāqutnāmih. n.p., n.d. Print. This image is culled from an Iranian revolution-era pamphlet full of 







 “Prison? Who understands what this word really means? For most people, this word is a mute 
concept. But you must look just one time behind the iron bars to [a prisoner’s] dried and 
cracked lips, and his bruised nose and bony face to begin to guess or at least try to guess what 
this word really signifies.” 
— Bozorg Alavi477 
  
 
Although little studied by contemporary scholars, the central topics of this dissertation — 
prisons and punishment throughout modern Iranian history — have nonetheless been subjects of 
great significance to Iranians themselves. Throughout the twentieth and now well into the 
twenty-first century, Iranians have written on, organized their political activism around, and 
produced copious art, literature, and music contemplating the relationship between power, 
punishment, prison, and citizenship in a modern authoritarian state. As I try to show throughout 
this study, this eruption of discourses on prisons and punishment is related to the transformative 
establishment of the modern legal and penal order in late Qajar and Pahlavi Iran, which altered 
social, public, and political life in myriad novel and unexpected ways. As such, this dissertation 
represents an initial entry in a much-needed inquiry on the history of punishment in Iran, but 
cannot by itself be an exhaustive study. There are, to be sure, myriad texts, testimonials, and 
documents related to Iranian prisons and punishments left to examine, due to the terrible but 
inarguable fact that the archive of modern Iranian punishment is regrettably vast. It is my hope 
that subsequent scholarship looks at both aspects of Qajar and Pahlavi punishment that I have not 
examined in detail as well as the significant archive of prisons and punishment in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




contemporary Islamic Republic of Iran. I believe that both this dissertation and future inquiries 
into these subjects are mandatory for understanding modern and contemporary Iran, and that the 
very enormity of the Iranian archive of punishment is that which most clearly demonstrates the 
need for studies such as this work. 
Beyond its specific and bounded historical concerns, this dissertation is also a study on 
the nature of power in the modern state. Although I take to heart Foucault’s rejoinder that we 
should be attentive to the dispersed nature of modern forms of power, this inquiry into the 
Iranian prison reminds us that we must not forget that modern power also has in its arsenal 
techniques that are necessarily concentrated and naked. Still, the effects of power — even 
concentrated state power such as that encountered in the prison — are typically diffuse and often 
unexpected. It is precisely for this reason that a modern state apparatus specifically committed to 
suppressing all dissent can nonetheless help produce the conditions of possibility for alternative 
social and political forms that could not have existed without those very repressive measures.  
Throughout this dissertation I show that both techniques of punishment as well as 
responses to those techniques have developed and varied over time. That is to say, punishment 
techniques are not natural, stable outgrowths of forms of governance (that is to say, we cannot 
speak coherently of “fascist punishment,” “liberal punishment,” “Islamic punishment,” etc.), but 
are rather historically contingent practices that fluctuate and evolve in the shifting arsenal of 
modern power. One can find an illustrative example of this phenomenon in the prison writing of 
novelist Bozorg Alavi, whose epochal Reza Shah-era prison memoirs reveal the degree to which 
the techniques and practices of both the state and its prisoners were learned through experience 
and experimentation. Alavi tells readers that Pahlavi-era prisoners’ lives were ever increasingly 
regulated by a modernizing state learning how to most effectively discipline and punish. Just as 
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importantly, he notes, it was within prison that otherwise ordinary people could, with repetition 
and practice, learn to endure any difficulty: 
The most difficult passions can be endured. A human being can get used to anything. 
Hunger, cold, all manner of bothers, and even torture — as long as they are repeated — 
can eventually be tolerated…I saw prisoners at Qasr shiver through the freezing cold 
nights with barely a blanket and nonetheless wake up the next morning in good spirits.478  
 
Discipline in this iteration is not merely something that happens to or is inflicted on a prisoner, 
but rather a more complicated process through which the prisoner’s body and capabilities are 
transformed. 
Importantly, Alavi notes that it would be “impossible” for anyone living an “ordinary 
life” to truly comprehend prison existence.479 Texts such as Alavi’s, then, bring what he terms 
the “mute concept” of the prison into public view, insofar as it is in part through these discourses 
that punishment techniques are implicated as public practice. That is to say, punishment in 
Iranian prison discourses is not simply a private experience, but rather a constellation of 
embodied disciplinary practices that have pubic implications for larger questions of ethics, 
justice, and citizenship. It is for these larger ethical and political and (and indeed, often painful) 
reasons that Iranians have so long been preoccupied with the issue of modern prisons. It is my 
hope that this dissertation contributes in some way to the ethical project exemplified by the best 
of these discourses.   
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